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This thesis consists of five essays: An introductory essay and four essays within the topic of
ageing, health and labour market participation. In the introduction I motivate the research
questions, discuss how it relates to empirical economics and summarise each of the four
papers.
The first project studies how a reform that changed the monetary incentives to delay
retirement affect health and healthcare utilisation. The identification strategy relies on the
2011 Norwegian pension reform that increased the monetary incentives to remain employed
for nearly half of the private sector workers at age 62. Before 2011, nearly half of the
private sector and the entire public sector had access to early retirement (ER) pension. ER
pension embodied certain aspects that could create disincentives to remain employed once
reaching the ER eligibility age. First, people who retired with full ER pension continued
accumulating pension points as if they had remained employed until the normal retirement
age of 67. Second, the combination of earnings and ER pension faced an earnings test
that proportionally reduced future pension entitlements. Instead of increasing the age at
which individuals could retire with ER pensions, an important aspect of the 2011 pension
reform was the introduction of flexible claiming together with employment, and the removal
of the earnings test. I exploit these changes in the empirical analysis, and identify the
effect of the reform by comparing potential changes in the health and employment of private
sector workers, who in the absence of the reform, would have been entitled to the full ER
pension, to public sector workers. Public sector workers are suitable as a comparison group,
since workers in this sector experienced no change in ER pensions. I use several objective
measures of health and healthcare utilisation. These are acute hospitalisations and hospital
days following an acute hospitalisations, number of visits to a general practitioner (emergency
room or health clinic) together with three diagnoses on cardiovascular, musculoskeletal and
psychological issues, and the probability to die by age 64. The results from this paper are
twofold. First, I document an average decrease in the probability of full retirement at ages
62–64, by around 10 percentage points, with a corresponding increase in the probability of
remaining employed at the same ages of around 8.5 percentage points. Second, I show that
these results have no clear side effect on health. The results indicate that there is a reduction
in hospital days for the entire sample, and the probability of dying by age 64 for females.
However, I find some indications of an increase in the probability of experiencing an acute
hospitalisation for higher educated people, and I find an increase in cardiovascular issues
among females. I conclude that a time-frame of 2 years leads to modest changes in objective
measures of health and healthcare utilisation.
The second project investigate the short term effect of retirement on age. To identify
the causal effect of retirement, we employ an regression discontinuity (RD) design. RD
exploits institutional settings that determine access to a treatment. The idea is that the
treatment (retirement) is determined by a running variable (age), reaching a known threshold
(the statutory retirement age) that discontinuously change the probability to retire. The
discontinuity gap in health at the cutoff age of 67 identifies the treatment effect. We assess
the health effects of retirement at age 67, which is an important policy contribution since
current retirement reforms typically aim at increasing the retirement age. We use both
survey and administrative data to study the short-term effect of retirement. We belive that
our health measures, collectively, will provide important insight into the multidimensional
effects of retirement on health. The empirical findings of the paper show that there is a
sizeable and positive effect of retirement on physical health. In contrast, we find no effect of
retirement on acute hospitalisations or mortality. The results shows that while individuals, in
the short term, experience a change in self-perceived heath, this does not necessarily translate
into a change in more objective measures of health. We also assess the effect by socioeconomic
status. Economic theory predicts that individuals with low socioeconomic status have to rely
more heavily on their health as an input to the labour market compared to individuals with
higher socioeconomic status. This is exactly what we found when considering the subjective
measures of health; in contrast, objective of health mask no such heterogeneity. Altogether,
this paper adds to a large body of literature on the relationship between retirement and
health. We conclude that while retirees may regard their health better compared to those
who are just below the statutory retirement age, this is only informative to the extent that
it reflects self-rated health and not objective measures of health.
The third project studies a targeted policy aimed at workers aged 60 in Norway, namely
the one-week extra holiday that employees aged 60 and above are entitled to by law. Until
2009, the length of vacation depended on the month of birth in the year an employee turned
60. We exploit this institutional setting in a sharp regression discontinuity design. The
probability of receiving an extra week of vacation changed sharply depending on whether a
worker was born in August or September. The institutional detail created a unique quasi-
experimental setting: only individuals born between January and August were entitled to
an extra week of vacation in the same year, whereas individuals born between September
and December had to wait until the subsequent year for the extra week. We found that
an increase in entitlement to vacation had no effect on sickness absence exceeding 16 days.
Moreover, we found a decrease in the number of sick notes as authorised by a physician, but
the effect is not robust to different specifications. The subsample estimates show that an
increase in entitlement to vacation resulted in a significant decrease in the number of sick
notes for women and individuals with high school as the highest level of education attained.
For females, the point estimates corresponds to a reduction in sick-notes of 24%, whereas
for individuals prone to sickness absence, the point estimates corresponds to a reduction of
around 38%. However, turning to cause specific diagnoses of musculoskeletal, cardiovascular
and psychological issues, we found no effect. Since we could not actually observe if the
individuals actually used their entitled vacation in the year in question, the results are the
intention-to-treat effect of being made eligible for treatment. The findings have important
policy implications as a growing share of people are nearing retirement, and around 25% on
disability insurance in Norway are aged 60-64. Targeted policies that adapt to the needs and
preferences of employees as they get older may be of importance to mitigate this problem,
but the paper questions the extent of the health-argument of increased vacation at age 60.
The fourth project study the labour market responses for individuals whose spouse expe-
rienced a health shock. Serious illness can have adverse consequences for the person with ill
health and we study how the other spouse’s cope with such events. The paper’s identification
strategy consists of an event study in which we assume that the event (the health shock) is
difficult to predict regardless of the presence of any risk factor. We define a health shock by
focusing on a particular set of outcomes that are assumed to stem from a major life event.
We link these outcomes to the unique administrative data. First, we identify individuals
whose spouse passed away due to ischemic heart disease, stroke or a transport accident.
Second, we identify individuals whose spouse was admitted to the hospital because of an
acute, non-planned admission, as a result of three conditions: myocardial infarction, stroke
or congestive heart failure. We find that individuals’ whose spouse experiences a fatal health
shock endure a reduction in both earnings and employment. The effect is significant and
relatively high for widowers, whose income decreases by around 8%, which is persistent for
the next five years after the death of their spouse. We find no effect on widows’ earnings, but
both widows and widowers experience a decrease in employment. On average, widows and
widowers reduce their employment by 2% and 3%, respectively. We document large flows of
liquid assets after the death of a spouse, which potentially offset some of the lost earnings,
but we find no clear pattern when analysing the effects by education and age. We find that
a spouse’s non-fatal health shock results in no significant effect on income and employment.
We do find a drop in income for spouses who experiences a non-fatal health shock, but this
does not seem to affect the other spouse’s.
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Chapter 2:
The Health Effects of a Pension Reform. Evidence From a Change in
Monetary Retirement Incentives

The Health Effects of a Pension Reform:





This paper examines the effect of retirement on health and healthcare utilisation. To
accomplish this, I exploit the Norwegian 2011 pension reform that increased the mon-
etary incentives to delay retiring for nearly half of the private sector workers at age
62. I take advantage of rich panel data and estimate the effect on health and labour
market participation at ages 62–64 years. The intention-to-treat estimates shows that
the targeted group of workers did increase their labour market participation at these
ages. The results on health, however, are mixed. For the entire sample, I find no effect
on acute hospitalisation, hospital days, visits to a physician or diagnoses related to
cardiovascular, musculoskeletal or phsychological issues, or on the probability of dying
by the age of 64. There is a degree of heterogeneity in the outcomes, and these re-
sults indicate that the probability of experiencing an acute hospitalisation increased for
individuals with high education. Yet, for females, the probability of dying by age 64
decreased. Altogether, the results suggests that gender and education are important
sources of heterogeneity, but increased employment for workers aged 62 is in general
not coupled with a worsening in health or an increase in public healthcare expenditures
through changes in objective measures of health and healthcare utilisations.
Keywords: health, retirement, mortality, inpatient care, intention-to-treat estimates
JEL Codes: I10, I18, J14, J26
∗The author would like to thank Astrid Grasdal, Arild Aakvik, Elisabeth Fevang and Eirik Strømland
for valuable comments.
†Department of Economics, University of Bergen
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1 Introduction
Demographic trends projects that the global numbers of adults aged 65 years and older
will double to around two billion by 2050 (World Health Organization, 2015).1 The same
demographic forecasts show that the fraction of retired relative to employed will decrease, and
as a result, several European countries either has or is on the verge of implementing policies
aimed at prolonging individuals’ working life (Hofäcker, 2015).2 This raises two important
policy questions about individuals affected by such reforms. First, on the supply side, does
the restructuring of the pension systems have its desired effects in that workers postpone
retirement and retain their position as employees? Second, on the spillover side, if retirement
is postponed, will this be coupled with any adverse effects on workers’ health? From a policy
standpoint, the potential financial benefits of increased employment for older workers stems
from workers postponing retirement. Yet, any fiscal gain from increased employment can
potentially be offset if this leads to a worsening in health and an increase in the demand for
health care.
Understanding the potential influence of a prolonged working life on health is important,
but causal estimates are inherently difficult because of the simultaneous nature of health and
labour market participation. Health affects people’s employment decisions, whereas employ-
ment affects people’s health, in a negative or positive direction. Thus, credible identification
requires an exogenous shock that directly affects individuals’ employment decision but not
their health. Furthermore, what constitutes as a good measure of health and how to credibly
measure health remain an open question in the literature.3
To overcome the potential challenges of endogeneity, the setting of the present paper is
the Norwegian 2011 pension reform. The Norwegian old age system is based on a national
insurance scheme (NIS). The NIS system provides a minimum pension benefit for all retirees
in Norway once they reach the normal retirement age (NRA) of 67, but before 2011, the
entire public sector and nearly half the private sector had access to early retirement (ER)
pension. The ER scheme was introduced to combat the rising share of disability insurance
(Bratberg et al., 2004), but this came at a cost of disincentives to remaining employed. First,
workers eligible for ER could fully retire at age 62, but a full ER pension was coupled with
an earnings test that implied a high marginal tax for any worker who wished to combine
1Recent forecasts by Statistics Norway show that the share of individuals aged 70 or older will increase
from 12 percent in 2018 to 21 percent in 2060 (Syse et al. (2018)). United Nations (2015) projects that the
share of individuals aged 80 or older in Norway will increase from 4.2% in 2015 to 8.8% in 2050, and that
the share of individuals aged 65 or older will increase from 16% in 2015 to 25% in 2060.
2Several countries have increased the mandatory retirement age, e.g. Israel from 65 to 67, Ireland from
65 to 70 and UK have abolished the compulsory retirement age (Hofäcker, 2015).
3I discuss the different outcomes of health in the next section.
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retirement and employment.4 Second, individuals who retired with full ER pensions accrued
pension benefits as if they had remained employed until the NRA. Economic disincentives for
prolonged employment, and preferences for leisure among older workers, represent prominent
explanations for why a large share of workers retire with full ER pensions (Kudrna (2017)).
Instead of increasing the age at which individuals could retire with full ER pensions,
an important aspect of the 2011 pension reform was the introduction of flexible claiming
together with employment, and the removal of the earnings test that proportionally reduced
ER entitlements for people who combined ER pensions with employment. This means that
workers can combine work and retirement without facing a high implicit tax on income
through the means of an earnings test. In the private sector, all workers could now start
claiming NIS old-age pensions at age 62, conditional on earnings above a certain thresh-
old.5 As a result, the full ER pension in the private sector was completely abolished and
implemented as a top-up annuity.
I exploit these changes in the empirical analysis, and identify the effect of the reform
by comparing potential changes in the health and employment of private sector workers,
who, in the absence of the reform, would have been entitled to the ER pension, to public
sector workers. More specifically, I exploit the cohort variation in the timing of the reform
and compare cohorts born in 1949 and 1950 with the counterfactual health of cohorts 1945-
1947, with the inclusion of public sector workers as a comparison group to account for age
differentials and other general period effects.6 Public sector workers are particularly suitable
as a comparison group, since workers in this sector experienced no change in ER pensions.7
To investigate whether the prolonged employment has an effect on health, and if so,
which aspects of health, I use several objective measures of health and healthcare utilisa-
tion. First, I use visits to a physician along with three corresponding diagnoses, as follows:
musculoskeletal, cardiovascular, and psychological diagnoses. Cardiovascular disease (CVD)
is the leading cause of death globally (World Health Organization, 2015), whereas mus-
culoskeletal and psychological diagnoses are among the leading contributors to disability
worldwide, and hence, an important aspect of individuals’ employment (see Kessler et al.
(2003), Murray and Lopez (1997) and World Health Organization (2002, 2015, 2018)). From
4Labour earnings below $1800 (in 2016 amounts) was considered as a ‘grace-amount’, in which no ad-
justments in benefits occurred. Earnings above this resulted in a proportional reduction in future benefits.
5After the implementation of the reform, public sector workers could give up their entitlements in favour
of the new NIS old-age pension system. However, this was not economically favourable and few people have
chosen to do so (Hernæs et al., 2016).
6A special set of transitional rules were in place for the 1948-cohort, and consequently, as will be explained
in the institutional section, this cohort is not included in the analysis.
7A life-expectancy adjustment was introduced for public sector workers as well, but at age 67, which is
the statutory retirement age in Norway.
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the national patient register (NPR), I identify all acute hospitalisations with corresponding
days hospitalised, and from the cause of death (CAD) register, I include information of the
month in which a person died. Altogether, this provides a comprehensive picture of average
changes in health and healthcare utilisation at both the intensive and extensive margins, in
the years after the reform, for individuals aged 62–64.
The results from this paper are twofold. First, I find an average decrease in the probability
of full retirement at ages 62–64, by around 10 percentage points, with a corresponding
increase in the probability of remaining employed at the same ages of around 8.5 percentage
points. As these outcomes may mask important heterogeneity, I further investigate the
outcomes by gender and educational level and find that there are no differences among
genders, but that the reform affected lower educated individuals to a greater extent. Second,
I show that these results have no clear side effect on health. The results indicate that there
is a reduction in hospital days for the entire sample, and the probability of dying by age
64 for females. However, I find some indications of an increase in the probability of acute
hospitalisation for higher educated people, and I find an increase in cardiovascular issues
among females.
One possible explanation for the findings is that the health outcomes have a low incidence
rate. This means that any change in health may not be traceable to the objective measures of
health. I document that a timeframe of 2 years leads to modest changes in objective measures
of health and healthcare utilisation, which potentially has important policy implications.
Increased employment for workers aged 62 is potentially not coupled with a worsening in
health or an increase in public healthcare expenditures through changes in objective measures
of health and healthcare utilisations.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion of previous literature.
Section 3 discusses the Norwegian pension system and the implications of the 2011 pension
reform. Section 3 discusses the data, construction of the treatment and control groups,
and outcomes. Section 5 discusses the methodological framework and presents the paper‘s
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Retirement and health: a literature review
Early work on the relationship between retirement and health documented a negative cor-
relation between early retirement and health (see Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) for a review).
However, this association does not control for selection into early retirement through poor
health, because those who retire early are likely to have worse health compared with those
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who maintain their employment status after age 62. Hence, studies using regression methods
on cross-sectional or longitudinal data or a fixed-effects approach are likely biased because
of the reverse causality stemming from bad health as a predictor of early retirement.
More recent studies on the association between retirement and health have moved toward
methods that seek to solve the problem with selection and reverse causality through a quasi-
experimental design (for example Neuman (2008); Rohwedder and Willis (2010); Hernæs
et al. (2013); Gorry et al. (2015); Hallberg et al. (2015); Bloemen et al. (2017)). These
studies relate to two (somewhat overlapping) empirical approaches, by exploiting either
quasi-experimental variation through reforms or age-specific retirement incentives in a two-
step instrumental variable (IV) approach. Yet, conflicting findings continue to be reported
on the the effect of retirement. This can (in part) be explained by the variety of econometric
methods, as well as the different measures of health used in the empirical analyses. The
outcomes can be divided into subjective measures of health (e.g. self-rated health and
objective measures of health (e.g. hospitalisations or mortality). In an excellent review in
Currie and Madrian (1999), the concept of how to measure health is discussed. The authors
conclude that the estimated effects of health may be very sensitive to what measure used.
In what follows, I review the literature and distinguish between subjective and objective
measures of health.
Subjective measures of health: In studies based on subjective measures, the data
come from sources like the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the
U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS), German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) Study or
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). Studying the increase in propensity to retire
at ages 60 and 65 in Germany, Eibich (2015) uses data from the SOEP study and employs a
fuzzy regression discontinuity design, exploiting the change in probability to retire at age 60
and 65. He finds that retirement increases the probability of reporting satisfactory mental
and physical health, and the effect is especially salient for workers who retired from strenuous
jobs.8 Behncke (2012) uses data from ELSA and exploits the exogenous variation from state
pension age in a propensity score matching and IV approach. She finds that retirement
increases the risk of being diagnosed with a self-reported chronic condition. Rohwedder and
Willis (2010), Coe and Zamarro (2011) and Insler (2014) use data from the HRS, and the
increase in (self-reported) probability to retire as an instrument, and find that retirement
has a beneficial effect on self-rated health.
Both Gorry et al. (2015) and Mazzonna and Peracchi (2017) argue that health consists
8A similar design is used by Grøtting and Lillebø (2018) to study the effect of retirement at age 67 in
Norway. They find an immediate increase in self-rated health following retirement, but no short-term effect
on either hospitalisation or mortality.
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of stock variables that either evolve slowly over time, are transitory or occur instantaneously
following a major life change like retirement. Some aspects of health respond slowly to
investments on the positive side or disregard on the negative side. Using panel data from
the HRS, Gorry et al. (2015) instrument for age-based variation in eligibility for retirement
benefits. They find that life satisfaction increases immediately after retirement, whereas
health evolves slowly, yet positively, over time. The authors use a measure that consists
of an index of eight prevalent health conditions (e.g. diabetes), and they find that the
health index improves 4 years after retirement. They interpret their findings as showing that
retirement causes improvements in health in the short and long runs, and some measures
change instantaneously, whereas other measures evolve slowly over time.
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2017) use data from SHARE and find important heterogenous
differences between workers retiring from strenuous jobs compared with the rest of the work-
force. For all but workers retiring from a strenuous job, they find a decline in cognitive
abilities and subjective health. Using social security eligibility as an instrument for retire-
ment decisions in the United States, Bonsang et al. (2012) show that retirement is associated
with a negative effect on cognitive functioning, as measured by word learning and recall tests.
The effect occurs at age 63, following retirement at age 62. At age 64, the effect is similar to
that estimated at age 61 (a year before retirement), whereas it seems to be a downward path
until age 70. What remains unclear, as highlighted by Bonsang et al. (2012), is whether the
cognitive decline is a result of retirement, or that retirement is associated with a certain loss
of purpose or social interaction that, in turn, has a negative effect on cognitive skills.9
Taken together, the studies using subjective measures of health employ eligibility rules
through IV to circumvent the endogeneity problem of retirement and health. Previous
research has shown that different health outcomes lead to different interpretations of the
association between retirement and health. This is also the conclusion in a literature review
by van der Heide et al. (2013). In other words, health is complex conceptually, since report-
ing symptoms or self-perceived health is affected by many confounding factors, which may
explain why measures of self-rated health lead to conflicting results in the literature.
To my knowledge, only one paper has studied the effect of an increase in retirement age
on subjective measures of health. Shai (2018) exploits an increase in the male full retirement
age from 65 to 67 in Israel and compares subjects retiring at this age with cohorts not
affected by the reform. The results show that prolonged employment as a result of the
increase in retirement age results in a deterioration in health, which is especially salient
9A theoretical framework proposed by Grossman (1972) supports these findings, arguing that retirement
leads to a so-called unengaged lifestyle. Once retired, people reduce their investment in cognitive abilities.
Social relations (social capital) and mortality is also extensively studied in the epidemiological literature.
See, for example, Holt-Lunstad et al. (2010) for a meta-analytic review.
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among individuals with low education. He constructs several indices of health based on
questions related to physician visits, the health index and the severe morbidity index. As
discussed in the present paper, the use of visits to the physician may be problematic because
retirees and workers do not necessarily visit a physician for the same reason, especially when
physicians serve as gate keepers for sickness absence.
Objective measures of health: Recently, the increased availability of longitudinal
administrative data has led researchers to use outcomes of health as recorded by third parties.
The use of longitudinal data may alleviate issues of attrition, as well as justification bias.
The predominant measure of health is mortality. Hernæs et al. (2013) use the stepwise
reduction in the early retirement age in Norway from 67 to 62 in an IV setup, and they find
that early retirement has no effect on mortality. Acknowledging that ill health related to
mortality is a health stock that evolves over time, they follow individuals until the age of 77,
but find no statistically significant effect. The authors question whether retirement has a
causal effect on mortality. Hallberg et al. (2015) exploit a targeted early retirement window
for the Swedish military, in which the retirement age was lowered from age 60 to 55. Using
Cox regression models to investigate the effect of the reform on mortality, they find that
retirement reduces the risk of dying by age 77 by 26%.
Bloemen et al. (2017) studies a group of male civil servants in Holland who were induced
to retire early through an early retirement window. The window offered early retirement at
age 58 instead of 62. They find that the probability of dying within 5 years after retirement
is reduced by 2.6 percentage points. Furthermore, the effect occurs immediately following
retirement, and seems to persist from year 1 to year 5.10 A potential problem with the
studies by Hallberg et al. (2015) and Bloemen et al. (2017) is that both exploit a ‘window’
in which a certain group of workers were offered to retire early. In Hallberg et al. (2015)
and Bloemen et al. (2017), the early retirement window was offered to people who would
otherwise have lost their jobs through layoffs and worked in a specific sector. Thus, it is not
clear how these effects map to the rest of the workforce.
To gain a further understanding of workers’ health, Hallberg et al. (2015) investigate the
effect of early retirement for male civil servants on inpatient care at age 56–70. They find that
the early retirement opportunity reduced the number of days in inpatient care by around 35%
(or 6.7 days). From a policy standpoint, these results may be problematic, since a reduction
in the retirement age led to lower demand for health care through reduced inpatient care
numbers. In addition, the estimated effect is even more salient for the compliers. In summary,
they find that opportunity to retire early decreased both mortality and number of days in
10The authors state that the numbers represents the smallest impact of retirement on mortality. In other
words, the authors reports the lower bounds estimates.
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inpatient care.
To the best of my knowledge, only one other paper has studied the effect of an increase
in retirement age combined with objective measures of health. Hagen (2018) studies an
increase in the normal retirement age in Sweden from 63 to 65 local government workers,
and compares the subjects’ health with private sector workers not affected by the reform.
His sample consists of female workers, because few men were employed as local government
workers. Using outcomes measured at age 65–69, he finds no effect on outcomes concerning
prescription of drugs, probability of being hospitalised or number of days hospitalised. In
addition, he finds no effect on mortality through the age of 69.
Against this background, the direction in which retirement affects health remains un-
clear. This is especially evident when considering measures of health as observed through
survey data, as the outcome of interest, method and time-frame usually varies. This is not
necessarily a drawback, but underlines the dynamic nature of the retirement process. In
what follows, I relate my contribution to those of Hernæs et al. (2013, 2016), Shai (2018)
and Hagen (2018).
3 Institutional Setting: The 2011 Norwegian Retirement Reform
In this paper, I take advantage of a 2011 reform that restructured the pension system in
Norway. As some of the aspects of the system before the reform are important elements
for the empirical analysis and understanding the changes that came with the reform, I start
with a discussion of relevant institutional features as they were before the reform. I then
proceed to discuss the Norwegian 2011 Pension Reform and how it relates to the empirical
strategy.
3.1 The Norwegian pension system before 2011
3.1.1 General structure
The Norwegian pension system is based on the NIS, in which every worker is enrolled,
conditional on at least 3 years of residency in Norway.11 The system was formed around
a pay-as-you-go defined benefit scheme and workers accumulated pension points based on
earnings that exceeded a minimum threshold, known as 1 basic amount,12 up to a contribu-
tion cap. Pension points were accumulated throughout individuals’ working lives, and the
old age pension consisted of basic pension (minimum guaranteed pension) and supplemen-
tary pension (earning components). To receive the full minimum guaranteed pension, a 40
11This section borrows information from Hernæs et al. (2016) and Kudrna (2017).
12The basic amount is used in relation to most of the NIS payments, and is adjusted each year.
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year period of residence was required, with a proportional reduction for each year without
accumulating the basic pension (i.e. no residency). The supplementary pension was calcu-
lated based on averaging pension points over the best (i.e. highest income) 20 years with
positive pension points.
3.1.2 Early retirement pensions
The NRA before the reform was 67 years, but nearly half the private sector and the entire
public sector had access to ER pension at age 62, financed by the government on a pay-
as-you-go basis. Conditional on relatively weak income requirements, around 70–80% of
the workforce could retire with full ER pension at the age of 62 (Bratberg et al., 2004;
Kudrna, 2017). The ER pension was paid up to the age of 67, and people were automatically
transferred to the NIS old-age pension system after this point.
Once retired with ER pensions, retirees that wished to combine ER and employment
were subject to a strict earnings test. Apart from a small ‘grace-amount’ (NOK 15,000 ≈
2016-USD 1,800), any income from employment resulted in a proportional reduction in ER
pensions, which represented a high implicit tax rate. In addition, individuals who retired
with the ER pension continued the accrual of pension points as if they had continued working
after the age of 62. Taken together, this created strong disincentives for employment after
the age of 62 for eligible workers, especially for low income workers (Hernæs et al., 2016).
3.2 The 2011 pension reform
Implemented in January 2011, Norway reformed its pension system based on the goal of
improving the long-term fiscal sustainability (Kudrna, 2017). Rather than increasing the
age at which workers could retire with ER, the reform had a clear goal, through increased
incentives, for workers to remain employed after the age of 62. First, the NRA was reduced
from 67 years of age, and conditional on some previous earnings requirements by accumulated
pension points, claiming the NIS old age pension could commence at age 62. Second, the
ER system in the private sector was completely redesigned, and it now serves as a top-up
annuity in combination with the NIS old age pension. The earnings test in the old ER
system was abolished, and workers are free to combine retirement and work without facing
a proportional reduction in the old age pension. According to Hernæs et al. (2016), the
removal of the earnings test resulted in a reduction in the implicit tax rate from around 70%
to the region of 40%, for average earners. Third, actuarially fair recalculations of annual
benefits were introduced by the means of life expectancy in a given cohort.
Due to a breakdown in talks with the unions in the public sector, the salient aspects
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of the reform, especially the restructuring of the ER system, was only implemented in the
private sector. Public sector workers can give up their current entitlements in favour of the
new system, but Hernæs et al. (2016) show that few have chosen to do so, and consequently,
remaining in the current system (as it was before 2011) is economically favourable for public
sector workers. Hence, individuals employed in the public sector after the age of 62 con-
tinue to face strong labour supply disincentives through high implicit marginal tax rates on
combining employment and retirement, as indicated by Hernæs et al. (2016) and Kudrna
(2017).13
Table 1 provides an overview of the ages, years and birth cohorts affected by the 2011
reform. One aspect of the reform is that transitional rules were specified for those born
between 1945 and 1948, displayed by the light shades. The transitional rule meant that
workers could choose between the new and old system if they retired before 2011. Those
who turned 62 years of age in 2010 (i.e. born in 1948) could claim a full ER pension in 2010.
In 2011, the same cohort had to abide by the new, albeit transitional, pension rules if they
did not retire in 2010. In the analysis, the 1948 cohort is left out of the analysis, since they
were subject to special transitional rules that could spark an anticipation of the reform.14,15
Table 2 summarises how the reform affected different groups of workers, conditional on
sector and entitlement to ER. Note that this table resembles Table 1 in Hernæs et al. (2016),
but includes additional cohorts (1950–1952), which may explain the difference in the share
of workers included in each group, compared with Hernæs et al. (2016). I split workers
by sector affiliation at age 62. If employed in the private sector, workers are categorised
by entitlement to ER (as it was before the reform). Next, I condition on whether workers
could hypothetically retire with full old age pension at age 62. To retire at age 62, workers
have to fulfil some earnings requirements, and consequently, individuals with an earnings
history below the requirement have to postpone full retirement by at least 1 year. These
are included in groups 4 to 6. To summarise, the 2011 pension reform affected workers
differently, conditional on sector and workplace affiliation to ER pensions. I exploit these
difference in the empirical framework.
13Life-expectancy adjustments was introduced in the public sector as well, but only at the statutory
retirement age of 67.
14 Note that these transitional rules were introduced as a monetary compensation since workers could
not increase their pension entitlements. The same compensation was introduced for the 1944–1947 cohorts
as well, although to a much lesser extent.(Hernæs et al., 2016)
15Hernæs et al. (2016) drops the 1948-cohort for the same reason, whereas Vigtel (2018) leaves them in
the analysis, studying the effect of the reform on the propensity to hire senior workers
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4 Data
4.1 Data sources and outcomes
I use Norwegian full population register data with information on all residents, given that
they lived in Norway at some point during 1992–2014. To arrive at the analysis sample, I
combine several registers that are linked through a unique anonymous identifier. I start by
defining the outcomes and how these relates to the sample selection.
4.1.1 Employment and entitlement to early retirement pension
Information on employment is taken from the employer-employee register, which is available
from 1992 to 2014. For each worker, I identify a person and his or her respective workplace
through an identification number, along with contracted hours of work. To determine eligi-
bility for ER pension, I follow Bratberg et al. (2004) and assume that an individual works
in an ER-affiliated firm if at least one previous employee retired with an ER pension.
To calculate accrual of pension points, I include information on previous earnings and
social security benefits, which is available from 1967. These records contain earnings and
income from self-employment, plus social insurance benefits (e.g. unemployment benefits),
which are subject to income tax and warrant accrual of pension points. Information is
reported by third parties and is reliable because it is a matter of public record, and comes
without any form of top or bottom coding. From the administrative records, I also use social
security files to identify the month at which individuals retire or if they have retired with
disability insurance (DI). DI requires a minimum of a 50% reduction in work capacity due
to health impairments.
4.1.2 Socioeconomic measures
I combine the information discussed above with information on the highest attained educa-
tion, marital status,16 immigration background and gender. I split educational attainment
through three groups. The first consists of individuals that completed the mandatory level of
education, that is junior high (Ungdomsskolen), or if they dropped out of high school. The
second group consists of individuals who completed high school, and the third contains indi-
viduals with at least 1 year of higher education, but not necessarily with a complete degree.
In the empirical analysis, I assume that education is a proxy for socioeconomic status.
16Whether individuals are single, married, or a legally registered partner. Thus, I am not able to identify
cohabiting partners not married or legally registered as a partner. The latter mostly concerned gay couples,
and were abolished in 2009 when same-sex couples legally could get married.
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4.1.3 Outcomes of health and healthcare utilisation
The contribution of this paper consists of investigating whether the 2011 Norwegian pension
reform had any subsequent effect on objective measures of health. In investigating this issue,
I rely on three different objective measures of health and healthcare utilisation. The first is
information about mortality from the cause of death register (CAD) register. This register
contains all deaths recorded in Norway between 1992 and 2014, along with the month in
which the death occurred. The outcome I construct is a dummy that takes a value 1 if a
person died by the age of 64 and 0 otherwise.
Second, I use the Norwegian Patient Registry (NPR) to identify all acute hospitalisations
(inpatient stays) from 2008 to 2014. The NPR data contain information in accordance with
whether treatment was deemed necessary and could not be postponed or if a person was
admitted for a planned surgery. The data also contain classification of the disease that
resulted in an inpatient stay, as measured by the International Classification of Diseases
version 10 (ICD-10; see World Health Organization (1992)). I focus on acute hospitalisations
as this does ensure some severity of a patient’s illness, but at a cost of a reduction in the
incidence rate. However, it is difficult to disentangle the severity between planned and acute
hospitalisations, and as a result, planned admissions are not included as an outcome in
the empirical analysis. Thus, the outcomes I construct represent a dummy that takes the
value 1 if a person was hospitalised at ages 62 to 64, as a result of an acute hospitalisation,
and 0 otherwise. I also study the intensive margin of healthcare utilisation through days
hospitalised following an acute hospitalisation. This is done by subtracting the date of
discharge from the date of admission.
Third, I utilise information on visits to general practitioners (GPs). For every visit to a
GP (or emergency care unit), the GP sends a reimbursement claim to a common register.
From this register, I identify the number of visits and corresponding diagnoses. Individuals
visit the GP for different reasons, and unlike information on inpatient stays, this register
contains no information on the severity of the health condition, but the reimbursements
claim include information on diagnoses in accordance with the International Classification
of Primary Care-2nd edition (ICPC-2). Based on the ICPC-2 classification, I construct, in
addition to number of GP visits, three variables on three specific groups of diagnoses, as
follows: the numbers of GP visits per year for CVD,17 musculoskeletal pain18 and psycholog-
17CVD and diagnoses related to, among others, coronary heart disease and ischaemic heart disease.
According to World Health Organization (2018), the former is the leading cause of death globally.
18According to World Health Organization (2015), musculoskeletal problems (e.g. back problems) are the
second largest contributor to disability worldwide. See Murray and Lopez (1997) for an extensive discussion
about leading causes of disability-adjusted life-years. About 70% of those receiving DI in Norway are above
the age of 59 (NAV, 2018).
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ical issues. CVD is the leading cause of death in most developed countries (World Health
Organization (2015)), whereas musculoskeletal (e.g. lower back problems) and psychological
issues are leading pathways to disability insurance worldwide (World Health Organization
(2015)).
4.1.4 Sample restrictions
This paper is interested in people who turned 62 years of age in the years before and after
2011. Thus I start by identifying all those born between 1945 and 1952, which comprises
459,679 individuals. Due to the transitional rules explained in the Section 3.2, I drop 64,699
persons born in 1948, and I also drop those who died before 2006. This leaves 433,125
individuals. Next, I restrict the sample to consist of those who, at the age of 60, were
employed and did not draw on any form of disability insurance. The reason for the latter
restriction follows from the interest in investigating whether changes in work incentives
affect the health and labour supply for workers nearing the retirement age. An individual
is employed within a year if he or she fulfils two important criteria, as follows: income
equal to or above the minimum amount required to accrue pension points and also that
each individual is identified in the employer-employee register. The latter is important for
determining entitlement to ER pension, and the construction of treatment and comparison
groups, as will be explained in section 5. This leaves a sample of 223,734 individuals.
For the empirical analysis, I impose two additional restrictions. First, I drop all indi-
viduals born in either 1951 or 1952. Because I am interested in the effect of the reform
at ages 62 to 64, these are left out of the final sample.19 Second, as discussed in the next
section, the empirical analysis uses private sector workers who, in the absence of the reform,
would have had access to full ER pensions at age 62, and compare their outcome to private
sector workers, as both groups hypothetically could retire with NIS old-age pensions at age
62. This leaves me with 113,185 individuals. The panel is unbalanced, given that a certain
number of individuals died before the end of the observation period.
19The data spans until 2014, which means that I only observe the 1952 cohort aged 62, and the 1951
cohort at ages 62 and 63. In the NPR-data, as a consequence of data being available from 2008, I do not
observe the 1945-cohort at age 62. This is not of a big concern since the cohort is included in all the other




The goal of this paper is to estimate the average effect on health and labour supply responses
following the changes in incentives to prolong employment at ages 62 to 64. This opens
up at least two methodological difficulties that must be addressed to overcome potential
endogeneity. The first is the joint determination of retirement and health. Retirement
may affect people’s health, but health may also affect the decision to retire. This two-way
relationship between retirement and health may lead to selection bias. The other, somewhat
overlapping concern, is that unobserved factors affect both health and the decision to retire.
For instance, a worker may have an extreme disutility for work, which is not only likely to
affect the decision to retire, but also his or her health. Thus, these unobserved factors pose
a risk of biasing any regression on the effect of retirement on health.
To address the possible endogeneity, I follow Shai (2018) and Hagen (2018) and use a
difference-in-difference (DiD) framework that exploits the quasi-experimental nature that
arises from the implementation of the 2011 pension reform. The reduced form estimates
will then yield the effect of how the 2011 pension reform affected health, healthcare utili-
sation, and employment, for a specific group of workers. To isolate the causal effect of the
reform, I then need a comparison group, or groups, that allows for credible counter-factual
identification of the average effect if the reform never materialised.
One potential comparison is using the private and public sector workers in the DiD
framework against the public sector. For a worker in the private sector, the effect of the
reform depends on entitlement to ER and previous earnings. In the absence of the reform,
workers in the private sector not entitled to ER would have had to wait until age 67 to
retire with the NIS old-age pension. However, after the implementation of the reform,
these workers, conditional on previous earnings, could retire at age 62. These workers thus
experienced a different change in incentives to remain employed after the age of 62, compared
with private-sector workers previously entitled to ER pensions. As a result, this group is not
included in the analysis.
Another potential comparison is using private-sector workers who, in the absence of the
reform, would have been entitled to ER pension at age 62, and comparing their outcomes with
public-sector workers. However, some of these workers had an earnings history that would
prevent them from entering full retirement at age 62. Likewise, conditional on giving up the
current ER entitlements, some workers in the public sector would not have been entitled to
full retirement at age 62 either. In Table 2, these are referred to as groups 4 and 5. This
leaves two groups, one of which experienced an increase in incentives to remain employed
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at age 62 (group 2 in Table 2) and one of which experienced few changes in incentives to
remain employed at age 62 (group 1 in Table 2).
More specifically, I exploit the 2011 retirement reform that increased the monetary in-
centives to remain employed at age 62 of those born in 1949 or later in group 2. In the DiD
setting, I use those born in 1945–1947 to estimate the counterfactual effect on health and
labor market outcomes of those born in 1949 and 1950. To address the likely cohort effect
of this set up, I use public sector workers as a comparison. In the next section, I explain the
estimation of this set up.
5.2 Estimation
For individual i in cohort j in sector P , I run the following regression on the outcome Y at
ages 62–64:
Yi,j,t = β0 + β1Ps + β2(Ps × Tj∈[1949,1952]) + λj + β′3Xi,j,s + εi,j,s, (1)
where Pi takes the value of 1 if individual i worked in a private sector firm that had signed up
for the ER scheme (group 2 in Table 2) and 0 if individual i works in the public sector (group
1 in Table 2). Tj∈[1949,1952] takes the value 1 if individual i is born in 1949–1952 and 0 if born
in 1945–1947. I add cohort fixed effects (λj) to account for potential labour market shocks
and time-invariant differences between the treatment and control groups. Xi,j,s is a set of
baseline control variables measured at age 60 and includes years of schooling, gender, marital
status, income and contracted work hours, which is similar to what used by Hernæs et al.
(2016). The parameter of interest is β2, which by estimation of ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression, yields the intention-to-treat effects at ages 62–64 of the change in retirement
incentives at age 62, for private sector workers. The reduced form model is similar to that
of Hagen (2018).20
Table 3 displays summary statistics for the cohorts affected by the reform (post) and
the cohorts not affected by the reform (pre), by treated and control groups. The fixed
characteristics and labour-market outcomes are measured at age 60. The outcomes are
measured in the post-treatment period (at ages 62–64). There are some differences between
pre and post-treatment for each group, as well as between treated and control groups. The
level of education is higher in the public sector, whereas the share of females is lower in the
20In a paper studying how the 2011 pension reform affected the firms propensity to hire senior workers,
Vigtel (2018) uses a similar DiD-framework. His method is formed around the years before and after the
implementation of the reform. This present paper, however, is interested in how health evolves at certain
ages. To that end, I therefore follow Hagen (2018) who study outcomes at a given age for a specific set of
cohorts.
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private sector compared with the public sector. In addition, income is higher in the private
sector compared with the public sector. However, these differences should not be of concern
if the outcomes follow similar trends. I investigate the extent to which the different outcomes
follow similar trends across cohorts in the Section 5.3.
As an implicit underlying model, I assume that any effect of the 2011 pension reform
on employment and retirement behaviour has an indirect effect on people’s health. The
identifying assumption for the DiD estimator is that, in the absence of the reform, any trend
in post-retirement health or utilisation of health care should be the same for private- and
public- sector workers. I discuss the validity of this assumption in the next section.
5.3 Threats to identification
The validity of the DiD-method requires that, given the control variables, the only thing
that could explain the differentials between treatment and non-treated is the 2011 pension
reform. This is an untestable assumption, since we do not know what would have happened
with employment or health for the treatment group in the absence of the reform. Regardless,
a common approach in the literature is to check how the trends evolved before the imple-
mentation of an intervention, which in this case, is the 2011 pension reform. If the trends
evolve in a similar way before the reform, it gives confidence that the post-treatment trends
would have evolved in the same way too.
Figure A.1 plots the unconditional, unweighted mean outcomes at ages 62–64 for the
private- and public-sector workers, by cohort. The two upper graphs display the labour
market outcomes. Figure 1(a) show that the 1945 and 1946 cohorts follows quite similar
trends of employment. However, for the 1947 cohort, there seems to be an reduction in
employment at ages 62–64, compared with the control group. As discussed in Section 3.2,
the 1947-cohort was subject to the 2011 pension reform at age 64, and moreover, would
have to retire at age 63 to receive the old ER pensions. If this caused the 1947 cohort to
change their retirement behaviour at ages 62–64, this anticipatory effect may cause problems
for the quasi-experimental design. Thus, I run the pooled regressions on the labour market
outcomes with 1947 against 1945 and 1946, as displayed in Table A.1. The results show that
there are no significant differences in the probability of employment between the 1947 cohort
at age 62–64 and the remainder of the unaffected cohorts.
Next, Figure 1(b) displays similar trends between the treated and control groups in the
unaffected cohorts, whereas, as illustrated in Figure 1(a), the gap is reduced for the cohorts
affected by the reform.21 The next two panels display the time trends for the outcomes of
21Note that the contracted work hours is missing for some workers, but given the quasi-experimental
design, this should not be of a concern.
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health. Figure 1(c) displays the share of the population who experienced a hospitalisation
at age 62–64, whereas Figure 1(d) displays hospital days, conditional on an acute hospital-
isation. There is a small reduction in the gap for the 1947 cohort in Figure 1(d), but the
remainder of the cohorts in both figures seems to follow a similar time-trend. Figures 1(e)
and 1(f) display the share who died by age 64 and number of GP consultations, respectively.
Overall, the trends for the unaffected cohorts are similar, apart from a reduction in the gap
between treated and controls for the 1947 cohort. Taken together, the trends for the unaf-
fected cohorts (1945–1947) are similar, whereas some differences between the treatment and
control groups opens up in the affected cohorts. Apart from Figure 1(d), Figure A.1 shows
that the parallel trend assumption is close to satisfied.
6 Analysis
6.1 The effect of the reform on employment and retirement
Any effect of the reform on employment and retirement is a precondition for quantifying a
possible spillover to people’s health. Table 4 presents the labour market outcomes at ages
62–64. As in Hernæs et al. (2016), the probability of employment increased, and probability
of retiring decreased. The point estimates show that the probability of employment increased
by 9 percentage points, whereas the probability of retiring decreased by 9 percentage points.
The 1950 cohort is driving some of the effect, but the magnitude of the point estimates is
smaller than that found in Hernæs et al. (2016).22 Either way, I conclude that the reform
increased the probability of employment, and reduced the probability of retiring for the
affected private-sector workers previously entitled to full ER pensions.
6.2 The effect on health and health care utilisation
6.2.1 The effect on inpatient care
Having established that the reform increased the average probability of employment and
reduced the probability of retirement in the treatment group, I next investigate whether
there are any spillover to objective measures of health and health care utilisation. I start
by investigating whether there are any effects on the probability of an acute hospitalisation
at ages 62–64. I include the same set of control variables as in the previous section, and
the outcome variables consists of a dummy equal to 1 if individual i was hospitalised in a
22Hernæs et al. (2016) finds an increase in the probability of employment by around 12 percentage points
at age 63 and 20 percentage points at age 64.
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calendar year t, and conditional on experiencing an acute hospitalisation, number of days
hospitalised.23
The results in Table 5 show that there were no effects of the reform on acute hospitalisa-
tions, or the number of hospital days. Splitting the analysis by cohorts, the point estimates
of the coefficients indicates an increase in the probability of acute hospitalisation for the
1950 cohort. The effect is significant at the 10% level and corresponds to an increase of
0.3 percentage points. Column 2 in Table 5 displays the estimated effect on the number of
inpatient days following an acute hospitalisation. For individuals born in 1949, the point
estimates shows a reduction in number of days hospitalised, following an acute hospitalisa-
tion. The effect is significant at the 5% level, and implies a reduction of 0.053 hospital days,
which corresponds to a 15% reduction.
The direction of the estimates points toward a small reduction in days hospitalised as
a result of an acute hospitalisation, but the point estimates are generally too imprecise for
any meaningful interpretation. When I estimate the outcome by cohort, the standard error
does increase as a result of the reduction in sample size. In any case, the precision of the
estimated effects are not convincing.
A possible caveat associated with the use of acute hospitalisations as a measure of health
and healthcare utilisation is that it is a severe and (usually) serious outcome, meaning that
the incidence rate is relatively low. As a result, the dependent variable includes a large set of
zeroes, which may cause problems for any meaningful inference in the linear model. Hallberg
et al. (2015) condition on days of inpatient stays only, comprising both planned and acute
hospitalisations, and find that a reduction in retirement age in the Swedish military, resulted
in reduced inpatient care by 2 and 4.7 days for those aged 56–60 and 61–70, respectively.
This is a reduction of 35%. The effect is estimated using a pseudo-maximum-likelihood
estimator, which may take better care of all the nulls in the dependent variable. However,
this comes at a cost of more stringent assumptions about the error term. I conclude that the
reform led to no change in the probability of experiencing acute hospitalisations, but there
is some, albeit deficient, evidence that the number of days in inpatient care is reduced.
6.2.2 The effect on healthcare utilisation through visits to a physician
To provide a comprehensive picture of any potential effects on health, I now include measures
of healthcare utilisation that may be less severe than an acute hospitalisation. To this end, I
create a variable that counts the number of GP visits each year, along with three important
diagnoses related to workers’ health and work capacity.
23Days hospitalised is calculated by subtracting day of admission from day of discharge.
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Table 6 presents the estimation results. In Column 1, for the entire sample, there is
no significant effect of the reform on the number of GP consultations. This is interesting
bearing in mind that, at least in Norway, GPs have a gatekeeper role in that they certify
sickness absence.24 Once retired, the opportunity cost of seeing a physician has fallen, and
one would expect that an increase in employment among elderly workers would lead to an
increase in GP consultations.25
Columns 2–4 in Table 6 displays estimates by cause-specific diagnoses. For the entire
sample, the point estimates show that there is a slight increase in diagnoses related to car-
diovascular issues, significant at the 10% level. However, when splitting the sample by the
affected cohorts, the results remain insignificant. For the two other diagnoses, musculoskele-
tal and psychological, the estimated effect is insignificant. Taken together, there seems to
be no effect of the reform on any of the measures of health care utilisation related to visits
to a physician.
6.2.3 The effect on mortality
Table 7 displays the estimated effect on the probability of dying by the age of 64. The results
show that there are no significant effects on the probability of dying by the age of 64 for
the entire sample or splitting by the two affected cohorts. One crux of using mortality in
the empirical analysis is the age at which I observe the treated, that is, ages 62–64. The
time frame may be too short to expect any changes in mortality rates. Previous literature
studying the effect of retirement on mortality has followed individuals well into their 70s.
Hallberg et al. (2015) study the consequence of targeted ER of male military workers up to
the age of 70, whereas Hernæs et al. (2013) follow individuals to the age of 77. An exception
is Bloemen et al. (2017), who studied the probability of dying 1 to 5 years after a targeted
reduction in the eligibility age for civil servants in Holland. They find an instant effect on
mortality, with a decrease in probability of dying within 1 year after retirement of around
2.2 percentage points. This effect is persistent up to 5 years after retirement.
More in line with the findings of Hernæs et al. (2013), I find no causal effect of the
reform on mortality. Moreover, as in Hernæs et al. (2013), I question whether mortality
should have any relevant policy implications and conclude that the reform had no effect on
the probability of dying by the age of 64.
24Spells of sickness absence of 3–7 days are usually self-certified without needing to consult a GP.
25The time-cost for seeing a physician varies between workers and retirees.
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6.3 Heterogeneity
So far, I have examined the effect for the entire sample, and these results show no apparent
effect of the reform on objective measures of health or healthcare utilisation. However,
the results may mask important heterogeneity, and the average results can also obscure
variation in the influence of the reform and the potential effect it had on health and healthcare
utilisation. Thus, I assess whether there are any heterogeneous effects of splitting the sample
by gender, and socioeconomic status proxied by education. In each subsample, I also assess
the differences in employment responses, to uncover whether heterogeneity in response to the
reform is driving the estimated effects. As with the previous section, I assume an underlying
model in which the effect of employment indirectly affects workers’ health.
6.3.1 Effect by gender
Employment: It is clear that the reform had an employment effect, which confirms the
findings of Hernæs et al. (2016). However, it is important to investigate whether the reform
had a different effect on genders, and if so, whether this resulted in a spillover to the outcomes
of health and healthcare utilisation. Table 8 presents the estimated effect of the reform on
the probability of employment, retirement and retaining at least 80% of contracted work
hours as measured at age 60. The first three columns display the estimated effects for males,
whereas the remaining columns display the estimated effects for females.
The estimated probability of remaining employed in the post-treatment period, in abso-
lute terms, is three-quarters larger for women than it is for men. Females seem to increase
employment and delay retiring at a larger fraction than that observed for males. The two
other columns, probability of retirement and retaining similar work hours as at age 60, re-
main similar between the genders. In addition, the magnitude of the estimated effects remain
somewhat similar when performing the same analysis separately for the different cohorts.
Hospitalisation: Table 9 displays the estimated effect of the reform on the probability of
experiencing an acute hospitalisation and number of days hospitalised, by gender. For acute
hospitalisations, the results are not significant, regardless of gender. Turning to hospital
days, Column 2 shows that for the 1949 cohort, there is a significant reduction of 19% in
days hospitalised for males at the 5% level, whereas for males as a whole, or for females,
there is no significant effect.
GP visits: I next look at the effect on healthcare utilisation through visits to the GP
and the three diagnoses. Table 10 presents the results. As discussed above, a priori, one
would expect an increase in the number of consultations, as retirees and employees do not
necessarily visit their GP for the same reason. The latter group may have to visit their
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GP to certify their sickness absence, whereas this is not necessary for retirees. However,
for males, Column 1 shows that there are no significant changes in number of GP visits for
all the cohorts pooled together. For females, Column 6 displays no significant effect on the
number of GP consultations either.
Turning to the three diagnoses, there seems to be a small increase in number of muscu-
loskeletal diagnoses for males born in 1950 (Column 3). Moreover, there seems to be a small
increase in number of cardiovascular diagnoses for females as well (Column 6). The point
estimates in Column 3 is significant at the 10% only. For females, displayed in Column 6,
the results indicates a small increase in number of cardiovascular diagnoses by around 7%.
However, the effect is not persistent when looking at each of the two affected cohorts.
There is ample evidence in both the economic and psychological literature that retirement
may lead to a loss of purpose, reduction in cognitive skills, and thus, an increase in symptoms
associated with depression (Behncke, 2012; Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2017). However, while
the directions of the estimates indicate a reduction in the number of psychological diagnoses,
none of the estimates are significant at any of the conventional levels.
Mortality: Turning to the outcomes for mortality, Table 11 displays the probability to die
by the age of 64 by gender. For the cohorts pooled together, there is no significant effect on
the probability of dying for males, whereas there is a significant reduction for females at the
10% level. The magnitude of the point estimates implies a 0.01 percentage point reduction in
the probability of dying by the age of 64, which equals a 3% reduction. Moreover, splitting
the estimates by the affected cohorts, the results show a 0.02 percentage point reduction
in the probability of dying by the age of 64, equal to a 6% reduction. Taken together, the
results indicates that, for females, there seems to be a positive effect of the reform in that
there is a small reduction in the probability of dying by the age of 64. For males, the results
shows no significant effect of the reform.
6.3.2 Effect by educational level
One finding in the retirement literature is that workers who retried from a strenuous job,
experience a better self-rated health (see for example Kuhn et al. (2010)). Unfortunately,
what constitutes as a strenuous job (blue collar vs. white collar) is difficult in the adminis-
trative data. Even if I link the employer-employee register to sectors characterised as manual
labour (e.g. carpenter), this is only informative to the extent that it characterises the sector
and not necessarily whether the job is strenuous. Thus, I therefore follow Shai (2018)), and
proxy socioeconomic status by whether workers have any form of higher (tertiary) education,
since education is an important determinant of health (Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2012). No
form of higher education means that a person has completed high school, whereas higher
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education means that a person has completed at least 1 year of tertiary education.
Employment: Table 12 displays the estimated effect of the reform on the probability of
employment, retirement and retaining at least 80% of the contracted work hours as measured
at age 60. Given that the reform increased the monetary incentives to postpone retirement
at age 62 for a certain groups of workers, the impact seems to be higher for lower educated
individuals compared with workers with high education. The probability of employment in
the post-treatment period seems to be three times as high for workers with low education,
compared to workers with high education. Similar results emerge when considering the
probability to retire and probability to retain at least 80% of the contracted work hours at
age 60. Moreover, the effect is persistent across the different cohorts as well.
Hospitalisation: Table 13 displays the effect on the probability of an acute hospital-
isation, and hospital days, by low and high education. The first two columns show the
estimated effects for workers with low education, whereas the remaining two columns show
the estimated effects for workers with high education. In Column 1, the results show an
increase in the probability of experiencing an acute hospitalisation at ages 62–64 for the
1950 cohort. However, the effect is only significant at the 10% level. Column 3 shows that
there is a significant increase in the probability of an acute hospitalisation for employees with
a higher education. For the cohorts pooled together, the results indicate a 0.7 percentage
point decrease, and this effect is significant at the 5% level. The magnitude is the same when
splitting by cohort, yet the effect is significant at the 10% level.
In Columns 2 and 4, the results shows that there are no significant effects on hospital
days for either low and high education, but for higher educated born in 1952. Yet this effect
is only significant at the 10% level. Taken together, there does seem to be some indications
of an increase in the probability of an acute hospitalisation, yet the standard errors are still
somewhat imprecise. If anything, the results indicates a worsening in health as measured by
acute hospitalisation.
GP visits: Table 14 shows that there is no significant effect on the number of GP
visits, regardless of educational level. By looking at the different diagnoses, we see that,
for low education, there is a small increase in cardiovascular-related diagnoses (Column 2),
significant at the 1% level. For high education, there is an increase (Column 8), and this is
significant at the 1% level. Splitting the sample by cohorts does not reveal any clear effect as
to what drives the estimated results. The effect in Column 8 seems to be driven by the 1950
cohort, whereas there is an significant increase in cardiovascular diagnoses for low education.
Taken together, Table 14 indicates that, if anything, there is an increase in diagnoses related
to cardiovascular issues for employees with a low education, and in diagnoses related to
psychological issues for workers with a higher education.
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Mortality. Table 15 displays the estimated probability of dying by the age of 64, by
educational level. I find no effect for the pooled sample, or for the 1949 and 1950 cohorts.
While I did find a small decrease in the probability of dying by the age of 64 among females,
the effect remains insignificant when splitting the sample by educational level.
6.4 Robustness tests
To test the validity of the results, I perform three separate robustness tests, all displayed
in Tables A.1 - A.3. First, I follow Hagen (2018) and test whether the results are sensitive
to the exclusion of the control variables. Columns 4 through 6 in Table A.1 display the
estimated results on the labour market outcomes, whereas Table A.2 presents the results for
the outcomes of health and healthcare utilisation. The results are quite close to the main
effect displayed in Tables 4–6, which implies that the results are robust to excluding these
controls. Column 2 in Table A.2 is now significant at the 5%, and cardiovascular diagnoses
become insignificant.
One of the preconditions for being defined as employed was earnings above one basis
level, with the other being identified in the employer-employee registry. The first condition
may be too lenient, as it is equal to between one-eighth and one-tenth of the mean earnings
in the analysis. In Table A.3, I check whether a more stringent earnings criteria affects the
results on employment. It turns out that the conclusion still stands in that employment did
increase as a result of the reform. As such, all of the robustness tests gives confidence to the
validity of the quasi-experimental design and this paper‘s main findings.
7 Discussion and conclusion
Population ageing and increasing constraints on public budgets have led most OECD coun-
tries to introduce policies aimed at prolonging individuals’ working life. Increasing the
labour market participation for workers closing in on the NRA can reduce pressure on pub-
lic finances, but it can also have a side effect in terms of workers’ deteriorating health.
This could potentially offset the gains from reduced costs in the pension system through an
increase in healthcare expenditures.
In this paper, I study how the implementation of the 2011 Norwegian pension reform
affected workers’ health and labour market participation. Until 2011, nearly half of the
workers in the private sector were entitled to an ER pension at age 62. The ER pension
embodied certain aspects that could create disincentives for prolonged employment. Work-
ers who retired with full ER retained their accumulation of pension-points as if they had
continued working up until the statutory retirement age of 67. Second, full ER retirement
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was coupled with an earnings test, which meant a high implicit tax rate on the combination
of employment and retirement along with no deferral option.
To increase the incentives of employment after the age of 62, the private sector ER system
was completely restructured, with the ER pension now serving as a top-up annuity to the
NIS old-age pension. Workers could still retire at age 62, but the removal of the earnings test
meant that workers could start claiming a pension at age 62 in conjunction with continued
employment. Before 2011, the earnings test meant that any earnings, apart from a small
grace amount, would result in a proportional reduction in ER benefits. I explore this setting
to obtain causal estimates on how prolonged employment affects workers health using data on
hospital admissions, visits to physicians and mortality, combined with high-quality register
data.
The results suggest that the reform had its desired effect on the supply side when consid-
ering the probability of employment and retirement. I find strong indications that workers
affected by the reform, on average, increased the labour market participation at ages 62–64
(and thus their contribution period). This is in line with the findings reported by Hernæs
et al. (2016). I further add to their findings by investigating the effect on employment by
gender and education. While it does not seem that differences in genders are driving the
employment effect, there are some differences between workers with high and low education.
The increased probability of employment at ages 62–64 could potentially create two some-
what interrelated mechanisms, namely an income effect and an activity effect. Grip et al.
(2012) show that when the Netherlands reduced the replacement rates for retirees, self-rated
depression did increase. Second, ample evidence from Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) and
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2017) shows that an increase in working life has repercussions for
health.
On the spillover-side, the results yield no clear effect of the reform. On the one hand,
I find some indications that prolonged employment resulted in a reduction in hospital days
for the sample as a whole, and the probability of dying by age 64 for females. On the other
hand, there are some indications that the probability of experiencing an acute hospitalisation
does increase for highly educated workers (tertiary education), and there is an increase in
diagnoses related to cardiovascular issues among females. The latter results need to be
interpreted with some caution, however, since people visits physicians for different reasons
depending on whether they are working or are retired. Taken together, the results are in line
with those found by Hagen (2018) to the effect that a prolonged working life has extremely
little effect on health and healthcare utilisation. When it does, however, the direction of the
results leaves little room to conclude whether there are any positive or negative spillovers
from delayed retirement.
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The findings of this paper adds to the increasing literature concerning retirement and
health, in which there is little consensus as of yet. While measures of health through survey
data attributes huge negative or positive effects of retirement on health, depending on the
outcome, at least from a policy perspective, it is not clear whether these findings take a toll
on public spending in the short run. Ignoring spillovers from the increased labour market
participation after the age of 62 could lead to misguided policy interventions. Targeted inter-
ventions aimed at increasing labour market participation after the age of 62 can potentially
reduce pressure on public budgets, without any immediate negative spillover on workers’
health. The results in this paper show that, at least in the short term of 2 years, there are
few effects of delayed retirement on objective measures of health and healthcare utilisation.
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Table 1: Age groups and birth cohorts affected by the 2011 Norwegian Pension Reform
Age
Birth Cohort 60 61 62 63 64
1945 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1946 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1947 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1948 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1949 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1950 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1951 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1952 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Notes: The table displays cohorts that were affected (dark shade) by the reform and the cohorts partially
affected (light shade) by the reform.
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Table 2: Consequence of the 2011 pension reform for different workers at age 62
After 2011
Before 2011
Entitled to full retirement at age
62 after the reform.
Not entitled to full retirement at
age 62 after the reform.
ER public sector Group 1 (41%) Group 4 (4%)
Access age and incentives to
work the same as before the re-
form. Can combine work and
retirement conditional on giving
up entitlement to ER.
Conditional on giving up entitle-
ment to ER, can now combine
retirement and work at age 62.
ER private sec-
tor Group 2 (30%) Group 5 (1%)
Old ER system removed. Can
still retire at age 62 conditional
on previous earnings, but old
earnings test removed (increase
in work-incentives).
Earliest access age to full retire-
ment increased, and old earnings
test removed for combining re-





Group 3 (21%) Group 6 (3%)
Earliest access age to full retire-
ment reduced from age 67 to age
62, conditional on previous earn-
ings.
No changes in access age or eco-
nomic incentives at age 62. Can
combine reduced pension and re-
tirement between age 62 and age
66.
Notes: Percentage of the workers (in parenthesis) is based on own calculations following the sample restric-
tions explained in chapter 4. Calculations are done based on the cohorts 1949 through 1952 to show how
the new rules affected workers differently, depending on sector and ER affiliation. Group 4,5 and 6 mainly
consists of female (around 98%).
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Table 3: Characteristics of different workers at age 62 - Before 2011 (pre-reform) and after
2011 (post-reform)
Treated Control
Pre Post Pre Post










Weekly work hours 20.52 22.41 21.42 22.87
[18.00] [17.67] [16.97] [16.68]
Immigrant 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08
No Education 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.07
High School 0.59 0.60 0.37 0.36
Some College 0.20 0.22 0.54 0.58











Employed 0.73 0.85 0.82 0.86
Retired 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.08
Workhours as at age 60 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.42
Health Outcomes
GP-Consultations 3.46 3.53 3.50 3.54
[3.45] [3.49] [3.38] [3.47]
Cardiovascular Diagnoses 1.63 1.24 1.34 1.22
[3.45] [3.40] [3.05] [2.95]
Musculoskeletal Diagnoses 1.32 1.46 1.50 1.61
[2.79] [3.40] [3.01] [3.22]
Psychological Diagnoses 0.39 0.39 0.52 0.58
[1.55] [1.74] [1.99] [2.3]








Mortality by age 64 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006
Number of observations 30,423 18,455 38,949 25,358
Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics for the treated and control groups, by pre and post reform.
The outcomes are measured at ages 62–64, whereas the fixed characteristics are measured at age 60. Treated
refers to private sector workers who, in the absence of the reform, could have retired with a full ER pension
at age 62, but are eligible for full NIS old-age-pensions after 2011. Control is public sector workers eligible
for full NIS old-age-pensions at age 62, conditional on giving up the public ER pensions entitlements.
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Table 4: The effect on the probability of employment, retirement and retaining similar
contracted work-hours as at age 60
(1) (2) (3)
Employed Retired hourWeek80_60
CH * T 0.082*** -0.090*** 0.039***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Cohort 1949 * T 0.071*** -0.085*** 0.030***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Cohort 1950 * T 0.094*** -0.094*** 0.049***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Mean dep. var. .813 .126 .371
Number of Observations 339,555
Notes: This table presents the effect of the interaction term on employment status using OLS. The regressions
compare a dummy for employment status, retirement status and probability of working similar workhours as
at age 60 for the treatment group against a control group of public sector workers. I add cohort fixed effects
and a set of baseline covariates measured at age 60: income, dummy for immigrant, education, gender,
marital status and contracted work hours. Number of observations is N*T. Robust SEs in parenthesis.
*=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Table 5: The effect on the probability of an acute hospitalisations and number of hospital
days
(1) (2)
=1 if hospitalised at ages
62 through 64 Hospital days
CH * T 0.0023 -0.0158
(0.0016) (0.0208)
Cohort 1949 * T 0.0008 -0.0533**
(0.0021) (0.0255)
Cohort 1950 * T 0.0038* 0.0226
(0.0021) (0.0266)
Mean dep. var. .054 .355
Number of Observations 339,555
Notes: This table presents the effect of the interaction term on a dummy indicating acute hospitalisations,
and number of inpatient days within a year using OLS. The regressions compare the health outcomes for
the treatment group with a control group of public sector workers. I add cohort fixed effects and a set of
baseline covariates measured at age 60: income, dummy for immigrant, education, gender, marital status and
contracted work hours. Number of observations is N*T. Robust SEs in parenthesis. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01.
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Table 6: The effect on GP consultations and three diagnoses
(1) (2) (3) (4)





CH * T 0.0185 0.0393* 0.0136 -0.0148
(0.0236) (0.0212) (0.0197) (0.0124)
Cohort 1949 * T 0.0173 0.0397 -0.0098 -0.0068
(0.0297) (0.0270) (0.0248) (0.0152)
Cohort 1950 * T 0.0193 0.0388 0.0376 -0.0227
(0.0303) (0.0268) (0.0259) (0.0170)
Mean dep. var. 2.903 1.183 1.220 0.387
Number of obs. 280,779
Notes: This table presents the effect of the interaction term on number of GP consultations per month
and three relevant diagnoses. The regressions compare the health outcomes for the treatment group with a
control group of public sector workers. I add cohort fixed effects and a set of baseline covariates measured
at age 60: income, dummy for immigrant, education, gender, marital status and contracted work hours.
Number of observations is N*T. Robust SEs in parenthesis. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Table 7: The effect on the probability of dying by age 64
(1)
=1 if died by age 64
CH * T 0.0002
(0.0005)
Cohort 1949 * T 0.0001
(0.0007)
Cohort 1950 * T 0.0003
(0.0006)
Mean dep. var. .0050
Number of Observations 339,555
Notes: This table presents the effect of the interaction term on the probability of dying by age 64. The
regressions compare the outcomes for the treatment group with a control group of public sector workers. I
add cohort fixed effects and a set of baseline covariates measured at age 60: income, dummy for immigrant,
education, gender, marital status and contracted work hours. Number of observations is N*T. Robust SEs
in parenthesis. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 8: The effect on the probability of employment, retirement and retaining similar
contracted work-hours as at age 60, by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Female
Employed Retired >80% workhours
as at age 60
Employed Retired >80% workhours
as at age 60
CH * T 0.081*** -0.094*** 0.040*** 0.097*** -0.095*** 0.044***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Cohort 1949 * T 0.071*** -0.088*** 0.032*** 0.091*** -0.096*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Cohort 1950 * T 0.092*** -0.099*** 0.048*** 0.102*** -0.094*** 0.054***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Mean dep. var. .806 .132 .338 .823 .117 .412
Number of obs. 189,828 149,727
Notes: This table presents the effect of the interaction term on employment status using OLS. The regressions compare a
dummy for employment status, retirement status and probability of working the same workhours as at age 60 for the treatment
group with a control group of public sector workers. I add cohort fixed effects and a set of baseline covariates measured at age
60: income, dummy for immigrant, education, gender, marital status and contracted work hours. Number of observations is
N*T. Robust SEs in parenthesis. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Table 9: The effect on the probability of acute hospitalisations and number of subsequent
hospital days, by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female
=1 if healthshock Hospital days =1 if healthshock Hospital days
CH * T 0.0001 -0.037 0.003 -0.007
(0.002) (0.030) (0.003) (0.031)
Cohort 1949 * T -0.002 -0.080** 0.002 -0.050
(0.003) (0.037) (0.003) (0.037)
Cohort 1950 * T 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.036
(0.003) (0.038) (0.003) (0.039)
Mean dep. var. 0.062 0.415 0.044 0.279
Number of obs. 189,828 149,727
Notes: This table presents the effect of the interaction term on a dummy indicating acute hospitalisations,
and number of inpatient days within a year using OLS, by gender. The regressions compare the health
outcomes for the treatment group with a control group of public sector workers. I add cohort fixed effects
and a set of baseline covariates measured at age 60: income, dummy for immigrant, education, gender,






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: The effect on probability of dying by age 64, by gender
(1) (2)
Male Female
=1 if died by age 64
CH * T 0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)
Cohort 1949 * T 0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Cohort 1950 * T 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Mean dep. var. 0.0063 0.0034
Number of obs. 189,828 149,727
Notes: The estimates are the effect on the probability of dying by age 64, by gender. The regressions
compare the outcomes for the treatment group with a control group of public sector workers. I add cohort
fixed effects and baseline covariates measured at age 60: income, dummy for immigrant, education, gender,
marital status and contracted work hours. Number of observations is N*T. Robust SEs in parenthesis.
*=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Table 12: The effect on the probability of employment, retirement and retaining similar
contracted work-hours as at age 60, by socioeconomic status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









CH * T 0.081*** -0.103*** 0.037*** 0.050*** -0.038*** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Cohort 1949 * T 0.067*** -0.097*** 0.026*** 0.043*** -0.034*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Cohort 1950 * T 0.097*** -0.110*** 0.049*** 0.057*** -0.041*** 0.034***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
0.782 0.148 0.373 0.859 0.290 0.482
Number of obs. 202,186 137,369
Notes: The regressions compare a dummy for employment status, retirement status and probability of working the same
workhours as at age 60 for the treatment group with a control group of public sector workers. I add cohort fixed effects and
baseline covariates measured at age 60: income, dummy for immigrant, gender, marital status and contracted work hours.
Number of observations is N*T. Robust SEs in parenthesis. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 13: The effect on probability of acute hospitalisations, and number of subsequent
hospital days, by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Education High Education
=1 if healthshock Hospital days =1 if healthshock Hospital days
CH * T 0.002 -0.019 0.007** 0.028
(0.002) (0.029) (0.003) (0.036)
Cohort 1949 *
T
-0.0001 -0.053 0.007* -0.048
(0.003) (0.036) (0.004) (0.037)
Cohort 1950 *
T 0.005
* 0.017 0.007* 0.103*
(0.003) (0.035) (0.004) (0.053)
Mean dep. var. 0.057 0.391 0.050 0.303
Number of obs. 202,186 137,369
Notes: This table presents the effect of the interaction term on a dummy indicating acute hospitalisations,
and number of inpatient days within a year using OLS, by socioeconomic status. The regressions compare
the health outcomes for the treatment group with a control group of public sector workers. I add cohort fixed
effects and a set of baseline covariates measured at age 60: income, dummy for immigrant, gender, marital



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 15: Effects on the probability of dying age 64, by socioeconomic status
(1) (2)
Low Education High Education
=1 if died by age 64
CH * T 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Cohort 1949 * T 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Cohort 1950 * T 0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Mean dep. var. 0.005 0.003
N 202,186 137,367
Notes: This table presents the effect of the interaction term on the probability of dying by age 64, by
socioeconomic status. The regressions compare the outcomes for the treatment group with a control group
of public sector workers. I add cohort fixed effects and a set of baseline covariates measured at age 60:
income, dummy for immigrant, gender, marital status and contracted work hours. Number of observations
is N*T. Robust SEs in parenthesis. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Appendix Graphs and Tables
(a) Employment (b) >80% as at age 60
(c) Acute Hospitalisation (d) Days Hospitalised
(e) Mortality (f) Number of GP-consultation
Figure A.1: Time trends in outcome variables
Notes: The figure show the differences in unconditional means between the treatment and
control group, by cohort.
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Table A.1: Robustness - Labour Market outcomes for the 1947-cohort and main results
without controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









CH * T -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.088*** -0.101*** 0.046***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of Observations 208,116 208,116 208,116 339,555 339,555 339,555
Notes: This table presents two differnt robustness-tests: First is the effect on labour market outcomes for the 1947-cohort and
second is the main labour market outcomes without controls. Cohort fixed effects is still included. Number of observations is
N*T. Robust SEs in parenthesis. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Table A.2: Robustness - The effect on health without controls









=1 if died by
age 64
CH * T 0.003 -0.008** 0.023 0.022 0.027 -0.012 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.001)
Obs. 339,555
Notes: This table presents the main effect on the health-outcomes without controls. I still add cohort fixed effects. Number of
observations is N*T. Robust SEs in parenthesis. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Table A.3: Robustness - The effect on different earnings thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
>1BP >2BP >3BP >4BP >5BP >6BP
CH * T 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.061***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of Obs. 339,555
Notes: This table presents the effect on employment for different earnings threshold. BP=Basispoints. 1 basispoint is the lowest
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Abstract
Using a local randomized experiment that arises from the statutory retirement age in
Norway, we study the effect of retirement on health across gender and socioeconomic
status. We apply data from administrative registers covering the entire population and
from survey data of a random sample to investigate the effects of retirement on acute
hospital admissions, mortality, and a composite physical health score. Our results show
that retirement has a positive effect on physical health, especially for individuals with
low socioeconomic status. We find no retirement effects on acute hospitalisations or
mortality in general. However, our results suggest that retirement leads to reduced
likelihood of hospitalisations for individuals with low socioeconomic status. Finally, we
show that the positive health effects are driven by reduced pain and reduced health
limitations in conducting daily activities. Our findings highlight heterogeneity in the
health effects across socioeconomic status and across subjective and objective measures
of health.
Keywords: retirement, health, socioeconomic status, gender, regression discontinuity
design
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1 Introduction
With increasing life expectancy, the number of retired individuals as a share of the total
population is rising in most OECD countries. This has led to concerns about the fiscal
sustainability of public pension systems, and to policy initiatives that aim to prolong working
lives and increase retirement age. An important issue that seems to be overlooked in policy
debates over these reforms is the impact that prolonged working lives has on health, and
especially if there are heterogeneous retirement effects by socioeconomic status (SES).
Findings in the empirical literature regarding the health effects of retirement are mixed.
Some studies report positive effects (Coe and Zamarro, 2011; Eibich, 2015), whereas others
report negative effects (Behncke, 2012; Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2017) or no effects (Hernæs
et al., 2013; Heller-Sahlgren, 2017). Although some studies highlight the importance of (SES)
in these health effects (Coe and Zamarro, 2011; Eibich, 2015), there is limited evidence from
formal tests to suggest the effects differ by SES. Another limitation in the literature is that
most studies assess retirement effects in the early 60s, an age threshold that is substantially
lower than proposed policies to postpone retirement toward age 70. retirement towards age
70. Finally, most studies rely on survey data or administrative records (of sub-samples of the
population), which often imply subjectivity in the health outcomes or small sample issues.
In this paper, we investigate the health effects of retirement across socioeconomic status
and gender in Norway by applying both survey and administrative data, where the latter
cover the entire population. We assess the health effects of retirement at age 67, which
was the statutory retirement age in 2007. This is a higher age threshold than what has
previously been studied. To control for individuals self-selecting into retirement, we exploit
that the statutory retirement age causes a discontinuous change in the likelihood of retiring
at the exact timing of eligibility. This implies a local randomization around the retirement
eligibility age threshold, and makes a regression discontinuity (RD) framework suitable. We
compare the health outcomes for those right above the statutory retirement age threshold
(i.e. the treatment group) to those right below (i.e. the control group). This allows for
identification of the causal short-term effects of retirement on health.
Most studies in this field rely on survey data with the well-known limitations related
to non-response and recall bias. Furthermore, while measures of subjective health provide
important insights into how individuals experience and rate their own health, such measures
have been criticized for being contextual, and can suffer from justification bias (see e.g.
McGarry (2004) for a thorough discussion). Another possible concern is that survey data
of older adults is especially prone to health related selection, as non-response or attrition is
correlated with poor health.
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The Norwegian administrative data is attractive with respect to overcoming some of these
concerns. In particular, administrative data covers the entire population and records certain
health conditions as truly objective. Still, measures of health from public registers are of-
ten extreme outcomes, such as mortality and acute hospital admissions, and hence unsuited
for studying moderate health effects. In addition to records of mortality and acute hospi-
tal admissions from public registers, we include a composite measurement of self-assessed
health from a representative sample of Norwegian older adults (The NorLAG Panel Sur-
vey (Slagsvold et al., 2012). This measure is the short form-12 (SF-12) health survey (see
(Ware Jr et al., 1996). We assess both the overall physical score and the specific components
that goes into the SF-12.
We believe that our health measures, collectively, will provide important insight into
the multidimensional effects of retirement on health. Moreover, both data sources (the
administrative data and the NorLAG data) contain exact birth month and retirement date
from public registers, ruling out recollection bias. Finally, having monthly records allows for
a more precise estimation of the effects of retirement on health, as it enables a more local
estimation around the timing of retirement compared to analyses using data on the year
level.1
Socioeconomic status is important in the analysis of health effects of retirement because
it determines the kind of work situation an individual retired from. Higher education and
white collar jobs are often less physically demanding and associated with greater autonomy
and control over the work situation, compared to low SES jobs (Case and Deaton, 2005;
Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2012). Moreover, Case and Deaton (2005) document that manual
labor jobs, associated with low education and low income, are more "wear and tear" types of
jobs, in which health deteriorates at a more rapid pace than individuals in a "non-manual"
professions.
According to the (Grossman, 1972) model of health demand, individuals with low edu-
cation or low financial capital (low SES) will have to rely more heavily on their health as an
input in the labor market, compared to individuals with higher SES, as the different sources
of capital are substitutes in the labor market. This is typically manifested through strenu-
ous manual labor for the low SES groups. Moreover, individuals with higher education are
assumed to be more efficient in promoting their own health. In sum, the two mechanisms
make it more costly for low SES groups to continue working. Retirement can therefore be
seen as a mechanism that levels health inequalities between SES groups. As SES can be
an important factor in analyses of retirement and health, we systematically assess how the
1See Dong (2015) and Lee and Card (2008) for a discussion of why age in years might yield inconsistent
results unless properly accounted for.
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health effects differ by socioeconomic status.
The RD application in this study identifies the short term health effects of retirement. On
the one hand, we can expect to see short term effects on health as the relief from strenuous
physical work or the relief from working in a stressful environment is an instantaneous change
of circumstance. On the other hand, retirement may lead to a reduced sense of purpose before
new routines has been developed (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010).
Our results show that retirement yields a sizeable and positive effect on physical health.
This effect is especially strong for the low SES group, whereas we find no effects for the high
SES group. We find no effects on mortality or acute hospitalisations in general. However,
for the low SES group, we find that retirement leads to a reduction in the likelihood of
acute hospitalisations. Our results show that SES is important when studying the effect of
retirement on health, but we find no gender differences. Moreover, we find that the reason
why retirement leads to better physical health is due to reduced pain and a lower likelihood
of reporting that physical health is a limitation in completing both “daily” tasks and “specific
tasks profoundly”. The results for physical health and mortality are robust to a wide range
of robustness and specification checks, whereas the checks regarding the results for hospital
admissions are less robust, and must therefore be interpreted with some caution.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of previous research and
describes the institutional structure of the Norwegian pension system. Section 3 describes
our empirical strategy. In Section 4, we present the data, outcome variables, and some basic
summary statistics. Our main results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Earlier literature and institutional sSetting
2.1 Earlier literature
Our paper is related to a growing body of economic research about the effect of retirement
on health. Given the important aspect of this issue and the vast amount of literature on
the topic, there is a surprising lack of consensus across studies. One reason for this is that a
large fraction of the existing evidence reports correlations rather than well-identified causal
effects. Lately, there has been an increasing amount of well-identified studies, most of which
apply exogenous variation in the retirement eligibility as sources of identification. As the
majority of these studies apply survey data or administrative records for sub-samples of the
population, we contribute to the literature by providing objective health outcomes for the
entire Norwegian population.
One of the most cited related studies is Coe and Zamarro (2011). They study the extent
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to which retirement affects measures of self-reported health and a composite health index
across several European countries using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) data. They find that retirement reduces the likelihood of reporting bad
self-rated health and leads to an improvement in a composite measure of subjective health.
From the US setting, Neuman (2008) uses age-specific retirement incentives as instru-
ments for retirement. Applying data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), he
provides evidence of retirement being both preserving and improving for self-rated health.
He argues that since retirement removes the time constraint induced by labor market partic-
ipation, more time can be devoted to activities that both preserve and enhance individuals’
health. This is in line with Grossman’s model of health demand, where it can be shown
that especially time-intensive workouts may be more attractive after retirement, when the
opportunity cost of participating in such activities drops.
Insler (2014) uses data from HRS, and apply workers’ self- reported probabilities of
working past ages 62 and 65 as instruments. He finds that retirees experience positive
effects on a health index, which consists of both objective and subjective measures of health.
Moreover, he finds that retirees tend to reduce smoking and participate more in health-
enhancing activities.
However, not all studies have shown retirement to have such a positive impact. Using
data from the English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA), Behncke (2012) reports that
retirement actually increases the risk of being diagnosed with a cardiovascular disease2 and
cancer. Also contradictory to the findings of the aforementioned studies, she finds that
retirement increases the probability of reporting poor health, and the risk of being diagnosed
with a chronic condition.
Bound and Waidmann (2007) apply measures of self-assessed and objective health from
the ELSA study, and find that retirement leads to a small, but significant positive effect on
physical health for men. Physical health entails self-assessed health, physical functioning and
biomarkers. Moreover, they show that these results are highly sensitive to job characteristics
and differences in socioeconomic status. As these differences arguably play an important role
in determining the effect of retirement on health, there has recently been a growing interest
in tackling these heterogeneity issues. To the best of our knowledge, only a small number of
studies have investigated the presence of heterogeneity across SES or gender in the effects of
retirement on health.
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2017) stress the importance of heterogeneity in the health effect
of retirement, and argue that the previous literature have failed to detect the potential
2Retirement is also found to have an impact on increased obesity (Godard, 2016; Rohwedder and Willis,
2010).
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heterogeneity. Using the SHARE data, they find that for people working in more physically
demanding jobs, retirement has an immediate beneficial effect on both a health index of
self-reported measures and cognition. For the rest of the workforce, however, retirement has
negative long-term effects on health and cognition.
In the paper closest to our study, Eibich (2015) applies a regression discontinuity frame-
work, to study the effect of retirement on several subjective measures of health in Germany.
The empirical evidence suggests the presence of effect-heterogeneity by socioeconomic status.
Whereas he uncovered no effect of retirement on health for individuals with higher education,
individuals who retire from strenuous jobs seem to experience a large and positive change in
physical health.
From the Norwegian setting, Hernæs et al. (2013) employ a stepwise introduction of
early retirement ages in Norway in the 1990s as instruments to assess whether retirement
age matters for mortality. They find no relationship between lowering early retirement age
and probability of dying, by following individuals until age 77.3 Moreover, they question
whether retirement has a causal impact on mortality.
Based on the relevant literature, it is unclear to what extent and in what direction re-
tirement affects health. Previous findings are characterized by differences in methodology,
be it an instrumental variable approach, regression discontinuity approach, or difference-in-
difference approach. Another aspect of the literature is the different outcomes of health.
While self-rated physical health often is positively associated with retirement, others docu-
ment a decline in mental health and cognitive abilities.
2.2 Institutional setting in Norway
This section provides background information on the institutional setting in Norway in
2007/2008.4 We start with a brief description of the pension system, as this is the main
focus of our study. An individual can start claiming retirement pension the first month
after reaching the statutory retirement age of 67, and is, in our analysis, considered retired
once this claim is made. The main provider of retirement pension is the mandatory pub-
lic National Insurance System (NIS). This is a pay-as-you-go defined benefit system, and
all individuals with a minimum number of years of residence are covered. Once retired, the
pension consists of a mix between fixed earnings-independent basic pension and pension con-
tributions based on previous labor market income. Replacement rates from annual earnings
3Early retirement in Norway was introduced at age 66, but later reduced in a stepwise matter to age 62.
The authors exploits this stepwise reduction as a source of exogenous variation.
4The pension system was reformed in 2011, but none of the new rules was in place throughout our
study-period.
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have been found to be around 72% on average (Røed and Haugen, 2003).
In theory, the statutory retirement age did not force individuals to retire. However, most
companies had contracted retirement upon reaching the statutory retirement, and the norm
was that people retired once they hit this age threshold. Moreover, for most of the workforce
there was little economic incentive to prolong working life once eligible for old age pension.
There was a full earnings test in place for individuals aged between 67 and 69 for earnings
above 2 basic amounts,5 resulting in a 40% reduction of the old age pension for each dollar
earned.6
Besides the statutory retirement age, there are two other commonly-used exit routes
from the labor market: disability insurance (DI) and the Early Retirement Program (ER).
These are early exits routes that are temporarily available until the statutory retirement age.
Eligibility for DI is based on health status and must be certified by a physician based on a
permanent reduced ability to work. DI can also be graded in a way that allows individuals to
combine work and DI. ER was available for all public and about half of private sector workers
from age 62.7 At 67, recipients of DI and ER are automatically transferred to retirement
pension.
Table 1 summarizes the labor market status for individuals aged 56-79 in 2007. This table
shows the fraction of individuals who are either working, on ER, DI, or claiming retirement
pensions. The shares do not summarize to unity because it is possible for the same individual
to be in two states, e.g. by combining partial uptake of DI and working.
Table 1 shows two important preconditions for our empirical analysis: labor market
participation rate remains relatively high for older workers in Norway, and most individuals
start claiming pensions as soon as they reach the age of 67. Provided the strong link between
retirement pension uptake and exit from employment, we argue that claiming retirement
pension in practice means withdrawing from the labor market. Strictly speaking, in this
analysis, we are estimating the intention-to-treat (ITT) effects of offering retirement pension
at age 67. Because uptake of pension in practice means withdrawal from the workforce for
the majority of the population, we assume that the health effects to a large degree will stem
from the relief from work related tasks. We refer to claiming retirement pension as retirement
in the remainder of this article.
5One basic amount is the lowest earnings required to accrue pension points.
6This was lifted in 2008 for 67 year-olds.
7See Hernæs et al. (2013) or Kudrna (2017) for more details about the ER system.
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3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Regression discontinuity design
We investigate the impact of retirement along several dimensions of health. Ideally, we seek
to investigate the following linear relationship between health and retirement:
Healthi = β0 + β1Retirementi +X
′
iβ2 + εi, (1)
where Retirementi is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual has retired and zero
otherwise and Xi is a vector of relevant covariates. If retirement were to be considered a
random event, Equation (1) would provide us with an unbiased estimate of the effect of
retirement on health. However, people typically decide themselves when to retire. Moreover,
unobservable factors such as knowledge about own longevity or other factors that correlate
with both health and the retirement decision remain unaccounted for in Equation (1). This
cause omitted variable bias in β1. Importantly, own health is likely to affect retirement,
causing bias in β1 due to reverse causation. In order to circumvent these issues in the OLS
specification, we apply regression discontinuity design (RD).
RD exploits institutional settings that determine access to a treatment. The idea is
that treatment (retirement) is determined by a running variable (age), reaching a known
threshold (the statutory retirement age). Units above the threshold receive the treatment
and units below the threshold do not receive the treatment. This means that we use age
as an allocation mechanism that determines retirement, rather than using actual retirement
behaviour. The RD design relies on local identification by comparing individuals’ right
above and right below the retirement age cut-off. The discontinuity gap in health at this
point identifies the treatment effect. Since the probability of retirement is discontinuous at
the cutoff age of 67, we assume that reaching this age limit is what causes individuals to
retire. Importantly, this assumption only holds for individuals close to the cutoff on the age
distribution.
As described in Section 2, the general rule was that individuals started claiming retire-
ment pensions at the statutory retirement age of 67. However, about 16 percent of men and
13 percent of women within the eligible age groups chose to retire early through ER, and a
small fraction retired later. This is a setting of imperfect compliance. The Fuzzy RD (FRD)
design is therefore more appropriate. Unlike in the Sharp RD, where all treated units are
compliers, i.e. the likelihood of treatment goes from zero to one at the threshold, the fuzzy
RD allows for a smaller discontinuity in the probability of retirement at the threshold.8
8The difference between sharp and fuzzy RD is parallel to the difference between a randomized experiment
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3.2 Estimation
The FRD design resembles a setting with instrumental variables, with retirement coefficients
consistently estimated by using two stage least squares (2SLS) (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
The treatment effect is to be interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE), i.e. the
estimated treatment effect of retirement on health, for individuals induced by the age thresh-
old to retire (Hahn et al., 2001). In the setting of imperfect compliance with the treatment,
the intention-to-treat (ITT) is as if randomized, which implies a causal interpretation of the
estimated coefficients. The estimated effects are interpreted as the health effects of offering
retirement pension at age 67.
Formally, we instrument for retirement using age equal to, or above the retirement thresh-
old at 805 months, the month after which an individual turn 67 years of age. Specifically,
we estimate the following two equations:
Retirementi = γ0 + γ11[Agei ≥ c] + γ2AgeBi + γ3AgeAi + ui, (2)
where the endogenous regressor Retirementi is a binary variable equal to one if the individ-
ual is retired, i.e. is claiming retirement pension. 1[•] is an indicator function taking the
value one if the condition inside the brackets is true, and zero otherwise. c represents the
retirement eligibility threshold at 805 months (age 67). Age is measured in months, and we
include continuous age controls. These are allowed to have different slopes at either side of
the threshold. Superscript B refers to ages below the retirement threshold at age 67, and
superscript A refers to ages above the threshold.
The first stage in this 2SLS set-up is actual retirement predicted by age exceeding the
threshold, controlled for the general effect of age on retirement. We apply retirement as
predicted in the first stage, and the second stage is given by:
Healthi = β0 + τ ̂Retirement+ β1AgeBi + β2AgeAi + ei, (3)
here, Healthi represents the different health measures for individual i. Our parameter of
interest is τ , and its estimate is the jump in the outcome variable at the threshold, divided by
the fraction induced to take up treatment at the threshold. This is the estimated treatment
effect of retirement on health, for individuals induced by the age threshold to retire.
As the health effects in the RD design is only identified close to the retirement threshold,
the estimations are done locally around the threshold. We choose the optimal bandwidth, i.e.
with perfect compliance and a randomized experiment with imperfect compliance, when only the intention
to treat is randomized.
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how many months on either sides of the age cutoff to include in the estimation,9 in a cross-
validation procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). This is designed to
minimize the mean squared error, and provides a trade-off between bias and variance. Based
on this bandwidth selector, we choose a bandwidth of 10 months.10 This means that only
individuals in the age range 795 months to 815 months (10 months before and 10 months after
the retirement age threshold) are included in the estimations.11 In the sensitivity analysis,
we assess different bandwidths to check the sensitivity of the results with respect to choice of
bandwidth. In addition to assessing different bandwidths, we perform a range of robustness
checks. Here we follow the guide to practice by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for robustness
checks using the RD design. These results are presented in the appendix, but we discuss
them briefly in Section 5 (Results).
Finally, in the cross-sectional survey data, we follow Lee and Card (2008) and cluster
at the age group level. As noted by Lee and Card (2008), for RD applications where the
running variable is discrete, estimating a parametric function away from the discontinuity
point can be seen as a form of random specification error. This implies a common component
of variance for all the observations at any given value of the running variable. Thus, they
suggest clustering at the age group level to account for this imperfect fit, as clustering leads
to wider confidence intervals. In the panel data from the administrative records, we cluster
at the individual level to account for the within-person correlation in the error term. The
structure of these data will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
4 Data and sample Selection
4.1 Data
We use data from two separate sources in our analysis. The first is a survey carried out
on a representative sample of Norwegian older adults, and the second is comprised of ad-
ministrative health and population registers covering the entire population. Unfortunately,
individuals from the two sources cannot be connected, as the first data source has been
9Dong (2015) show that using regression discontinuity design calls for careful consideration of the unit
of measurement when age is the forcing variable, as age in years, as opposed to age in months, might lead
to inconsistent results.
10The optimal bandwidth suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) varies by SES-group. The
suggested bandwidth is in the range 8-12 months for all the groups. For simplicity, we apply a bandwidth of
10 months in all estimations. Choosing different bandwidths within this interval has little influence on the
estimated effects. See the robustness checks in the appendix for more on sensitivity of bandwidths.
11Due to the small sample size left in the survey data when we apply the 10 months bandwidths, we also
ran the entire analysis using a bandwidth of 20 months. This does not change the results from the survey
data in any substantial way.
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anonymized.
The NorLAG survey data
The first datasource is a survey carried out on a representative sample of Norwegian older
adults, the Norwegian Study on Life-Course, Aging and Generation (NorLAG) panel study.
12 The data was collected in 2002 and 2007. NorLAG contains individual data on a range
of health outcomes, as well as information about socioeconomic status. Data collection was
carried out by Statistics Norway with computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI).
All respondents to the survey are merged with administrative registers for the period
2002-2012. The registers contain information on year and month of birth and of retirement.
Furthermore, the registers contain various sociodemographic background information such
as labor income, social insurance take-up, and educational attainment. We are thus able to
construct detailed information for each individual regarding attachment to the labor market,
retirement status and social security take-up, enabling identification of the exact timing of
retirement, and whether the individual retired directly from the labor force or transitioned
from disability insurance or other welfare programs.
Currently, the panel consists of two waves. For the main analyses, we use the second
wave as this contains a larger sample than the first wave.13 However, for some specifications
in the sensitivity analysis, we rely on data from the first wave to obtain information about
past labor market performance. This is outlined in more detail in Section 4.2.
Our health outcome from the NorLAG data is a composite measure of physical health,
namely the physical component of the Short Form 12 (SF12) scale (Ware Jr et al., 1996).
Self-rated health (SRH) is one of the components that go into the SF12. Other factors are
measures of the degree to which an individual is able to perform tasks like vacuuming, moving
a table or climbing stairs, whether there are certain tasks that could not be performed due
to health limitations, or whether pain limits daily activities. The score is standardized on a
scale from 0-100 with a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 using the US population as
a reference. SF12 has been found to be a strong predictor of hospitalisation, job loss due to
health, future use of medical health services, and depression (see e.g. Jenkinson and Layte
(1997); Ware Jr et al. (1996); Brazier and Roberts (2004)).
Occupational status in the NorLAG data is coded in accordance with the ISCO-88 scale.
This has been re-coded into two occupational groups: manual and professional workers,
following the classical division into blue and white collar workers of higher and lower skills.14
12See Slagsvold et al. (2012) for a thorough description.
13The first wave contains 5,559 observations (response rate 67%), whereas the second wave contains 15,149
observations (response rate 60%).
14Coded according to NACE Rev.1.1.
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Professional workers are defined as high skilled white collar workers, the term "manual
workers" refers to three categories: high and low skilled blue collar workers and low skilled
white collar workers. We apply this categorization of manual workers, because the latter
three groups are more similar based on observable characteristics.
Administrative data
Our second data source is comprised of administrative data that covers the entire Norwegian
population. All residents are assigned to a unique personal identification number, which en-
ables them to link information from various administrative registers, such as health registers,
income and social insurance registers, and population registers. These registers contain infor-
mation on year and month of birth, death and retirement, as well as educational attainment,
income, and social security uptake.
We apply two health outcomes from the administrative data. The first is a binary indica-
tor of whether a person has been acutely hospitalized in a particular month. This information
comes from the national patient register (NPR), which contains records of all inpatient and
outpatient stays at Norwegian hospitals from 2008–2014. Admissions are coded by whether
the hospitalisation is a result of a planned or unplanned admission. The latter can be thought
of as acute in the sense that treatment has been deemed necessary, typically as a result of
an accident, stroke, or severe heart condition.15 The second health outcome is a binary
indicator of whether a person passed away in a particular month. This information comes
from the Norwegian cause-of-death registry, and contains all recorded deaths in Norway from
1992–2014. Both outcomes thus yield the likelihood of the particular outcome at a specific
age-in-month.
Importantly, these measures of health are not correlated with the time cost to consult
medical expertise. As individuals have more time at their disposal after retirement, the
opportunity cost of seeking medical help is reduced once retired compared to when working.
It is therefore likely that the prevalence of a diagnosis or a medical treatment that is not
acute increases after retirement, when the opportunity cost of seeing a physician has fallen.
Applying a health outcome that is correlated with the opportunity cost of medical consulta-
tions can therefore erroneously lead to the conclusion that retirement caused the increased
prevalence of the health outcome.
15All admissions are coded in accordance with the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and
Related Health Problems, ICD-10, (see WHO (1992)).
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4.2 Sample selection
We restrict our attention to individuals aged 56-79 in 2007 and 2008 in both data-sources.
From the administrative records, we use data from 2008.16 This leaves 4,619 individuals in
the NorLAG sample and 892,908 individuals in the register sample. The administrative data
in our analysis is a panel data set, with monthly records of hospitalisation, mortality, retire-
ment, and age in months. As such, month by month, the treatment variable is determined
according to age in months exceeding the retirement age threshold. Including fixed effects
is unnecessary for identification in an RD design. Moreover, as the source of identification
is a comparison between those just below and just above the threshold, which can be car-
ried out with a single cross-section, imposing a specific dynamic structure introduces more
restrictions without any gain in identification (see Lee and Lemieux (2010)). We therefore
treat the sample from the register panel data as repeated cross-sections and pool all months
together, treating each observation as an individual. This also makes the administrative
data more comparable to the NorLAG data.
In order to maintain the intention to treat in the RD design and to ensure that we
have enough data for inference, we place no further restrictions on the sample for the main
analysis. This means that our analytical sample will include individuals on DI or individuals
who are not working for other reasons. Individuals on DI are automatically classified as
retired once they hit the age threshold. In theory, we should expect no retirement effects
for this group, as their work status remains unchanged when they retire. This would bias
our results towards zero. However, the health outcomes in the survey data can suffer from
justification bias. Being on disability insurance might make an individual, consciously or
subconsciously, under-report their health in order to justify their status as disabled. The
need for this justification is no longer present once they are transferred to retirement pension.
In this case, the estimates would be biased upwards and we might worry that the positive
effect on health was driven by these individuals. As a sensitivity analysis, we therefore run
the whole analysis including only individuals who were gainfully employed or working until
retirement.
Ideally, we want to compare individuals working up to retirement age to individuals
who retired from working. In the NorLAG data, this is done by adjusting the sample by
two rules. The first rule implies including only individuals who had income from labor the
previous year in the analysis; the second rule implies including only individuals who have
stated that they are working or were working before they became retired. Some caveats are
worth mentioning: the first rule results in a substantial reduction in the sample size, as we
16This is the earliest year in which data on hospitalisations are available.
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need to use the balanced panel from both waves of the NorLAG study to identify labor income
in 2006. A potential concern with the second rule is that the formulation of the question
to the working and retired part of the population differs slightly in the NorLAG data. To
maintain continuity across the retirement threshold, it is crucial that we apply exactly the
same selection rule on either side of the threshold when identifying the sub-samples for the
sensitivity analyses. In the administrative data, we define individuals as working if they
currently have positive income or if they had positive income before retirement. We find
that these sensitivity analyses does not alter our conclusions.17
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the sample from both the NorLAG data and the
administrative data. These are men and women aged 56-79 in 2007 and 2008 respectively.
The first two columns are summary statistics for the whole sample, whereas the next two
columns show the summary statistics for those within the bandwidth of 10 months below and
10 months above the retirement threshold of 805 months (age 67). These are the observations
within the bandwidth used for estimating the short-term retirement effects in the regression
analysis. It is important that the two groups are balanced with respect to the covariates.
T-tests (not shown) confirm that individuals on either side of the threshold are similar with
respect to education, living arrangements and occupation.
5 Results
5.1 Graphical results
To motivate the use of the FRD design, Figure 1 displays the share of retired individuals
from age 55 until age 79. The two upper graphs are constructed using the survey data,
whereas the two lower graphs are constructed using the administrative data. The age span
in the four graphs are the same (55-79), but the x-axis on the two left graphs depicts age
in years, whereas the x-axis on the two right graphs depicts age in months. The latter is
to show that the discontinuity in retirement coincides with the first month after turning 67
(the first month of retirement eligibility).
In all of the four figures, the patterns are very similar.18 There is a substantial disconti-
17The results from the sensitivity analysis are shown in the Appendix.
18In the graphs, retirement refers only to those who have actually retired, either through the early pension
program or at the retirement age of 67. This means that individuals on DI are not considered retired. If we
remove all individuals that are currently on DI or who were on DI before they retired from our sample, the
picture looks the same.
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nuity in the likelihood of being retired at age 67 (805 months). Since some workers chose to
retire early, we also see a small discontinuity at age 62, the lowest eligible age for early retire-
ment. Only a negligible share of individuals chose to retire later than age 67. The graphical
evidence thus show a clear response in terms of retirement at the statutory retirement age.
We build our empirical analysis on the discontinuity at age 67.
Figure 2 presents graphical evidence on the relationships between health and age for the
three outcomes used in our study: physical health, acute hospital admissions, and mortality.
The age range spans from 55 to 79 years, and the x-axes are depicted as age-in-months
relative to the retirement age threshold at 805 months, normalized to zero. The lines are
fitted on either side of the threshold using a second order polynomial global fit.
The upper graph (a) in Figure 2 shows the observed health pattern for physical health for
all individuals aged 56-79 in the NorLAG sample. Physical health declines with increasing
age, but there is a substantial jump at the retirement threshold. At this threshold, the
trajectory shifts up to a level of someone 80 months younger, which amounts to 6.5 years.
For acute hospitalisations and mortality, the two lower graphs, (b) and (c) respectively,
we see that the incidence rate increases across the age-span 56-79, but there does not seem
to be any substantial discontinuities in the outcomes reflected in the graphs. For acute
hospitalisations, we see a small, possible negligible, downward shift at the threshold.
There is an ongoing debate as to whether it is the cumulative or contemporaneous effects
of retirement that are the largest (see Coe and Zamarro (2011); Mazzonna and Peracchi
(2017)). As mentioned above, the effects estimated using RD are only identified close to
the threshold, so any prolonged retirement effects becomes mere speculation in this setting.
However, by visual inspection of the graph for physical health, (a) in Figure 2, there is
suggestive evidence of a prolonged effect of retirement on physical health, as retirement
shifts individuals to a higher health trajectory, where they seem to stay as age increases.
5.2 Regression results
We present the 2SLS regression results for all three health dimensions in Table 3 - Table
6. The effects are estimated using a bandwidth of +/− 10 months around the threshold,
which is the optimal bandwidth using the selector suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012)). We estimate the effects for each gender and for the different SES-groups separately.
In Table 8, we present results from a formal test of heterogeneous retirement effects in which
the instrument is interacted with indicators of the different SES-groups.
In Table 3, we present the first stage of the 2SLS regression results. This is the estimated
effect of crossing the statutory retirement age on the probability of retirement, i.e. τ from
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Equation (2). The results in Table 3 show that crossing the statutory retirement age sig-
nificantly increases the probability of retirement, thus indicating a strong first stage. These
results are in line with the graphical results presented in Figure 1.
5.2.1 The effect on physical health
Table 4 displays the results of the short-term retirement effects on physical health. We
find that retirement leads to a 5.7 points increase in physical health for the population as
a whole. This is a substantial effect given that the mean and standard deviation for this
health outcome is 47 and 10 points, respectively. We find a strong and positive effect for
men (8 points), and a positive (4 points), but not statistically significant, effect for women.
Our findings are in line with evidence from Coe and Zamarro (2011) and Eibich (2015), who
suggest that, in general, retirement leads to an increase in physical health in both the USA
and Germany. Although our estimates are short-term effects, previous findings suggest that
retirement also has a cumulative effect on physical health through increased physical activity
(e.g., Eibich (2015)).
Based on the discussion in the introduction, we can expect different health effects of
retirement depending on education and occupation. The four latter columns in Table 4 show
the effects for the different SES-groups. For the manual workers and low educated groups,
the effects are large (13.2 and 8.4 points respectively) at about one standard deviation, and
significant at the 1 percent level. For the high SES groups, we find no statistically significant
effects, and the coefficients are closer to zero.
These results are in line with the findings of Eibich (2015). He shows that highly edu-
cated individuals benefit less from retirement in terms of self-reported health, compared to
individuals with low SES. Moreover, Insler (2014) suggests that wealthy people have more
time to invest in their health while working.
Power calculations show that a sample of at least 90 is needed to ensure a power of
0.8. Allthough well above this threshold, the sub-group samples are fairly small. It could
be argued that this should lead to the application of wider bandwidths. However, wider
bandwidths also imply more bias (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). We did, however, run the whole
analysis using a bandwidth of 20 months. This about doubles the observations in each
sub-group, but the effects sizes and significance levels remains fairly the same.
To sum up, the results are clear in that retirement leads to better physical health for
men, and for the low SES groups. For women, the results are similar in effects size, yet
statistically not significant. We find no health effects of retirement for the high SES group.
Based on this analysis, there does not seem to be substantial differences by gender, but both
the gender difference and the differences by SES will be formally assessed in Section 5.2.5.
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5.2.2 The effect on acute hospitalisation
We now turn to our estimates from the administrative data. Acute hospitalisation is based
on a dummy for inpatient care in which treatment is deemed necessary. The results are
presented in Table 5.
First, we explore how retirement affects acute unscheduled hospitalisations for the pop-
ulation on average and by gender. For all sub-groups the effect size is about -0.4 percentage
points, but not significant. When we divide by SES, we find that retirement leads to a 0.6
percentage point reduction in the likelihood of acute hospitalisation for the low SES group.
As the incidence of acute hospitalisations is 14 percent, this amounts to a 4 percent reduction
in the likelihood of acute hospitalisations. The effect is significant at the 5 percent level. For
the high SES group, we find an effect of 0.3, yet this is not significantly different from zero.
One way to think of these results is that retirement for the population in general leads to
no short-term change in serious health-conditions. Hallberg et al. (2015) studied a targeted
early retirement offer to workers in the military at age 55 and find that the number of days in
inpatient care is significantly reduced at ages 61-70. One possible drawback with our method
is that the regression discontinuity design only captures the short-term effect of retirement,
and any potential gain of retirement is possibly not found in the subsequent months after
retirement. For instance, Hallberg et al. (2015) find a 4.7 days reduction in inpatient care
6-10 years after early retirement, whereas the estimated effect is 2 days in the first years
after early retirement.
To some extent, the same intuition can be found in Behncke (2012). She shows that retire-
ment increases the risk of being diagnosed with a chronic condition in the subsequent years
after retirement. However, assessments applying less acute diagnoses can be confounded for
two reasons. First, the opportunity cost of seeking medical help is greatly reduced after
retirement, hence increasing the likelihood of detecting such conditions. Second, the reason
for seeking medical help can differ for individuals who are working and individuals who are
retired. In Norway, for example, sickness absence from work for longer than the self certified
absence period19 must be certified by a physician, which means that retirees and employers
most likely visit the doctor for different reasons.
19A medical certificate is required for spells of absence of more than three days or eight days, depending
on whether the employer has signed the "IA-agreement" or not.
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5.2.3 The effect on mortality
The results described in the previous sections suggests that retirement leads to a short-term
positive effect on subjective measures of health, whereas we find no or small effects on the
number of acute hospitalisations. Given the latter findings, a-priori, we expect to see little or
no short-term effect on mortality. In Table 6, we display the estimation results on mortality.
We find no short-term effect of retirement on mortality. Regardless of gender and sub-
group, the estimates remain statistical indistinguishable from zero.
The question remains whether a short-term effect of retirement on relatively serious
outcomes, such as mortality, is implausible in the short run. Hallberg et al. (2015) use cox-
regression models to form hazard ratios and find that early retirement at age 55 reduces
the risk of dying at age 70 by around 26 percent. Studying the first five years after an
early retirement window in Holland, Bloemen et al. (2017) find a drop in the probability of
dying of around 2.6 percent. The same effect is found in Blake and Garrouste (2013) and
Kuhn et al. (2010), albeit the latter only for male blue-collar workers. However, studying
the introduction of early retirement in Norway, Hernæs et al. (2013) find no effect of early
retirement on mortality. They follow workers for a maximum up to 77 years of age, with
eligibility for early retirement varying between 62 and 65 years of age. They conclude that
early retirement in itself has no effect on mortality.
Taken together, our results show that in general there are no effects of retirement on
serious health outcomes. However, as this study and several other studies show, retirement
affects subjective health. What is it about these outcomes that actually makes people feel
better? In the next section, we look further into the subjective physical health outcome
(SF-12) to assess which aspects of health that are improved by retirement.
5.2.4 Looking further into the effect on physical health
SF-12 is composed by survey responses to the following 20: rate your health on a scale from
1-5 (self-rated health); is your health of such a character that it limits you in doing tasks
like moving a table, vacuuming, hiking or gardening; is your health of such a character
that it limits you from climbing several flights of stairs; has your physical health limited
you in doing your daily tasks so that you have accomplished less than you wished for; has
your physical health limited you from completing specific tasks; has psychological problems
limited you from doing daily tasks so that you have accomplished less than you which for;
has psychological problems limited you from doing these tasks as profoundly as usually; has
pain limited you from doing your daily tasks; have you been feeling calm and harmonious,
20Translated from Norwegian by the authors.
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energized or sad during the last four weeks; and, finally, has physical or mental health limited
you from socializing as much as you wanted.
Out of the 12 components that go into the SF-12, five were significantly impacted by
retirement. These are the following: is your health of such a character that it limits you
in doing tasks like moving a table, vacuuming, hiking or gardening (Functional); has your
physical health limited you in doing your daily tasks so that you have accomplished less than
you wished for (Daily); has your physical health limited you from completing specific tasks
(Specific); has psychological problems limited you from doing these tasks as profoundly as
usually (Mental); has pain limited you from doing your daily tasks (Pain). Each question is
coded as a binary variable, where one means that health or pain is experienced as limiting.
In Table 7, we present the results for these four components.
Retirement was found to reduce the experience that physical health is a limiting factor
in accomplishing as much as one would like, and as a limiting factor in doing specific tasks.
The former holds for both men and women, whereas the latter holds for men. We find
particularly strong effects on reduced pain, especially for women. Furthermore, we find that,
in general, retirement reduced the limitations in doing tasks profoundly experienced due to
mental health.
When we assess the different SES-groups we find that it is manual workers or lower-
educated individuals who experience reduced pain and limitations from physical and mental
health. We find no effects for the high SES groups. Moreover, when we divide the groups
by SES, we also find that, for the low SES group, retirement reduced the limitation caused
by health in doing functional tasks such as vacuuming, moving a table, hiking, or gardening.
These effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for manual workers and at the
10 percent level for the low-educated group.
5.2.5 A formal test of effect heterogeneity
Table 8 presents the results from the formal test of heterogeneity. These are the results of
a reduced form of Equation (3), where the instrument is interacted with SES groups and
gender. We estimate the following:
Healthi = β0 + γ1[Agei ≥ c]× SESi + β11[Agei ≥ c] + β2AgeBi + β3AgeAi + ei, (4)
where γ is the coefficient of interest and 1[Agei ≥ c] is the instrument indicating whether age
in months is equal to or exceeds the threshold. SES is a binary indicator of either manual
workers, low education or women. We apply the same +/- 10 months bandwidth in these
estimations.
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We see that the effects of retirement are statistically different from each other when
SES is measured by occupation. Although the estimated effects differ quite substantially by
educational group as shown in Table 4, the differences are not statistically significant when
SES is proxied by education. Moreover, there are no statistically significant differences in the
retirement effect by gender. Hence, we show that accounting for differences by socioeconomic
status can be important in analyses of retirement effects on health.
5.3 Robustness checks and sensitivity Analysis
The results from the robustness checks are presented in the Appendix, but we provide a brief
overview here. First, we show that our results on physical health and mortality are robust
to different bandwidths, whereas increasing the bandwidth from 10 to 15 months yields
significant, negative effects on the likelihood of having an acute hospitalisation. The effects
are still small, ranging from 0.7 to 1 percentage points, yielding a 5-7 percent reduction in
the likelihood of an acute hospitalisation. Increasing the bandwidth increases the likelihood
of factors, other than retirement, affecting acute hospital admissions. Another explanation
can be that it takes some time for retirement to take effect on health issues such as stroke and
acute heart conditions, thus including more post-retirement months increases the likelihood
of finding significant effects.21
We then look for discontinuities at the retirement age threshold in a covariate that is
not affected by the treatment, in this case marital status. Although, retirement can affect
the likelihood of being married, it is highly unlikely in the immediate aftermath (within
10 months) of retirement. We find no retirement effects on the likelihood of living with a
partner or spouse (the NorLAG data) or on being married (the administrative data).
Next, we perform placebo tests by checking for discontinuities in the health outcomes
at values of the forcing variable and age where there should be no discontinuities. We find
no discontinuities in the health outcomes at the placebo thresholds of age 61 and 73 for
physical health or mortality, but we find some inconsistencies at these thresholds for acute
hospitalisations. The effects are smaller than at the retirement threshold, yet significant, thus
we might worry that this outcome is prone to be discontinuous at arbitrary age-thresholds.
We then test for discontinuities in the conditional density of the forcing variable to avoid
self-selection or sorting into treatment or control groups. The RD design may be invalid
if individuals just above the threshold are more likely to answer a survey than those just
21When we run the entire analysis using a bandwidth of 20, we find larger and (negative) significant
effects for the population as a whole, for men, and for the low educated group for this outcome. Effects sizes
range from 1 to 1.5 percentage points, significant at the 5 percent level. Using this bandwidth, we still find
no significant effects of retirement on mortality.
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below the threshold, i.e. violating the RD assumption that the running variable is continuous
at the threshold. In the Appendix, we provide histograms that display the age-in-months-
distribution in the NorLAG data. There is no apparent discontinuity at the threshold in
these histograms. Moreover, we applied the local polynomial density estimator for testing
the null of continuous density of the forcing variable at the threshold proposed by Cattaneo
et al. (2016). The p-value under this test is 0.3251.
Finally, the results for physical health and mortality are robust to the different sub-
samples that are conditioned upon working or working until retirement, as described in
Section 4. For acute hospitalisations, we find the same results as in the main analysis for
all sub-groups, except for the lower SES group, where the negative impact of retirement on
the likelihood of acute hospitalisation is no longer found when we condition on working or
working until the retirement age.
6 Conclusion
Whether retirement has a causal effect on health is a difficult question to answer because of
selection into retirement. In this paper, we study the short-term health effect of retirement
using the statutory retirement age at 67 in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. We exploit
the fact that once individuals reach the statutory retirement age, the probability of claiming
retirement pension drastically increase. We apply both subjective measures of health from
survey data and objective health outcomes from administrative data, where the latter covers
the entire Norwegian population.
We find that, on average, in the population, retirement has a positive effect on self-
assessed physical health, but no effects on the objective measures of health: acute hospi-
talisations and mortality. When we assess the effects by different SES groups, we find that
retirement has a large, positive impact on physical health and leads to reduced likelihood of
acute hospitalisation among the low SES groups. We find no significant effects for the high
SES groups for any of these outcomes. For mortality, we find no significant effects for any
group.
We thus confirm what has been found in several studies, namely that retirement has
a positive effect on health for subjective health outcomes. How this manifests to objective
outcomes is less clear as there exist little evidence using objective health outcomes, especially
on the full population. In general, we find no effects on the objective outcomes, besides
suggestive evidence of a retirement effect on reduced likelihood of hospitalisations for the
low SES group. However, this result does not pass the robustness tests, and must therefore
be interpreted with care.
85
Both acute hospitalisations and mortality are extreme outcomes. We can thus conclude
that retirement mainly impacts subjective outcomes, not objective ones. When we assess
the factors that go into the physical health outcome, SF-12, we find that the positive health
effect was driven by a few different factors. On the one hand, finding that retirement leads
to reduced likelihood of reporting that health is limiting in managing in daily chores and in
conducting specific chores profoundly, can be due to the fact that work (a possible health
consuming chore), is no longer present, so health feels less limiting. This implies that the
underlying health has not changed, but the presence of health consuming activities has. On
the other hand, we also found that retirement reduced the presence of pain and reduced
the likelihood of reporting difficulties with activities such as vacuuming, moving a table,
hiking, or gardening. This indicates that retirement affects health in a more fundamental
way. Future research should thus assess objective health outcomes that are less extreme. In
doing so, it is key to recognize that retirement necessarily coincides with reduced opportunity
cost of time.
This study accentuates the importance of assessing the potential heterogeniety in the
effects for individuals in different circumstances. Occupation, more than education, deter-
mines social differences in the effects of retirement on health. Our findings indicate that
the retirement reforms aimed at prolonging working life can be socially distortive due to
the differential effects based on SES. We find that retirement at age 67 has positive health
implications for low SES groups, but we find no effects for high SES groups. A formal test
of these differences confirms that occupation matters for the health effects of retirement.
Finally, our study contributes to generalizing the positive physical health effect of re-
tirement found in the literature across a larger age span. The current literature has mainly
assessed retirement ages from late the 50s to about 65. Here, we confirm that the positive
effects still hold for individuals retiring at age 67. Assessments of higher age thresholds
are valuable for policymakers as current retirement reforms typically aim at increasing the
retirement age. These reforms will likely affect relatively healthy individuals, i.e. workers
who remain employed until these higher retirement ages.
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Graphs and Tables
(a) NorLAG Data: Fraction Retired - Age in Years (b) NorLAG Data: Fraction Retired - Age in Months
(c) Adm. Data: Fraction Retired - Age in Years (d) Adm. Data: Fraction Retired - Age in Months
Figure 1: Discontinuity in Retirement at the Retirement Age Threshold
Notes: The graphs show the fraction retired by age from the two datasets. The upper graphs
are based on the survey data, whereas the two lower graphs are based on administrative data.
All graphs depicts the fraction retired across the age span 55-79. The x-axis on the left two
graphs depicts age in years, whereas the x-axis in the graphs to the right depicts age in months,
relative to the retirement eligibility age-in-months (805 months).
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(a) NorLAG Data: Physical Health (SF-12)
(b) Administrative Data: Acute hospitalisations (c) Administrative Data: Mortality
Figure 2: Discontinuity in Health at the Retirement Age Threshold
Notes: The graphs present the age-health relationship for physical health, acute hospital ad-
missions and mortality. The scale for physical health are points on the SF-12 scale and the
scale of acute hospital admissions and mortality corresponds to the incidence in the population.
The x-axis displays age-in-months relative to the retirement age threshold at 805 months.
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Table 1: Labor Market Participation for Individuals Aged 56-79 in 2007
Age Group Working Retired ER DI
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
56 – 61 79% 72% - - - - 19% 28%
62 – 66 59% 49% - - 16% 13% 31% 41%
67 – 69 17% 9% 89% 92% - - - -
70 – 79 18% 2% 98% 98% - - - -
Notes: The numbers are based on own calculations using the administrative data which covers the entire
population of Norway (See Section 4 for a description). Work is defined as having earnings larger than zero.
The states will not sum to unity because individuals can be in two states at the same time, e.g. by combining
work and partial uptake of DI.
92







Characteristics (1) (2) (3)
Source: NorLAG
Age 65.34 66.15 67.00
[6.58] [0.36] [0.00]
Retired 0.44 0.18 0.96
Less than high school de-
gree 0.23 0.25 0.25
High school degree 0.51 0.45 0.51
Any college 0.27 0.30 0.25
Professional 0.48 0.47 0.50
Manual 0.43 0.40 0.41
Female 0.48 0.47 0.50
Living with partner 0.71 0.75 0.72
SF12 46.93 45.73 47.55
[10.78] [12.03] [10.12]
Observations 4619 190 200
Source: Admin. Data
Age 64.92 66.19 67.00
[6.67] [0.38] [0.00]
Retired 0.40 0.29 0.95
Less than high school de-
gree 0.31 0.32 0.34
High school degree 0.45 0.46 0.45
Any college 0.24 0.23 0.21
Married 0.63 0.64 0.64
Female 0.51 0.51 0.51
Acute Hospital Admissions 0.142 0.140 0.141
Mortality 0.019 0.017 0.018
Observations 1,071,068 31,751 33,752
Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics for the two data sources, the NorLAG data (above) and
the administrative data (below). Column (1) presents means for the entire sample, whereas the other two
columns display means for the sub-sample of individuals included in the estimations (we use a bandwidth of
ten months for the estimations). Column (2) displays the means for the sub-samples aged 795-804 months
(control group) and Column (3) for those aged 805-814 months (treatment group). Standard deviations in
square brackets.
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Table 3: First-Stage Regressions
All Men Women
Source: NorLAG
Retired 0.954*** 0.941*** 0.961***
(0.0362) (0.0587) (0.0431)
Observations 371 190 181
Source: Admin. Data
Retired 0.720*** 0.683*** 0.756***
(0.00264) (0.00389) (0.0356)
Observations 825,605 407,386 418,219
Notes: This table show the first-stage regressions specified in Equation (2). The reported coefficient is γ
from Equation (2). Estimation is done using a bandwidth of ten months. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the age-in-months level for the NorLAG data and at the individual level for the administrative
data. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Table 4: Short-Term Retirement Effects on Physical Health
All Men Women Manual Professional Lower Higher
Retired 5.689∗∗∗ 8.036∗∗∗ 4.053 13.16∗∗∗ -0.333 8.358∗∗∗ -1.952
(1.979) (3.026) (3.465) (3.508) (3.761) (2.415) (5.449)
Observations 361 185 176 126 123 261 99
Notes: This table displays the impact of retirement on physical health. All refers to the sample as a whole,
Professional and Manual to type of occupation and Lower and Higher to education levels. The reported
coefficient is τ from Equation (3). Estimation is done using a bandiwdth of ten months. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the age-in-month level. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 5: Short-Term Retirement Effects on Acute hospitalisations
All Men Women
Retired -0.00419 -0.00417 -.00440
(0.00258) (0.00395) (0.00339)
Observations 825,605 407,386 418,219
Lower Higher
Retired - -0.00589** -0.00255
(0.00292) (0.00535)
Observations 643,441 182,164
Notes: This table displays the impact of retirement on acute hospitalisations for the whole population and
divided by gender and SES (Education). The reported coefficient is τ from Equation (3). All refers to
the whole sample and Lower and Higher to education levels. Estimation is done using a bandwidth of
ten months. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01.
Table 6: Short-Term Retirement Effects on Mortality
All Men Women
Retired -0.000123 0.0000355 -0.000266
(0.000204) (0.000343) (0.000236)
Observations 840,239 416,611 423,628
Lower Higher
Retired - -0.0000895 -0.000299
(0.000233) (0.000399)
Observations 655,743 184,496
Notes: This table displays the impact of retirement on mortality for the full population and divided by
gender and SES (Education). The reported coefficient is τ from Equation (3). All refers to the whole sample
and Lower and Higher to education levels. Estimation is done using a bandwidth of ten months. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 7: Short Term Retirement Effects on Health by SF12 Components
Functional Daily Specific Mental Pain
All -0.0741 -0.171∗∗ -0.229∗∗ 0.0754∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗
(0.0791) (0.0776) (0.0934) (0.0377) (0.0783)
Observations 371 368 369 368 371
Men -0.0344 -0.325∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗ 0.0953 -0.180∗
(0.140) (0.123) (0.168) (0.0803) (0.100)
Observations 190 189 189 188 190
Women -0.126 -0.0378 -0.0693 0.0562 -0.328∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.128) (0.152) (0.0419) (0.117)
Observations 181 179 180 180 181
Manual -0.258∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗ -0.551∗∗∗ 0.0703 -0.503∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.128) (0.132) (0.123) (0.135)
Observations 127 126 127 127 127
Professional -0.0110 0.0937 0.0160 -0.0455 0.0342
(0.166) (0.123) (0.157) (0.0486) (0.178)
Observations 123 123 123 123 123
Low Education -0.158∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗
(0.0864) (0.110) (0.0971) (0.0441) (0.103)
Observations 270 267 268 267 270
High education 0.124 0.104 -0.0597 -0.0215 0.0183
(0.200) (0.156) (0.194) (0.0723) (0.159)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: This table presents the impact of retirement on selected components of the physical health outcome
(SF-12). The reported coefficient is τ from Equation (3). Estimation is done using a bandwidth of ten
months. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the age-in-month level. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01.
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Table 8: Formal Test of Differences by Socioeconomic Status
Physical Health Acute hospitalisation Mortality
Low education
Retired 4.975 -0.00294 0.0000666
(3.115) (0.00533) (0.0000145)
Observations 361 825,605 840,239
Gender
Retired 3.696 0.00224 0.0000171
(2.549) (0.00509) (0.000139)
Observations 361 825,605 840,239
Manual Workers
Retired 6.858* - -
(3.305) - -
Observations 249 - -
Notes: This table displays the interaction between retirement eligibility and SES (education and occupation
(only for the NorLAG)) and gender. The first column presents the results for physical health from the
NorLAG data and the second and third columns presents the results for acute hospitalisations and mortality,
respectively, for the Administrative data. The reported coefficient is γ from Equation (4). Estimation is
done using a bandwidth of ten months. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the age-in-month
level for the NorLAG data and at the individual level for the Administrative data. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01.
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Appendix - Sensitivity and Robustness
A.1 Disabled individuals: past earnings and self-reported work status
People on disability insurance are mechanically transferred from disability pension to retire-
ment pension at age 805 months. We need to make sure that the positive physical health
effects we found are not driven by these individuals. Initially, there is no reason to believe
that there should be an effect for these individuals as they were not working before retire-
ment, and should therefore have no change in circumstances. However, as the health measure
contains elements of self-assessed health, one could imagine that someone who is disabled
may need to justify their status as disabled, consciously or subconsciously. In this case, poor
health prior to the statutory retirement age may be under-reported. Post retirement, when
they are no longer in a situation where poor health is defining their labor market status,
they might feel healthier, or no longer have the need to report poor health. If this scenario
is plausible, we need to rule out that the results found in Section 5 are driven by this group.
The first two rows of Table A.1 displays the results on two sub-samples of the survey data
(labeled “Working” and “Income”), each aimed at running the analysis only on the sub-sample
that was recorded as working until the statutory retirement age. The working sub-samples
are defined in Section 4.2. Finding coefficients of the same sign and magnitude, especially
for the rule based on self-assessed work status, ensures us that these effects are not driven
by the disability justification hypothesis. The estimations based on the income-rule yields
large and insignificant coefficients, both a consequence of the small sample sizes. Yet, the
direction of the effects are similar to what was found in the main analysis.
For the outcomes from the administrative data, as these are not subject to the potential
justification bias, we should expect that individuals who retire formally at 67, but without
any actual change in circumstances, should water down the effects. We can therefore expect
that this assessment can uncover significant effect, not detected in the gross sample. The
first row of Table A.2 and Table A.3 presents the estimations restricted to “workers” for
acute hospitalisations and mortality, respectively. Here, we find no significant results for any
of the sub-groups, besides a significant effect on mortality for women (0.2 percentage points
significant at the 5 percent level). The significant result on hospitalisations found for men
with low education in the main analysis, is no longer present.
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A.2 Robustness checks and validity of the regression discontinuity
design
Below we assess the sensitivity of the results for different bandwidth selections; we check
for discontinuities in the forcing variable, age, at the cutoff; we test for discontinuities in
other outcomes that should not have been effected by the threshold; and, we check for
discontinuities in the outcomes of interest at points in the age distribution where there
should not be any discontinuities. This robusness assessment follows the suggestions in
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) closely.
A.2.1 Bandwidth selection
The worry in an RD application is that using a bandwidth that is too wide, allows for other
things than the intervention of interest to drive differences in outcomes for those right above
compared to those right below the threshold. In Table A.1 we display the results using
bandwidths of 7 and 15 months for physical health. Using a bandwidth of 7 months does
not alter the results, whereas increasing the bandwidths to 15 months somewhat reduces the
effects. This is not surprising given the downward slope of the health trajectory across age
and the upward shift in this trajectory at the retirement eligibility threshold.
The results for hospitalisations and mortality are displayed in Table A.2 and Table A.3.
For acute hospital admissions, we find that increasing the bandwidth to 15 months yields
significant, negative effects. The effects are still small ranging from 0.7 to 1 percentage points.
As the incidence is 14 percent, this entails a 5-7 percent reduction in the likelihood of an
acute hospitalisation. Increasing the bandwidth increases the likelihood of factors, other
than retirement, affecting acute hospital admissions. Another explanation can be that it
takes some time for retirement to take effect on health issues such as stroke and acute heart
conditions, thus including more post-retirement months increase the likelihood of finding
significant effects. As in the main analysis, we find no effects of retirement on mortality at
any of these bandwidths.
A.2.2 Continuity in the forcing variable
Vital to any RD application is that individuals are unable to manipulate the forcing variable.
In this case, the forcing variable is age (reported by public registers), which individuals cannot
manipulate in any way. It could however be the case that retired individuals are more likely
to respond to the survey due to the reduced opportunity cost of time. Figure A.1 shows
two histograms of age-in-months assessing potential bunching at the threshold. There is no
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evidence of any discontinuity in the forcing variable at the threshold. We also did a more
formal test proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2016), a local polynomial density estimator for
testing the null of continuous density of the forcing variable at the threshold. The p-value
under this test is 0.3251. For the population level data, this holds by construction, as people
cannot manipulate their age and as all individuals in the population are represented in the
data.
A.2.3 Placebo tests
The placebo tests entails testing for discontinuities in the three health outcomes at points
in the age distribution where there should be no discontinuities. A common practice is to
conduct placebo tests at the median age of the two sub-samples below and above the actual
cutoff. In this case, the median age below the threshold is age 62. However, some individuals
can retire at this age, thus making is an unsuited placebo threshold. Consequently, we use
age 61 for the lower placebo. For the upper placebo, we use age 73. No discontinuities or
significant effects were found at these placebo thresholds for physical health (Table A.1).
For acute hospital admissions (Table A.2), we find significant effects for both the upper and
lower placebo. For the lower placebo, this could be due to some occupations having special
age-limits for retirement at 61. However, we find no explanations for why the upper placebo
yields significant, and even positive effects. This finding reduce the credibility of the effects
found in the main analysis for this outcome. The placebo results for mortality is presented
in Table A.3. There are no significant effects and the coefficients are close to zero for all
sub-group at both placebo thresholds.
A.2.4 Discontinuity in other outcomes
Finally, we look for discontinuities in an outcome that should not be affected by retirement,
at least not in the short-term. Here, we assess the likelihood of living with a partner or
spouse (NorLAG) or being married (administrative data). The regression results shown in
Table A.1 and Table A.4 confirm that there are no retirement effect on these outcomes.
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Appendix Graphs and Tables
(a) (b)
Figure A.1: Discontinuity of the Forcing Variable
Notes: The histograms show the distribution of age in months for the age-range 56-79 using
the bin-width suggested by STATA (left histogram) and using one bin for each age-in-months
(right histogram).
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Table A.1: Robustness Checks Survey Data: Physical Health
All Men Women
Conditional on income 16.42*** 15.83 -1.553
(2.966) (10.88) (7.264)
Observations 82 53 39
Conditional on working 6.274*** 9.741*** 2.523
(2.089) (3.758) (7.312)
Observations 247 142 105
Bandwidth 7 9.472*** 14.69*** 2.623
(2.019) (5.206) (4.245)
Observations 275 142 133
Bandwidth 15 5.801*** 9.391*** 2.623
(2.130) (3.109) (6.628)
Observations 540 278 262
Placebo at 61 -1.441 .971 -5.752
(3.665) (4.220) (6.628)
Observations 454 242 212
Placebo at 73 -1.111 -1.264 .628
(1.685) (4.786) (2.213)
Observations 251 127 124
Living with a partner -0.106 -0.0413 -0.162
(0.0931) (0.108) (0.176)
Observations 371 190 181
Notes: This table displays the various robustness checks described in the Appendix, for the physical health




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.4: Robustness Checks Administrative Data: Discontinuity in Marital Status
All Men Women Low Educ. High Educ.
Married 0.00233 0.00324 0.00104 0.00156 0.00654
(0.00229) (0.00336) (0.00311) (0.00249) (0.00576)
Observations 825,605 407,386 418,219 643,441 182,164
Notes: This table displays the impact of retirement on the likelihood of being married. The reported
coefficient is τ from Equation (3). Estimation is done using a bandwidth of ten months. Standard errors in
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uals aged 60. For the period 2001 through 2008, an extra week of vacation was given to
individuals who turned 60 years of age in August or before. Using a regression discon-
tinuity design, we compare individuals who were entitled to an extra week of vacation
with individuals close in age who had to wait until the following year to receive the
entitlement. We consider days of sickness absence, sick notes authorised by a physician
and a set of conditions related to individual health. We find that for the sample as a
whole, the increase in the entitlement had no effect on any of the outcomes studied.
However, we find that the number of sick notes was reduced for women, for individ-
uals with a history of relatively high sick leave and for individuals with high school
as their highest level of education. Targeted policies for older workers may contribute
to a reduction in social security dependency through compensation for sick leave. For
some, increased vacation may reduce the sickness absence, but it is not clear whether
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1 Introduction
How should labour market institutions adapt to the needs and preferences of employees as
they get older? This question arises not only from a concern for the welfare of older workers
who are worn out after a long and demanding work life but also because of the ageing of the
population in Western countries, which mandates policies achieve increased labour market
activity of older individuals (OECD, 2013). A relevant target group for such policies is
workers who are approaching the early retirement age. In this paper, we study one such
policy measure implemented in Norway, namely the one-week extra holiday that employees
aged 60 and above are entitled to by law. Until 2009, the length of vacation depended on the
month of birth in the year an employee turned 60. This institutional detail creates a unique
quasi-experimental setting; only individuals born from January through August could have
the extra week that same year; individuals born September through December had to wait
until the next year. We exploit this exogenous source of variation to study the causal effects
of increased entitlement to vacation in a regression discontinuity (RD) design where the
identifying assumption is that individuals born on either side of the cutoff are similar in all
relevant aspects except entitlement to increased vacation.1
We have two primary outcomes of interest. First, we study the effect on certified sickness
absence; both the number of spells exceeding 16 days and the total number of sick notes
within a calendar year.2 Certified sickness absence is an interesting outcome in the context
of employment, since disability pension entries typically succeeds longer spells of sickness
absence Fevang and Røed (2006) and that it the replacement rate is 100% up to a relatively
high ceiling (Markussen et al., 2011). Second, we explore the health effects further by
investigating the frequency of specific diagnoses given at general practitioners (GPs) visits,
namely regarding cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, and psychological issues. We focus on
these diagnoses because they represent common health issues in the population, and they
are the main causes of death or disability (World Health Organization, 2002, 2015). This is
an important outcome since recent statistics show that 9.8% of the population in Norway
receives disability insurance, out of which 24% are aged 60–64 (NAV, 2018).
We find that an increase in the entitlement to vacation had no effect on sickness absence
as measured by sick leave exceeding 16 days. In addition, we find a decrease in the number of
1At the limit, there is no reason to believe that a person born 31 August is different from a person born
1st September when they are 60 years old. However, issues may arise when we increase the bandwidth since
those exposed to the reform (born in August or earlier) are slightly older than those not exposed to the
reform (born in September or later). This motivates the use of the RD design.
2Spells of sickness absence shorter than 16 days are covered by the employer. Shorter spells of 1-3 days
(or 8, depending on workplace-agreement) does not require a medical certificate (sick note). All length of
spells are included in the number of sick notes.
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sick notes as authorised by a physician, but the effect is not robust to different specifications.
Turning to the case-specific diagnoses, we did not find any significant effect. Moreover, the
direction of these estimates are not robust to different specifications. Sub-sample analysis
reveals important heterogeneity by gender, education level and previous levels of sickness
absence. The sub-samples estimates show that an increase in the entitlement to vacation
results in a significant decrease in the number of sick notes for women of 24%, but we find
no significant effect for men. Turning to highest attained education, we find a reduction
in sick notes of around 25% for individuals with compulsory schooling only, and we find a
reduction in sick notes of 26% for individuals with high school as highest level of education
attained. We do not find any effect for individuals with some form of tertiary education. For
individuals with sickness absence above the mean at age 59, we find a reduction of around
38% in sick notes. However, for the cause specific diagnoses and total days of sick leave
within a year, the conclusion from the entire sample remains in that the direction of the
estimates is not robust to the different specifications.
The results have important policy implications because more vacation may imply a gain
in individual welfare and adapt to the needs of workers as they grow older, but also a loss in
the production value. However, the results reveals no clear health-preserving effect. Since we
are unable to observe whether individuals used their entitled vacation the year in question,
the results are interpreted as the intention-to-treat effect, which is the effect of being made
eligible for treatment.3
There is a large body of literature on the effect of working hours on health (for example
Ahn (2016), Rätzel (2012) or Cygan-Rehm and Wunder (2018) and references therein), as
well as time allocation between income and leisure (for example Manski (2014)).4 The litera-
ture on how vacation affects sickness absence and health in general is, however, rather scarce.
To our knowledge, only two related papers exist on this subject. Recently, Hofmarcher (2017)
studied an institutional setting in which Swedish central government employees received en-
titlement to three extra days of vacation the year they turned 30 and entitlement to four
extra days of vacation the year they turned 40. As measures of health, he used specialized
outpatient care visits, inpatient care admissions and long-term sickness absence. He found
that increased entitlement to vacation had no effect on any of the outcomes, regardless of
gender or socioeconomic status. Schnitzlein (2012), using survey data, found suggestive
evidence that individuals who do not use their full vacation entitlement have a lower life
satisfaction and higher sickness absence, compared with individuals who claim their full va-
3This may underestimate the potential treatment effect of the policy. The point estimates should there-
fore be interpreted as a lower bound effect of the policy.
4There is also a large body of literature on job-stress recovery related to occupational pension. See for
example Demerouti et al. (2009).
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cation entitlement. However, this interpretation is probably not causal since there may be
underlying unobserved factors that affect the propensity to use full vacation.
Our study differs from Hofmarcher (2017) in three important aspects. First, we do not
limit our attention to a particular sector of the economy since we study the effect of a
regulation that affects all workers in Norway who reach a certain age. Second, the setting
allows for comparing individuals born in the same calendar year in a regression discontinuity
setting. Third, the sample studied are employees who are older (age 60) and who are at an
age where health-related absence or withdrawal from the labour market is common.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the institutional setting of
vacation and sickness absence. Section 3 describes a simple theoretical framework relevant
for the analysis. Section 4 describes the data for the analysis, final sample selection and
descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the regression discontinuity framework and its
validity. Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2 Institutional Setting
2.1 Vacation Regulations
In the following, we present institutional details regarding vacation relevant for the period
studied (2001–2008). First, we sketch the general regulations that apply for employees below
the age of 60, and we present the special regulations for employees 60 years old and above.
By law, all employees are entitled to 25 days of vacation during a calendar year. Since
Saturdays are included in this number, 25 days imply four weeks (six days each) and one
day. Within some industries, because of collective agreements, employees are entitled to five
weeks (30 days) of vacation. If an employer has signed the collective agreement, it applies to
all employees of the firm, union and non-union members alike. Some employers offer their
employees longer vacation through local agreements at the company level. The vacation act
sets a minimum standard; its regulations can only be overruled by local agreements if this
is to the benefit of the employees. The right to vacation remains for employees who change
employers.
Whether the vacation is paid or unpaid depends on the length of the employee’s employ-
ment in the previous calendar year. Every employer is obliged to set aside a fixed proportion
of each employee’s wage for holiday pay the following year. There is every reason to believe
that the uptake of vacation is high.5 Employers are responsible for seeing to it that em-
ployees actually take holidays, and can, in fact, receive a fine if workplace conditions, such
5No survey or official statistics documents record the number of vacation days, but rather the number
of days travelling.
109
as job and workplace stress, prevent their employees from having vacation. Furthermore,
employees also have a duty to see to it that they take time off from work in the form of
vacation. For the 25-day vacation, there are very few exceptions to the rule that vacation
cannot be traded for cash.6 However, in the private sector, employees entitled to 30 days of
vacation can trade the extra five days for cash.
Employees are entitled to three consecutive weeks of vacation from the period 1 July
through 30 September (in the manufacturing sector, the tradition is to take four weeks of
vacation in July). For the rest of the entitled vacation, with a few restrictions, employees and
employers must agree when the vacation should be taken. The holidays act allows a written
agreement about maximum 12 vacation days in advance or, more commonly, postponing the
maximum 12 days of the entitled vacation
Since 1976, employees aged 60 or older were entitled to one extra week of vacation,
irrespective of tenure/seniority or wage level.7 Since the extra week of vacation is determined
by law and independent of local and collective agreements, it may be beneficial for groups
of employees with weak bargaining power. The employee is free to decide when to take the
extra vacation, and it may be spread throughout the year or concentrated to one week.
Important for our study, the extra week of vacation was restricted to individuals who
turned 60 years before the 1 September. For example, in 2008, a person born 31 August
1948 would be eligible for one extra week in 2008, while a person born the 1 September
1948 would have to wait until 2009 to get the same length of vacation.8 We do not observe
whether (or when) individuals actually made use of the option during a given year. The
extra week of vacation can, for instance, be postponed until the following year.
2.2 Sickness Absence
An important institutional aspect of our study concerns sickness absence. Norwegian sickness
insurance is mandatory and regulated by law, and it covers all employees who have been
employed at the same employer for at least two weeks. Furthermore, the replacement rate
is 100% up to a relatively high ceiling from day one. A medical certificate is required for
spells of absence of three to eight days, depending on whether the employer has signed the
6Until 2014, if an employee had not had the full vacation that he or she is entitled to by law because of
illness or parental leave, the employer could compensate in cash for vacation not taken after the maximum
prolongation of 12 days is utilized
7Thus, 60 year olds enjoy enjoy 30 or 36 days’ vacation in total, while their younger colleagues enjoy 25
or 30 days, depending on local agreements.
8From 2009 onwards, this rule was cancelled so that all employees are eligible for one week extra vacation
the same year they turn 60, irrespective of month of birth.
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IA-agreement.9 The first 16 days of absence are paid by the employer (the employer period),
whereas the remaining period is paid by social insurance. The maximum period of benefits
is one year, including the employer period. The level of sickness absence in Norway is high,
especially among women Markussen et al. (2011), and around 1.7% of the GDP is allocated to
sickness benefits annually (Bjørnstad, 2013). Recent statistics from Statistics Norway (2018)
show that around 8.2% of workers aged 60–64 in Norway had sickness absence certified by
a GP in 2017. In the analysis, sick leave exceeding 16 days is one of the outcomes. We also
consider number of sick notes certified by GPs and diagnoses that may or may not be related
to a certified absence. We discuss these outcomes in greater detail in Section 4.
3 Conceptual Framework
While the institutional characteristics of our setting provide the random variation in the
allocation of an extra week of vacation, it is useful to discuss some theoretical aspects to
guide our empirical analysis of individual responses to increased leisure. A useful starting
point is the human capital framework, where health is a commodity that individuals produce
by means of market goods and services and their own time input (Grossman, 2006). Formally,
using the notation in Grossman (2006), the individual utility function can be expressed as
follows:
U = U(Z1, Z2, .., Zn), (1)
where health is represented by Zi. We formalize the production of health as follows:
Zi = e
piSFi(Xi, Ti), (2)
where Xi is a market good or service input, Ti represents time disposable for producing
health, S is a measure of the efficiency of the health-production process, and pi is a positive
parameter. S represents human capital, which in empirical work is typically proxied with
years of schooling or highest level of attained education.
In our setting, where entitlement to vacation is increased and income is unchanged, the
level of utility is unambiguously increased (the individual’s consumption possibilities have
expanded). Looking at the production of health, Ti increases (as long as we think that leisure
gives more opportunities for health production than being occupied at work). Ruhm (2000)
shows that less time working allows more time to invest in non-market goods. Increased
leisure could lead individuals to pursue activities otherwise bounded by time-constraints,
9The IA agreement is a letter of intent based on agreement between authorities, employees and employers.
The intention is to work towards a more inclusive working life.
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for instance, exercise, which could mean less work-related stress. On the other hand, more
leisure could also lead to physical inactivity. Some studies have found that we can think of
unhealthy goods, along with vacation, as a normal good (Ettner (1996), Petry (2000), Kenkel
et al. (2014) and Apouey and Clark (2015)). In our setting, where income is unchanged, X
will change only to the extent that it is complementary to or a substitute for T . X could,
for instance, be travelling, use of alcohol or tobacco, or GP visits.
The human capital model (which assumes a positive marginal product of T) predicts
that the efficiency of T increases with education. Overall, the predicted effect of increased
leisure on health is not clear (neither the sign of the marginal effect of T or of the interaction
between T and X), and this is what we investigate in the empirical section.
4 Data, Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Data
To study the effect of increased leisure on health and sickness absence, we use several ad-
ministrative data sources linked through a unique, project-specific, anonymous identifier
assigned to every individual in Norway. Information about employment, days of sickness
absence (covered by social insurance) and demographic information comes from various reg-
isters maintained and delivered by Statistics Norway. Data on sick notes and physician visits
are from the Normal Tariff for Private General Practice KUHR database,10 administered by
Helfo, a subordinate of the Norwegian Directorate of Health. Data from Statistics Norway
cover the years 2001–2008, and the KUHR data exists from 2006 through 2008. In contrast
to survey data, there is no attrition from the original sample due to non-response or non-
consent in any of these variables. In the next sections, we elaborate how we apply these data
sources in the empirical analysis.
Data on employment and sick leave: Information about employment are from the
employer-employee register, and consists of all spells of employment, and information on
start and stop dates of all spells (in months). This information is important for the sample
construction, which will be discussed later in this chapter. We also have data on all spells of
sickness absence covered by social insurance, for example, spells of sick leave exceeding 16
days, with the exact start and stop dates for each spell.
For the empirical analysis, we use the outcome variable days of sick leave, which for each
individual represents the total number of days covered by social insurance in a given calendar
year.
10KUHR stands for Normal tariff for private general practice (Kontroll og utbetaling av helserefusjoner)
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Data on visits to a physician: For every visit to a physician, whether at the GP
office or at an emergency care unit, the GP sends a reimbursement claim, which is then then
registered in the KUHR register. This claim specifies the services and procedures rendered
during the consultation. In particular, the reimbursement claim specifies whether the GP
certifies sickness absence through a sick note or extends a sick note. Therefore, for each
person, we are able to identify the number of sick notes issued during a calendar year. Since
employees need a certified sick note for spells that exceeds three (eight) days, the number of
sick notes is an outcome that captures all certified spells, irrespective of duration of the sick
leave. In that respect, it is a more comprehensive measure of sickness absence than days of
sick leave.
Individuals also visit the GP for medical help not related to sickness absence certification,
and we want to capture this by investigating all GP visits regardless of the issuance of a
sick note at the consultation. To this end, we exploited reimbursement claim information on
diagnosis, divided into groups following the International Classification of Primary Care-2nd
Edition (ICPC-2) (Lamberts and Wood, 1987). We construct three outcome variables that
represent three specific groups of diagnoses: the number of GP visits per year for cardio-
vascular diseases,11 musculoskeletal pain, and psychological issues. Cardiovascular disease is
the leading cause of death in most developed countries (World Health Organization, 2015),
whereas musculoskeletal (e.g. lower back problems) and psychological issues is one of the
leading pathways to disability insurance (ibid.). In Norway, around 9.8% of the population
receives some form of disability insurance, and in 2018, 13.1% of the population aged 60–64
received some form of disability insurance (NAV, 2018)
Other administrative data: We also use demographic information regarding the high-
est level of education, marital status and annual earnings; the latter originates from tax
registers. From the central population register, we included information about gender and
month of birth, which defines our control and treatment group. Information on educational
level comes from the educational database, and we define three different categories: compul-
sory schooling only, high school completion and any form of tertiary education. From the
family register, we included information regarding legal marital status.
4.2 Sample Definition & Descriptive Statistics
In the empirical analysis, we are interested in individuals who turned 60 years of age at some
point between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2008. This means that the relevant cohorts
(454,066 individuals) were born between 1941 and 1948. Besides the time frame of the
11Cardiovascular diseases and diagnoses related to, among others, coronary heart disease and ischemic
heart disease.
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cohorts, the sample was constructed following two additional criteria. First, an individual
must remain employed from 1 January to 31 December the year he/she reached 59 years
of age. As explained in Section 2, individuals who experienced spells of unemployment are
still entitled to paid vacation time, but, unless otherwise agreed, receive the holiday pay the
same day he/she receives the final wage payout. We therefore imposed the restriction of
employment the year a person turns 59 years of age to ensure that individuals are entitled
to the same weeks of paid vacation. Second, individuals who work as teachers are entitled to
a reduction in hours thought by 12.5%, from the school year that starts when they turn 60.
As this is in conjunction with an increase in vacation entitlement, teachers are not included
in the final sample. These two criteria yielded a sample of 244,757 individuals.
Table 1 presents the mean summary statistics for demographic characteristics and out-
comes. The first columns displays the information for the entire sample. The second and
third column displays information for those born from January through August (entitled
to 6 weeks) and for those born from September through December (entitled to 5 weeks),
respectively. For the background characteristics, when looking at the fixed characteristics
we see that there are very few differences between these groups. The outcomes indicates
that there may be no differences in any of the outcomes as these variable are very similar.
The two remaining columns shows that there are some differences by gender. Males have
a relatively higher share of individuals with some college or more as highest attained ed-
ucation. The mean income (measured the year individuals turn 59 years) is also, perhaps
unsurprisingly, higher among men than women. Turning to the outcomes used in the analy-
sis, there are particularly clear sex-differences in the relevant diagnoses used as an outcome
in this analysis, let alone the outcomes for sick leave and sick notes. Both psychological and
musculoskeletal diagnoses are higher among women, whereas cardiovascular diagnoses are
higher among men.
5 Regression Discontinuity Design
5.1 Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design
We are interested in whether increased entitlement to vacation has any effect on health and
sickness absence. The identification problem is that individuals preferences for (increased
entitlement to) vacation may be correlated with unobserved preferences, or characteristics
may be correlated with health and sickness absence. As discussed in Section 3, it is not
a-priori clear whether vacation, as time of from work, may lead to better health. People
may have preferences that directly determine their health and, thus, sickness absence. We
address these problems using a RD design, where we exploit the assignment mechanism of
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the legislation induced for workers aged 60. As described above, entitlement to increased
vacation is here a deterministic function of month of birth. The treatment in our case
changes from zero to one at the cut-off point, which means that all subjects received their
assigned treatment or control condition. This particular feature of the RD design is the sharp
regression discontinuity design (SRD) because the probability of treatment change sharply
for all individuals born between August and September (see Hahn et al. (2001), Imbens and
Lemieux (2008), Lee (2008), and Lee and Lemieux (2010).
A compelling feature of the RD design is that individuals born within a few months of each
other, but on the opposite sides of the cutoff, are most likely to be very similar. Hahn et al.
(2001) linked this feature to the ‘gold standard’ of randomised experiments. The conjecture
that the treatment assignment is as ‘good as randomised’ hinges on the assumption that
individuals just below and just above the cutoff point have the same potential outcome in
an identical experience where an extra week of vacation is randomly assigned.12
Lee (2008) shows that treatment depends on whether a variable exceeds a known thresh-
old and agents cannot control precisely the forcing variable, the continuity assumption is
satisfied since the variation in treatment around the cut-off is randomised. This is because
the variation in treatment close to the cutoff is randomised in a way similar to if a person
randomly has been given a month of birth just below or just above the cutoff. In that re-
spect, the method identifies the effect of the increase in entitlement to vacation at the cutoff
point (Hahn et al., 2001).
To further explain the intuition behind our choice of SRD design, we follow the setup
applied by Kostøl and Mogstad (2014) in which individuals are eligible for an extra week of
vacation based on turning 60 years of age before a particular cutoff date c. For this group,
denoted by l, we can specify the regression model of the following form, where X is month
of birth and X < c :
Y = αl + fl(c−X) + εl, (3)
Likewise, the following regression model is specified for individuals who turn 60 in September
or later, denoted by r:
Y = αr + fr(c−X) + εr, (4)
The effect of an extra week vacation on health H is the difference in intercept between the
12Sekhon and Titiunik (2017) discusses a few settings in which compliance with treatment assignment
is perfect, but where the score may be a possible determinant of the outcome regardless of the assignment
mechanism itself. Their examples is based on outcomes with a likely underlying but unobserved ability,
and it is not clear if their setting relates to a setting in which month of birth solely determines access to
treatment. It is however worth noting that random assignment of the running variable does not necessarily
imply local independence.
115
two groups, given by Ĥ:
Ĥ = α̂l − α̂r, (5)
The identifying assumption is that assignment to treatment (entitlement to one extra week
of vacation) is uncorrelated with observed and unobserved covariates. By pooling the two
regressions (3) and (4) together into equation (5), we test whether entitlement to an extra
week of vacation matters discontinuously, by comparing individuals whose date of birth
correspond to being entitled to an extra week of vacation to those who just falls short of
being entitled to an extra week of vacation.
Formally, we estimate the following reduced form equation:
Yi = α + f(Xi) + τDi + εi, (6)
where Yi is the outcome variable summarized within the calendar year when the individual
turns 60 years. The dummy variable Di indicates if an individual is born before September
and hence if he or she was entitled to an extra week of vacation. f(Xi) is an (unknown)
function that captures the underlying relationship between the dependent variable and the
running variable. Since the running (or forcing) variable is discrete, random disturbances
can be correlated within each month of birth which means that standard errors could be
downward-biased.13 Thus, in all of the regressions, and as suggested by Lee and Card (2008)
we use heteroskedastic-adjusted standard errors. The reduced form equation displayed in
Equation 6 does not include any covariates, as adding these should not alter the estimates
from parameter τ , but only improve precision (through reducing residual variation in the
outcome variable).14
Two important aspects of the estimated model (Equation 6) warrant discussion in the
RD-setting. First, we need to specify f(Xi) as this is an unknown functional form. Second,
we specify the bandwidth, that is, how many months to include on each side of the cutoff
in the estimation. This is important, since results in the the RD design can be sensitive
to the functional form or the interval around the cutoff point used in the local regressions,
and a non-linearity can be mistaken as a discontinuity. We therefore check the specification
choice by examining the sensitivity of regression estimates to functional form assumption,
and especially, by comparing the different functional forms with each other.15
13The running (or forcing) variable is only discrete to the extent that month of birth is the most detailed
information we have on date of birth. It is reasonable to assume that information on the exact date of birth
can be treated as continuous random variables.
14However, we do show that adding a set of covariates does not alter the conclusion.
15Several methods of choosing the neighbourhood around the cutoff exists in the literature and Cattaneo
and Vazquez-Bare (2016) provide an excellent overview of these methods.
116
The choice of specification and bandwidth follows the discussion in Lee and Lemieux
(2010), and the first approach is to make use of the full sample by using a flexible functional
form by including second-order polynomials in the regression.16 The second approach is a
local linear regression where we choose the bandwidth (that is how many months to include on
each side of the threshold) based on a trade-off between variance and bias (Lee and Lemieux,
2010). The trade-off arises because when moving further away from the threshold, one has
more data points at hand, but this comes at a cost of an increased risk of biased estimates
since the observations are further from the threshold (in our case, born before September).
The goal is to find a bandwidth that minimizes the mean square errors of the conditional
expectation function. Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) proposes an optimal bandwidth
selector that follows from a cross-validation procedure, but they provide an automatic way
of selecting the optimal bandwidth for local linear regressions.17
While our preferred specification follows from the optimal bandwidth calculation in the
cross-validation procedure, it has become standard in the RD-literature to present a variety
of different bandwidths and functional forms (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). As a robustness
to the RD specification, we report the results with a range of bandwidths from one to three
months around the discontinuity and a linear regression including second-order polynomials
in the regression making use of all observations.
5.2 Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design
In this section, we discuss the validity of the RD strategy. The first concern that would violate
the validity of the RD design is individuals’ ability to manipulate the running variable (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010). In general, when there is an economic incentive involved, we would
expect individuals to make an effort to obtain a favourable value of the running variable (or
score) relative to the cutoff. Imprecise control of the running variable is therefore crucial to
avoid self-selection bias. It is highly unlikely that month of birth varies in other ways than by
the means of seasonal patterns. Manipulation behaviour require knowledge of institutional
rules before being born, and as outlined in Section 2, the introduction of entitlement to
an extra week of vacation came in 1976. This means that it is impossible that parents
manipulated their children’s date of birth in anticipation of this change in policy. As we base
our information on month and year of birth from administrative registers, we are confident
16Gelman and Zelizer (2015) and Gelman and Imbens (2017) discuss why the use of higher-order polyno-
mials than degree two may be inappropriate.
17Cross validation in general refers to splitting the data into a so called training set and a validation
set in which the goal is to find the bandwidth h that minimize the Mean Squared Error (MSE). In Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012), the bandwidth is selected following an optimal MSE data-dependent bandwidth
choice for the local-linear regression point estimator.
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that no later life manipulation falls in conjunction with the assignment variable.
For the sake of completeness, Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of individuals’
month of birth relative to the cut-off. People born to the left of the cut-off receive an extra
week of vacation, whereas individuals born in September or later are only entitled to five
weeks of vacation. The distribution displays some seasonal patterns but remains somewhat
smooth around the cut-off for entitlement to increased vacation, as would be expected in a
valid RD design Lee (2008).18
Another key assumption in the RD design is that the conditional expectations of the
potential outcomes are smooth functions at the threshold. The only variables that should
vary discontinuously at the threshold are the outcome variables defined in the previous
chapter. If this assumption holds, we attribute any discontinuity in the outcomes of interest
at the threshold to the effect of an extra week of vacation only. We follow Lee and Lemieux
(2010) and rely on some indirect tests to investigate whether individual characteristics have
the same distribution on both sides of the threshold.
Figure 2 further plots evidence of the validity of our design. Here, we verify that a range
of covariates expected to be correlated with health (earnings, gender, marital status and
education) do not vary discontinuously at the threshold. This is reassuring and gives us
confidence that our conjecture that the results do not reflect pre-existing demographic or
work-related differences across month of birth.19
6 Results
6.1 Graphical Analysis
To examine the effect of the increase in entitlement to vacation, we present a set of descriptive
figures that show the relationship between month of birth and different outcomes of sick leave
and health. In Figure 3, each point represents the sample mean for months of birth. Recall
that the only outcome covering the entire period of 2001 through 2008 is sick leave exceeding
16 days; the remaining outcomes are sample means. We also include a local linear fit covering
all months of birth relative to September. The vertical line denotes September, which is the
cut-off date.
There seems to be no general effect on days of sick leave, as displayed in Figure 3a. While
18In settings where it is debatable whether individuals have imperfect control of the running variable,
a common application in the literature is to perform the McCrary (2008) density-test for manipulation.
However, this test has been shown to perform poorly in the presence of a discrete running variable (Frandsen,
2017).
19The estimate in Figure 2 depends on the breakpoint chosen, which may lead to different trajectories on
both sides of the cut-off. See Gelman and Zelizer (2015) for a discussion.
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there is a change in trajectories in Figure 3b, there is no jump at the threshold. Turning
to the health outcomes, Figures 3c–3e show the discontinuity in psychological diagnoses,
cardiovascular and musculoskeletal diagnoses, respectively. In general, there is very little
variability in month of birth averages. Figure 3c indicates some discontinuity, but this
increase is not obvious when looking at the variability on each side of the threshold.
The descriptive graphs presented in Figure 3 suggest that there are few patterns regarding
the effect of the increase in entitlement to vacation. To test whether this is actually the case,
we move on to the empirical models with a complete set of specification tests.
6.2 Regression Results
We first investigate the effect of an increase in the entitlement to vacation for the full sample.
Following the cross-validation procedure in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), we calculate
the optimal bandwidths to be three months for the total number of days on sick leave, and
two months for all the other outcomes. This holds for the main sample and for all subsamples
used in the estimations. To discuss the sensitivity of the choice of bandwidth, we display
the results for each outcome with a bandwidth of 1–3 months on each side of the cutoff.
Table 2 provides, for the full sample, regression discontinuity estimates over varying
bandwidths and functional forms with standard errors reported in parentheses. Panel (a)
displays the results using second-order polynomials, whereas the coefficients in Panel (b) are
interpreted as a first-difference. Column 1 reflects the estimated effect on sickness absence
through the calendar year. Column 2 displays the number of sick notes, whereas the final
columns display the three different diagnoses. There were no statistically significant effects
on any of the outcomes under consideration. Column 1 reflects a small increase in sickness
absence for individuals who received the entitlement.
However, the precision of the estimated coefficients is poor, and the estimates are not
significant in any of the specifications. Column 2 indicates a small reduction in the number
of sick notes. Remember that sick notes consist of all spells of sickness absence that require
certification from a physician, whereas the measure of sickness absence in itself only consist
of spells longer than 16 days. The effect is significant at the 10% level in Panels (b) and (c),
but they are not robust to differences in specification. In addition, the standard errors are
too large to justify any inference. Furthermore, there are no statistically significant effects
on any of the three diagnoses under consideration. The standard errors are relatively large,
which means that none of the estimated parameters are distinguishable from zero.
As for the robustness to the results in Table 2, we performed the same regression with
the inclusion of some relevant covariates, displayed in Table 9. As argued in Section 5, any
valid RD design should only be affected by increased precision. Adding educational level,
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marital status and earnings from the year he/she turned 59 (year before the policy) does
not alter the conclusions in any away. The number of sick notes is now significant at the
10% level in Panel (d), but this is not of a concern since the point estimates and standard
errors only barely changes. For the rest of the specifications and outcomes, we observe only
minimal changes in the point estimates and standard errors.
Either way, we find that for the entire sample, an increase in entitlement to vacation
had no effect on sickness absence or health as measured by visits to a physician, but there
are some indications of a decrease in the number of sick-notes, significant at the 10% level.
In the case of Sweden, Hofmarcher (2017) found that an increase in vacation for central
government employees aged 30 and 40 resulted in no change in objective measures of health.
While his sample consisted of workers at a different stages in life, he challenges the health
argument for more paid vacation days. This is exactly what we find, and the results shows
that, regardless of specification, choice of bandwidth and outcome, and inclusion of controls,
the estimated coefficients yields no meaningful effect as the standard errors are too large to
justify any consistent inference and thus not statistically distinguishable from zero.
6.3 Heterogeneity
While the analysis thus far reveals no effect of the increase in entitlement to vacation, it
is important to look further into how different groups are affected. For example, women
may respond differently than men. Furthermore, we also investigate whether differences in
socioeconomic status as a result of differences in education and previous history of sickness
absence affected the outcomes. In a next step, we split our analysis sample into several sub-
samples to evaluate whether the increase in entitlement to vacation had any heterogeneous
effect.
Outcomes by gender
Table 3 provides the results from the effect of the increased entitlement to vacation for
men, following the same specification and bandwidth as above. In general, the estimates
confirm the results found in Table 2. Regardless of specification, the estimated parameters
are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The results in Columns 1 through 5 support the
findings in Table 2, in that an increased entitlement to vacation has no observable effect on
objective measures of health or sickness absence. In other words, we find no evidence that
an increase in entitlement to vacation is associated with an effect on sickness absence and
objective measures of health for men. There is no (statistically significant) pattern of any
type for men around the cutoff.
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Table 4 displays the effect of the increase in vacation for women. Interestingly, compared
with the findings in Tables 2 and 3, the sign of the estimated coefficients changed. Column
1 shows, albeit not significant, a reduction in days of sickness absence. Looking at the
number of sick notes in Column 2, we see that Panel (a) displays no significant effect. The
linear regressions presented in Panels (b) through (d) show that there is a significant drop
in the number of sick notes. For the preferred bandwidth specification in Panel (c), the
effect corresponds to an average reduction by 0.27 sick notes, approximately 24%, decrease.
Moreover, while the impact of the increase varies between Panels (b) and (d), the effect does
seem to be robust to varying bandwidths but not the flexible specification that includes a
second-order polynomial on each side of the cutoff.
By breaking down the effects shown in Table 2 by gender, it is clear that the increased
entitlement to vacation had no effect for men, whereas we do find a reduction in GP certified
sick notes for women. Qualitatively, the results reported in Columns 3 through 5 in Table 4
are similar for the whole sample and for men; neither of the estimated coefficients of interest
are statistically significant at any of the conventional levels.
Outcomes by Education
An important question is whether the increase in entitlement to paid vacation days masks
any heterogeneity across socioeconomic groups. While this distinction is common when con-
sidering the difference between white-collar and blue-collar jobs, we proxy for socioeconomic
status by splitting our sample into three different levels of education. The reason is that
administrative data enables us to identify the sector in which he/she works and not whether
the job is strenuous. Education is also an important determinant of health (Mazzonna and
Peracchi, 2013). The subgroups are individuals with no form of attained education (for ex-
ample a high school dropout), high school as highest attained education and at least one
year of college-education, respectively.
Table 5 provides the estimated results for individuals who have only completed the
mandatory years of education (i.e., not graduated from high school). For this group, the
estimated effect on days of sick leave is positive, but far from statistically significant in any
specification, as reported in Column 1. Interestingly, when considering the number of sick
notes, Panels (a), (b), and (d) of Column 2 display an increase in the number of sick notes
significant at the 5% level. For the preferred bandwidth in Panel (c), there is a similar mag-
nitude as in Panel (a), but it is only significant at the 10% level. Either way, we find that
the number of sick notes increased for individuals with only compulsory schooling. This is
somewhat surprising since we expect that the number of sick notes would go down.
Next, Table 6 reflects the results for individuals with high school as the highest attained
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education. The results stand in contrast to those found in Table 5. Although not significant,
Column 1 shows a reduction in days of sickness absence. Column 2 reflects a reduction in
the number of sick notes by 0.3 in a year, approximately 26%, for the preferred bandwidth
in Panel (c), significant at the 1% level. While the estimates differ in magnitude, they are
still robust to the different specifications. Columns 3 and 5 show no changes in number of
psychological and cardiovascular diagnoses. Column 4 reflects a reduction in the number
of musculoskeletal diagnoses. Remember that this type of diagnoses consists of lower back
pain, which is one of the most prevalent conditions related to disability insurance in OECD
countries (World Health Organization, 2011). Within the different specifications in Column
4, the effect does not appear to be robust. The flexible specification shows that the estimated
coefficient is indistinguishable from zero, which questions the validity of the findings in Panels
(b) and (c). However, the direction of the estimated coefficients indicates a reduction in
diagnosis concerning musculoskeletal issues.
Table 7 displays the estimated coefficients for individuals with a minimum of one year of
higher education. The first column indicates that days of sick leave increased for the group
who received the entitlement to an increase in vacation. However, the outcome is not robust
to differences in bandwidth. While specifications reflect a significant increase in days of sick
leave, the estimates are not robust to the preferred bandwidth or the flexible specification.
At the same time, the standard errors are too large for any meaningful interpretation. Thus,
the results suggest that there was no change in days of sick leave for individuals who received
the entitlement. Consequently, none of the estimates in Columns 2–5 are significant, which
suggests that for individuals with higher education, the increase in vacation has no effect on
any of the outcomes. The optimal bandwidth in Panel (c) reveals no change in any of the
outcomes, which, together with the results discussed above, confirms that the point estimate
is small and statistically insignificant for these measures.
Consequently, none of the estimates in the second through fifth column are significant,
which further suggests that for individuals with higher education, the increase in vacation
had no effect on any of the measures under consideration. The optimal bandwidth in panel
c reveals no noticeable change in any of the outcomes, which, coupled with the results
discussed above, confirms that the point estimate is small and statistically insignificant for
these measures.
Altogether, there are some differences in the effect of an increase in vacation by education.
Individuals with some college education and individuals with compulsory schooling only
seem experience a small increase in sickness absence, but this result is not robust to the
different forms of specification. In contrast, individuals with no education beyond high
school experience a decrease in number of sick notes, which is robust to different forms of
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specifications.
Heterogeneity by previous sickness absence
Based on the findings above, one may speculate that individuals prone to sick leave have
already left the labour market through disability insurance. Another interesting aspect is
whether individuals previously prone to sickness absence benefit from an increase in entitle-
ment to vacation. Because this measure is inherently coupled with dispersion, we suspect
that it is the individuals already struggling with high rates of absence who should benefit
the most from an increase in vacation.
Table 8 shows the estimated effect for individuals who, in the preceding year, had a total
number of sick days equal to or above the mean in that particular year. Panel (a) shows that,
for this group of individuals, an increase in vacation led to a decrease in sickness absence
of around seven days. However, this result is not robust to specification, which calls into
question the credibility of the estimated effect in Panel (a). Turning to the second column,
we find a reduction in the number of sick notes as authorised by a physician, which is robust
to the different specifications. Thus, it appears that those individuals prone to relatively
higher rates of sick leave experienced a reduction in days of sick leave. The magnitude of the
estimated coefficients in Panel (c) corresponds to an average reduction of around 0.43 sick
notes, a reduction of 37%. The effect on diagnoses is not clear. Although Panels (c) and (d)
in Column 5 display a significant reduction in the number of cardiovascular diagnoses at the
10% level, the outcome is not robust to the different bandwidths.
How do all of these results fit together? Women, individuals with a history of relatively
high sickness absence and individuals with a high school education experience a significant
reduction in the number of sick notes. Moreover, for the two latter groups, we find indications
of a reduction in days of sickness absence above 16 days, albeit not robust to difference in
bandwidth or difference in specifications.
In general, the outcomes representing health and sickness absence above 16 days yields
no significant effect. To speculate on why this may be the case, it is likely that individuals
potentially benefiting the most from extra time off from work actually have left the work force
before turning 60. Remember that Norway, as briefly discussed in the institutional section,
has a relatively high proportion of individuals on disability insurance. Since we condition
on continuous employment throughout the year individuals turn 59 years of age, we may
disregard individuals who would have benefited from such an increase. This is consistent
with the finding that sickness absence is reduced for individuals with a relatively high rate
of sickness absence at age 59.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we examine how an increase in entitlement to vacation affects workers sickness
absence and health. We exploit a targeted increase in vacation for individuals at the age
of 60. Between 2001 and 2008, month of birth determined whether individuals received
entitlement to an extra week of vacation at age 60. Individuals who reached the age of
60 in September or later had to wait until the following year to receive the extra week of
vacation, whereas individuals born in August or earlier received the entitlement the year
they turned 60. We take advantage of this sharp discontinuity and high quality register data
to investigate whether an increase in vacation affects sickness absence above 16 days, number
of sick notes as authorized by a physician and measures of health.
The vacation reform was intended to relieve the work strain of older employees, potentially
leading to improved employee health and individual welfare in general. However, these
favourable consequences were presented under the condition that extra leisure time was ‘used
well’, that is, it did not encourage a passive life-style (Ot. Prp. nr. 42 (1976) Proposition
to Parliament). In the green paper, reduced sickness absences and shirking were mentioned
as possible consequences, but also the risk for increased job intensity (same workload but
fewer work hours) and the possibility that older workers would become less competitive. The
green paper concludes that there is a need for an evaluation of the reform, but this has not
been carried out (NOU, 1975).
We find that for the whole population of 60-year old employees, entitlement to an extra
week of vacation has no effect on sickness absence or health. However, we did find that
some groups experienced a reduction in sick notes issued. The effect is especially salient
for individuals with a relatively high rate of sickness absence in the preceding year and
individuals with high school as highest level of education. There are also indications of a
reduction in sick notes among women and an increase among employees with compulsory
schooling only, although these results are clear.
While there is a negative effect on sick notes for some subgroups, we did not find an
effect on days of sick leave for the same groups. The coefficients are predominately negative
across specifications, but are not statistically significant. Remember that certified sick notes
concern all spells of sick leave irrespective of duration, apart from the first self-reported
days. Thus, this outcome most likely captures less severe issues of health compared with
days of sickness absence in excess of the first 16 days. Finally, none of the estimated effects
on the three measures of health (number of GP visits for psychological, musculoskeletal,
and cardiovascular diagnoses, respectively) are robust to specification or bandwidth. A
reasonable explanation is that one extra week of vacation has a transitory effect on individual
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health, which does not affect the measures of health we considered. Furthermore, since the
estimates are the ITT effect of the entitlement to increased vacation, it may underestimate
the true benefit of actual treatment. However, it may also be that increased vacation is not
linked to a health-preserving effect, or if so, not detectable in our data.
Our study contributes to two important aspects in the policy debate. First, Norway has
a relatively high degree of sick leave and individuals on disability insurance. Second, many
OECD countries have implemented reforms to increase the share of individuals working rela-
tive to people retired. We find that some groups may benefit from the increased entitlement
to vacation, especially individuals with a relatively high sick leave in the preceding year.
However, for most groups, the health-preserving argument is not present. Our findings are
also important since there is a growing share of the population in most OECD countries who
are nearing retirement, and given an increased toll on public budgets, targeted policies for
older workers may contribute to a reduction in social security dependency through compen-
sation for sick leave. It is unfortunately not clear whether increased entitlement to vacation
is the right policy tool to accomplish this target.
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Figure 1: Histogram of Running Variable for RD Analysis
Notes: The sample consists of all individuals who turned 60 at some point in the calendar year
between 2001 and 2008 whose month of birth decided entitlement to an extra week of vacation.
Month 1 indicates born in September, whereas -1 indicates born in August and 1 indicates
born in October.
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(a) Average Earnings (The year they turn 59) (b) Female
(c) Fraction Married (d) High School Education
(e) No Attained Education (f) Some College
Figure 2: Characteristics by month of birth
Notes: The figure displays individual characteristics by month of birth, relative to September.
4 months before the cut-off date indicates born in June whereas 1 month after the cut-off date
indicates being born in September. In each graph, we plot the unrestricted monthly means and
the estimated monthly means from a local linear regression applied to each side of the cut-off
date. The scale of the y-axis is equal to ± 0.5 of the variables standard deviation.
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(a) Sickness Absence (b) Sicknotes
(c) No. of Psychological Diagnoses (d) No. of Cardiovascular Diagnoses
(e) No. of Musculoskeletal Diagnoses
Figure 3: Effect of the increased entitlement to vacation
Notes: The graphs present the relationship between month of birth, diagnoses set by a GP,
number of sick notes certified by a physician and sick leave. The x-axis displays age-in-months
relative to the threshold for entitlement to an extra week of vacation. 4 months before the
cut-off date indicates born in June whereas 1 month after the cut-off date indicates being born
in September.
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Year of birth – 1941-1948 1944.66 1944.70 1944.58 1944.64 1944.69
[2.29] [2.29] [2.30] [2.29] [2.29]
Compulsory schooling only 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.22
High school as highest attained edu-
cation
0.55 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.57
Some college or more as highest at-
tained
0.25 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.21
education
Other Controls
Married 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.69
Average earnings (1000 NOK)** 355.57 355.50 355.73 426.33 272.80
[216.17] [216.81] [214.81] [187.98] [108.77]
Outcomes
Days of sick leave 29.87 29.83 29.97 25.16 35.39
[69.59] [69.46] [69.87] [64.67] [74.56]
Number of sick notes* 1.15 1.14 1.16 0.89 1.45
[2.40] [2.38] [2.43] [2.10] [2.66]
Number of GP visits for 0.99 1.01 0.97 1.14 0.82
cardiovascular diagnoses* [2.73] [2.76] [2.68] [3.05] [2.30]
Number of GP visits for 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.33 0.60
psychological diagnoses * [2.03] [2.01] [2.08] [1.74] [2.31]
Number of GP visits for 1.44 1.43 1.45 1.11 1.81
musculoskeletal diagnoses * [3.14] [3.12] [3.19] [2.74] [3.51]
N 244,757 166,261 78,496 131,948 112,809
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets. This table displays descriptive statistics on the pooled
sample from 2001 through 2008. All variables are measured the year when individuals turn 60 years
of age.
∗ For these outcomes, we have information for the period 2006–2008; 100.876 individuals of which
69.828 are born in January through August, 31.048 are born in September through December, 53.819
are men and 47.057 are women. ∗∗ Measured the year they turn 59 (year before treatment).
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Table 2: Estimated impact of increased entitlement to vacation on the full sample















Panel (a): Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Treatment Effect 0.916 -0.016 -0.023 0.034 -0.015
(0.828) (0.045) (0.037) (0.058) (0.051)
Observations 244757 100876 100876 100876 100876
Panel (b): local linear regression. h=1
Treatment Effect 0.515 -0.065* -0.016 -0.030 -0.007
(0.693) (0.038) (0.031) (0.049) (0.043)
Observations 40787 16453 16453 16453 16453
Panel (c): local linear regression. h=2
Treatment Effect 0.596 -0.122* 0.027 -0.091 0.003
(1.212) (0.065) (0.054) (0.086) (0.072)
Observations 80887 32693 32693 32693 32693
Panel (d): local linear regression. h=3
Treatment Effect 0.634 -0.074 -0.034 0.011 -0.033
(0.877) (0.047) (0.039) (0.062) (0.053)
Observations 119873 48470 48470 48470 48470
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level. ***,**,* indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes individuals in the final analysis sample.
Columns denote the different outcomes under consideration. All outcomes are displayed based on
a local linear regression with quadratic polynomials or difference in bandwidths h.
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Table 3: Estimated impact of increased entitlement to vacation: Men















Panel (a): Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Treatment Effect 1.323 0.037 0.035 0.020 0.051
(1.056) (0.054) (0.045) (0.069) (0.077)
Observations 131948 53819 53819 53819 53819
Panel (b): local linear regression. h=1
Treatment Effect 1.415 -0.008 0.021 -0.021 0.053
(0.879) (0.046) (0.038) (0.058) (0.064)
Observations 21920 8773 8773 8773 8773
Panel (c): local linear regression. h=2
Treatment Effect 2.395 0.002 0.073 -0.102 0.068
(1.545) (0.079) (0.067) (0.101) (0.109)
Observations 43533 17466 17466 17466 17466
Panel (d): local linear regression. h=3
Treatment Effect 1.542 -0.018 0.017 0.018 0.024
(1.117) (0.058) (0.048) (0.072) (0.080)
Observations 64594 25919 25919 25919 25919
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level. ***,**,* indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes individuals in the final analysis sample.
Columns denote the different outcomes under consideration. All outcomes are displayed based on
a local linear regression with quadratic polynomials or difference in bandwidths h.
134
Table 4: Estimated impact of increased entitlement to vacation: Women















Panel (a): Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Treatment Effect 0.799 -0.058 -0.087 0.071 -0.085
(1.310) (0.073) (0.061) (0.098) (0.065)
Observations 112809 47057 47057 47057 47057
Panel (b): local linear regression. h=1
Treatment Effect -0.445 -0.133** -0.059 -0.042 -0.074
(1.090) (0.061) (0.050) (0.082) (0.055)
Observations 18867 7680 7680 7680 7680
Panel (c): local linear regression. h=2
Treatment Effect -1.397 -0.272*** -0.029 -0.090 -0.065
(1.902) (0.105) (0.086) (0.141) (0.093)
Observations 37354 15227 15227 15227 15227
Panel (d): local linear regression. h=3
Treatment Effect -0.423 -0.140* -0.093 -0.001 -0.096
(1.378) (0.077) (0.064) (0.102) (0.067)
Observations 55279 22551 22551 22551 22551
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level. ***,**,* indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes individuals in the final analysis sample.
Columns denote the different outcomes under consideration. All outcomes are displayed based on
a local linear regression with quadratic polynomials or difference in bandwidths h.
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Table 5: Estimated impact of increased vacation: Compulsory Schooling Only















Panel (a): Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Treatment Effect 2.563 0.265** 0.005 0.144 -0.042
(2.036) (0.121) (0.091) (0.163) (0.121)
Observations 50660 18484 18484 18484 18484
Panel (b): local linear regression. h=1
Treatment Effect 1.881 0.201** 0.032 0.076 0.018
(1.693) (0.101) (0.073) (0.137) (0.100)
Observations 8526 3075 3075 3075 3075
Panel (c): local linear regression. h=2
Treatment Effect 2.673 0.298* 0.067 0.148 0.056
(2.970) (0.178) (0.135) (0.236) (0.171)
Observations 16939 6166 6166 6166 6166
Panel (d): local linear regression. h=3
Treatment Effect 2.781 0.263** -0.002 0.176 0.004
(2.151) (0.129) (0.100) (0.170) (0.124)
Observations 24985 9024 9024 9024 9024
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level. ***,**,* indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes individuals in the final analysis sample.
Columns denote the different outcomes under consideration. All outcomes are displayed based on
a local linear regression with quadratic polynomials or difference in bandwidths h.
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Table 6: Estimated impact of increased entitlement to vacation: High School as highest
attained education















Panel (a): Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Treatment Effect -0.605 -0.139** -0.016 -0.041 0.035
(1.131) (0.060) (0.050) (0.079) (0.068)
Observations 133661 56956 56956 56956 56956
Panel (b): local linear regression. h=1
Treatment Effect -1.362 -0.194*** -0.034 -0.131** 0.002
(0.946) (0.050) (0.042) (0.067) (0.056)
Observations 22419 9321 9321 9321 9321
Panel (c): local linear regression. h=2
Treatment Effect -1.870 -0.307*** 0.008 -0.246** -0.022
(1.638) (0.085) (0.073) (0.115) (0.098)
Observations 44284 18405 18405 18405 18405
Panel (d): local linear regression. h=3
Treatment Effect -1.093 -0.221*** -0.046 -0.090 -0.037
(1.188) (0.062) (0.053) (0.082) (0.071)
Observations 65496 27346 27346 27346 27346
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level. ***,**,* indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes individuals in the final analysis sample.
Columns denote the different outcomes under consideration. All outcomes are displayed based on
a local linear regression with quadratic polynomials or difference in bandwidths h.
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Table 7: Estimated impact of increased entitlement to vacation: Some College as highest
attained education















Panel (a): Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Treatment Effect 2.843** 0.052 -0.064 0.120 -0.109
(1.440) (0.075) (0.070) (0.090) (0.100)
Observations 60436 25436 25436 25436 25436
Panel (b): local linear regression. h=1
Treatment Effect 3.404*** 0.028 -0.010 0.123* -0.049
(1.178) (0.062) (0.057) (0.074) (0.087)
Observations 9842 4057 4057 4057 4057
Panel (c): local linear regression. h=2
Treatment Effect 4.021* -0.002 0.044 0.093 0.015
(2.127) (0.112) (0.096) (0.135) (0.136)
Observations 19664 8122 8122 8122 8122
Panel (d): local linear regression. h=3
Treatment Effect 2.200 -0.010 -0.033 0.092 -0.060
(1.534) (0.081) (0.072) (0.097) (0.101)
Observations 29392 12100 12100 12100 12100
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level. ***,**,* indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes individuals in the final analysis sample.
Columns denote the different outcomes under consideration. All outcomes are displayed based on
a local linear regression with quadratic polynomials or difference in bandwidths h.
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Table 8: Estimated impact of increased entitlement to vacation: Sick leave above mean, at
age 59















Panel (a): Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Treatment Effect -6.895*** -0.289** -0.146 0.050 -0.140
(2.412) (0.135) (0.128) (0.191) (0.150)
Observations 57897 23261 23261 23261 23261
Panel (b): local linear regression. h=1
Treatment Effect -1.797 -0.304*** -0.076 -0.104 -0.175
(1.976) (0.112) (0.105) (0.160) (0.124)
Observations 10211 4053 4053 4053 4053
Panel (c): local linear regression. h=2
Treatment Effect 0.198 -0.438** 0.042 -0.181 -0.378*
(3.457) (0.195) (0.181) (0.275) (0.205)
Observations 20229 8005 8005 8005 8005
Panel (d): local linear regression. h=3
Treatment Effect -1.041 -0.302** -0.103 0.111 -0.284*
(2.515) (0.142) (0.134) (0.198) (0.152)
Observations 29721 11814 11814 11814 11814
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level. ***,**,* indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes individuals in the final analysis sample.
Columns denote the different outcomes under consideration. All outcomes are displayed based on
a local linear regression with quadratic polynomials or difference in bandwidths h.
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Table 9: Estimated impact of increased entitlement to vacation on full sample. With controls















Panel (a): Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Treatment Effect 1.081 -0.009 -0.023 0.043 -0.012
(0.830) (0.045) (0.037) (0.059) (0.051)
Observations 244757 100876 100876 100876 100876
Panel (b): local linear regression. h=1
Treatment Effect 0.488 -0.067* -0.017 -0.032 -0.007
(0.689) (0.037) (0.031) (0.049) (0.043)
Observations 40787 16453 16453 16453 16453
Panel (c): local linear regression. h=2
Treatment Effect 0.532 -0.126* 0.023 -0.096 0.006
(1.206) (0.065) (0.054) (0.085) (0.072)
Observations 80887 32693 32693 32693 32693
Panel (d): local linear regression. h=3
Treatment Effect 0.502 -0.080* -0.036 0.003 -0.034
(0.873) (0.047) (0.039) (0.061) (0.053)
Observations 119873 48470 48470 48470 48470
Notes: Results includes controls for eduation being married, and earnings measured the year he or
she turned 59 years of age. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level. ***,**,*
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes individuals in the
final analysis sample. Columns denote the different outcomes under consideration. All outcomes are
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1 Introduction
The effect of serious illness on individuals’ labour supply has long been of interest in the
empirical literature.1 Serious illness can have adverse economic consequences for the individ-
uals experiencing the shock, and also for the entire household. In particular, sudden illness,
or a fatal health outcome can potentially have devastating economic consequences within a
household, be it loss of workdays or out-of-pocket expenditures on healthcare. A natural
question to ask, then, is how the other (physically unaffected) spouse‘s of the household cope
with such events.
In the present paper, we investigate the impact on earnings, employment, liquid assets
and social insurance for individuals’ whose spouses experienced a health shock. A common
concern when studying how health interacts with labour market participation is that labour
supply and health are jointly determined. We overcome this challenge by focusing on the
timing of health-related events that are arguably hard to predict, regardless of any exist-
ing risk factors. To this end, we use data from the national patient register (NPR) from
2008–2014, and the cause of death (CAD) register from 1992–2014 to identify a particular
set of health outcomes. First, we use the CAD register to identify individuals’ whose spouse
passed away due to ischemic heart diseases, stroke or transport accidents. Second, we use
the NPR register to identify individuals’ whose spouse were hospitalized because of an acute
non-scheduled condition. We then link these outcomes to administrative data. The admin-
istrative data enables us to identify married couples2 together with information on labour
market participation, the uptake of social insurance and liquid assets.3
The econometric method in this paper follows a ‘timing-of-event’ design, similar to that
used by Fadlon and Nielsen (2015). They use a quasi-experimental design where they exploit
the random timing of a severe health event to construct a counterfactual. The authors
construct a treatment group of individuals’ whose spouses experienced either a fatal or a non-
fatal health shock within a given period, and compare them to individuals’ who experienced
the same shock but a few years later. The key identifying assumption is that the timing of
the event is uncorrelated with prior knowledge of individuals’ health. Rather than focusing
on a set of pre-specified ranges of treatment and controls, we follow Druedahl and Martinello
(2016), who show that such an approach can be extended to an event study in which all
available comparisons are included in an analysis. From the ‘timing-of-event’ design, we
recover the outcomes of interest by comparing spousal earnings, where spouses experienced
1For example, Charles (2003); Lindeboom et al. (2016); Trevisan and Zantomio (2016).
2We are unfortunately unable to identify cohabitation or other forms of partnerships.
3Liquid assets is the sum of all liquid assets and financial investments, such as stocks, bonds and exchange-
traded funds. It also includes direct transfers, such as survivor pensions or life insurance.
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the same shock at different points in time. Thus, we estimate the outcome at a given year
relative to a base year.
Our results show a clear difference between fatal and non-fatal health shocks. First, we
find that individuals’ whose spouses died experienced a large and negative change in earnings
and employment. Widows’ earnings decreased by 8% the second year after the death of a
spouse. We find no effect on earnings for widowers, but widows and widowers experience
a drop in labour market participation in the years after the death of a spouse. Turning to
non-fatal health shocks, we find no effect on any of the outcomes under consideration. A non-
fatal health shock may not inflict the same type of economic consequences as a fatal health
shock, even if we find evidence of reduced employment for individuals’ who experienced the
non-fatal health shock.
To get a fuller picture of a person’s response to the spousal health shock, we also assess
whether there are any changes in the uptake of social insurance or liquid assets, as these
outcomes may have an impact on both employment and earnings. While we do not distin-
guish between the different social support programs, we find that widowers increase their
dependency on social insurance in the years after the death of a spouse. Furthermore, we find
large flows of liquid assets in the years after the death of a spouse. We are unfortunately
unable to disentangle the different components of liquid assets, but they do include both
transfers as a result of a will and life insurance. Splitting the sample by age at the time
when the spousal shock occurred, and by level of education, reveals that the effect is more
pronounced for individuals’ who became widows or widowers at a relatively young age. We
find no clear pattern between levels of education.
Individuals’ responses to a spouse’s ill health (of women, mostly) have previously been
studied by, for example, Parsons (1977); Berger (1983); Berger and Fleisher (1984) and
Siegel (2006), but the effects on employment range from a reduction to a very large increase.
These authors demonstrate that wives tend to increase labour supply when their husbands
experience a deterioration in health, whereas husbands’ responses to their wives falling ill
generally leads to no change at all. Siegel (2006) shows that these results heavily depend on
two important features: They are casespecific in terms of the health-related outcomes and
whether the individuals’ possess health insurance.4 There is also ample evidence from the
epidemiological literature of a so-called widowhood effect, manifested by increased mortality
for widows or widowers in the weeks after the death of a spouse (see e.g. Brenn and Ytterstad
(2016)).
Recently, some studies have tried to tackle endogeneity in health by including objective
4Whether self-reported measures of health lead to justification bias is a long-standing question (see e.g.
Deaton (2012)).
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measures from administrative records. García-Gómez et al. (2013) use acute and non-fatal
hospitalisations taken from administrative records in the Netherlands and argue that the
nature of unscheduled hospitalisations makes it more likely that they are exogenous to the
labour market participation. Studying the effect of ill health on spouses’ labour supply, Jeon
and Pohl (2017) use cancer diagnoses as an unanticipated deterioration in health. They
argue that such a condition makes it more unlikely to observe an adjustment in labour
market supply before the uncovering of the diagnosis.
García-Gómez et al. (2013) find a reduction in the probability of being employed two years
after the shock, of around two percentage points, for individuals’ whose spouse experienced
an acute hospitalisation. They also find a reduction in earnings of around two percentage
points. Interestingly, the estimated effect is only significant for males whose female spouses
experienced a health shock. In contrast, Jeon and Pohl (2017), find negative effects on labour
market participation that are similar between genders. Upon being diagnosed with cancer,
spouses reduce labour market participation by 2.4%, and this effect persists for around four
years, after which it is likely that individuals’ either have recovered or passed away. Jeon
and Pohl (2017) also argue that the use of hospitalisations as a determinant of a shock,
as in García-Gómez (2011), is problematic because hospitalisations may occur following a
longer period of deteriorating health. They argue that receiving a cancer diagnosis acts
as an unexpected shock and is a major life event. While the latter certainly is true, it is
not given that receiving a cancer diagnosis alleviates the concerns about a longer period of
deteriorating health. Deteriorating health because of a sudden loss of weight in conjunction
with loss of breath while carrying out simple tasks are for example known symptoms of
cancer.5
As explained above, the econometric method used by García-Gómez et al. (2013) and Jeon
and Pohl (2017) is matching combined with differences-in-differences. This method might
be problematic, as any type of matching relies on the conditional independence assumption,
which may create biased estimates if the health shock is partly determined by selection of
individuals’ to be treated (Smith and Todd, 2005).
Exploiting the rich nature of Danish administrative data, Fadlon and Nielsen (2015) find
that both fatal and non-fatal health shocks affect the overall household earnings but spouses
respond differently depending on the severity of the shock. They find that individuals’ whose
spouses passed away because of an unanticipated health shock, increase their labour market
participation by around 7.6% on average and their earnings by 6.8% on average by the
fourth year after the shock. Older widows mainly drive this effect. In addition, however, the
5Several studies on the symptoms associated with advanced cancer exist in the epidemiological literature
(e.g. Walsh et al. (2000)).
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estimated effect is present only for widows or widowers who had substantially lower earnings
than their spouse. The authors find modest, yet significant negative effects on spouses’
labour supply when individuals’ experience a non-fatal health shock.
A recent paper by Dobkin et al. (2018) in the U.S. context shows individuals’ financial
outcomes following a hospital admission, and, as in our paper, they use an event study
methodology. They find that a large and significant impact of hospital admissions on unpaid
bills, especially for people with no health insurance. Moreover, they find no evidence of a
spousal labour supply response to a hospital admission.
From a theoretical standpoint, several interrelated mechanisms are likely to affect the
outcome. One strand in the literature underlines the importance of within-household insur-
ance (or an earnings effect) in the context of unemployment, referred to as the added-worker
effect (see e.g. Ashenfelter (1980); Lundberg (1985); Cullen and Gruber (2000)).6 In order
to compensate a loss in earnings due to a spouse losing his or her job, individuals’ contribute
to the household earnings by increasing their own labour supply. However, the presence of
such an effect is not clear in the event of spouses experiencing a fatal or non-fatal health
shock. Coile (2004) finds no evidence of the added-worker effect in a household when one
of the members experienced a non-fatal health shock. According to Heckman and MaCurdy
(1980), the added-worker effect should be small, unless the earnings loss is large relative to
lifetime earnings.
Another perspective is the role of caregiving within the family, where spouses synchronize
their non-market time (Coile, 2004). Healthy spouses might value their non-market time in a
different way than people with worse health and thus reduce their labour supply to provide
care within the household. Furthermore, Coile (2004) highlights the interdependence in
preferences for work and leisure between spouses. In the event of a fatal health shock, it is
reasonable to assume that individuals’ may also experience a disutility for work as a result
of grief, which potentially can crowd out the added-worker effect.7
Liquidity constraints may also have an impact on the response. How the unaffected
spouse respond to a spousal health shock may depend on social safety nets and social care
services, which is important because Norway has one of the most generous levels of social
insurance (see e.g. Scruggs 2006 for a comparison within OECD countries). The social
security programs may therefore crowd out the potential need for the unaffected spouse to
increase the labour supply to compensate for a drop in earnings. In the case of a non-fatal
health shock, and as highlighted by Coile (2004), there may be complementaries in leisure
6One crux with referring to the U.S. setting is that the out-of-pocket expenditure as a result of changes
in health is related to, among other things, institutional differences and private health insurance.
7van den Berg et al. (2017) show how grief negatively affects labour market outcomes in the event of
loosing a child.
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among spouses.8 This complementarity may crowd out any potential increase in employment
on both the intensive and extensive margin. The earnings effect, the caregiving hypothesis
and leisure as a complement to poor health have offsetting effects, and it is not clear which of
these effects prevail. We therefore test the individuals’ responses to a spouse’s health shock
empirically.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes institutional features, how we define
the relevant health shocks and the descriptive analysis. In section 3, we introduce the
empirical framework and then detail: how a sudden and unexpected fatal health shock and a
sudden but non-fatal health shock affect labour supply and liquid assets. Section 4 concludes.
2 Institutions, Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.1 Institutional Background
Norway has a comprehensive public system of social insurance, with entitlement often de-
pending on employment status. The most relevant programs for our paper are sick pay and
temporary and permanent disability insurance. The replacement rate for sick pay is 100%
from day one of the sick leave, but it is limited to one year. In addition to sick pay, indi-
viduals’ may be entitled to either temporary or permanent disability insurance (DI) with a
replacement rate of around 60%. A physician must certify entitlement to either sick pay or
temporary or permanent DI, apart from the first three (eight)9 days of a spell of absence due
to sickness. Individuals who quit or lose their job are entitled to unemployment benefits, up
to a maximum of two years. The replacement rate is 62.4% (capped at high earnings).
Instead of focusing on a particular type of social insurance, we combine temporary and
permanent DI along with unemployment insurance and construct an indicator for whether
one receives transfers from any of these programs. Bratsberg et al. (2013) show that it is
difficult to distinguish between the programs, and Fevang et al. (2004) identify large flows
between the different programs.
The unaffected spouse may be entitled to leave to care for their sick spouse. In the
terminal stages of a person’s life, individuals are entitled to a maximum of 60 days’ leave,
whereas individuals’ are entitled to a maximum of 10 days’ leave to care for their sick
spouse.10 Unfortunately, we do not have information about this specific type of leave, as it
8Complementaries in leisure follows from non-separable utility in that a person values leisure more if
shared with a spouse.
9Self-certification can be up to 8 days, depending on whether the workplace having signed the so-called
inclusive workplace agreement. This agreement did relax the requirement of self-certification from 3 to 8
days.
10Working Environment Act §12-10.
146
follows other rules than those covering sickness absence.11
2.2 Definition of a Health Shock
We form our analysis around two different health shocks, non-fatal and fatal. First, we
construct the measure of a non-fatal health shock using data from the NPR, which contains
information on all contacts with somatic hospitals from 2008–2014, coupled with conditions
classified according to the World Health Organization International Statistical Classification
of Diseases, ICD-10 (World Health Organization (1992)). In the data from the NPR, all
admissions are classified as planned or acute and coded in accordance with ICD-10. Acute
admission consists of all unscheduled hospital admissions, where a patient is in dire need of
treatment.
We follow Jeon and Pohl (2017), García-Gómez (2011), and Fadlon and Nielsen (2015),
and define a non-fatal health shock based on an acute and unscheduled hospitalisation. We
also follow Fadlon and Nielsen (2015), Jones et al. (2016), Trevisan and Zantomio (2016) and
McClellan (1998) and focus on a particular subset of shocks that constitute major health
events. These are stroke, acute myocardial infarction (heart attack) and congestive heart
failure.12 The conditions in question are the leading causes of death in most developed
countries (World Health Organization, 2015).13,14 To further reduce the possibility that the
hospitilzation is a result of a long-term deterioration in health, we include individuals who did
not have an unscheduled hospitalisation in the preceding 365 days, although this restriction
does not ensure that we study the first onset of a non-fatal health shock. This means that
we include all acute hospitalisations between 2009 and 2014 as a result of either a stroke,
myocardial infarction or congestive heart failure.
Second, we construct a measure of a fatal health shock, based on information on all
recorded deaths from 1992–2014 from the CAD register. Each death is coded in accordance
with the European shortlist for CAD, which is a standardized categorization based on ICD
codes. One limitation with the CAD register is that people can die for reasons not associated
with a particular deterioration in health. It is therefore not clear if we should include all
recorded deaths between 1992 and 2014 or limit the focus to a subset of causes. In our
11People may be entitled to social security compensation to care for persons who are in the terminal
stages of their life. No such compensation exists after the death of a spouse.
12Acute myocardial infarction and congestive heart failure are forms of cardiovascular disease.
13The ICD-10 codes for stroke are: I60–I69; I20-I25 for myocardial infarction; and I438, I500 and I501 for
congestive heart failure.
14Acute myocardial infarction has been used in other economic literature to study variations in the
utilisation of medical procedures (Chandra and Staiger, 2007), and whether more spending is associated
with better outcomes in health care (Doyle, 2011), and how technology may result in better productivity
growth in health care (Skinner and Staiger, 2015).
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analysis, we therefore define a sudden death caused by either ischemic heart diseases, other
heart diseases, cerebrovascular diseases, or transport accidents.15 We are unfortunately
unable to check if people have a known history of heart disease, but we are confident that
limiting the attention to a subset of causes increases the chances that the death indeed is
sudden and unexpected.
While we cannot rule out that these events occur as a result of a chronic illness or long-
lasting deterioration in health, and although not perfect, we believe that restricting the
sample to a particular set of serious outcomes does at least reduce the possibility. In the
next section, we elaborate on how these conditions relate to the sample selection.
2.3 Data and Sample Selection
2.3.1 Data
In addition to the data on hospitalisation and mortality, we have several data sources from
Statistics Norway linked through a unique encrypted identifier. The registers contain demo-
graphic information, such as month of birth, marital status and educational attainment, and
various longitudinal measures of earnings and liabilities. Important for our analysis, data on
legal marriage are taken directly from population registers, from which we can identify all
married couples in Norway.
Earnings data are in annual amounts and are verified by the Norwegian Tax Authorities.
Annual earnings include information on all Norwegian residents from 1993–2014 and consist
of wages and self-employed earnings, but disregard capital earnings and pensions. We also
include an annual measure of financial wealth, reported by all third-party financial institu-
tions in Norway. This measure is the sum of all liquid assets and financial investments, such
as stocks, bonds and exchange-traded funds, plus direct transfers, such as survivor pensions
or life insurance. In other words, liquid assets are assets that can be converted into cash
quickly. There is no attrition from the original sample due to non-response or non-consent
in any of these measures, and all annual amounts are without any top or bottom-coding.
2.3.2 Sample Selection
We base the empirical analysis on two complementary datasets. First, we identify all acute
hospitalisations based on the conditions outlined in the previous section. Likewise, we iden-
tify all recorded deaths corresponding to the causes of death discussed in the previous section.
15The codes in the CAD register for heart diseases are 34–36, whereas transport accidents are code 60.
The corresponding ICD-10 codes for heart diseases: I20–I25, I30–I33, I39–I52 and I60–I69, whereas the codes
for transport accidents are V01–V99.
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That way, we have two subsamples that consist of individuals whose spouses experienced
fatal or non-fatal health shocks. This allows for a more homogeneous way of comparing
individuals, compared to the inclusion of individuals’ whose spouses did not experience any
health shock. This approach closely follows the samples used in Fadlon and Nielsen (2015),
who study the effect of the same events as in the present paper.
Table 2 summarises how we construct our samples. First, as displayed in Panel A,
we identify all deaths recorded in Norway between 1992 and 2014. This leaves 461,040
men and 478,469 woman. Of these, we keep all individuals’ with a recorded cause of death
corresponding to either ischemic or other heart diseases, cerabrovascular diseases or transport
accidents. This leaves 154,578 men and 164,385 woman. Of these, we identify individuals’
who at the time of death were aged between 30 and 70 and were married. We also restrict
the spouse to whom these were married to be at age 30-70 at the time of their spouse‘s
death. This leaves an analysis sample of 5,198 men whose female spouses died and 20,585
woman whose male spouses died.16
Likewise, we identify all individuals’ who experienced an acute hospitalisation between
2009 and 2014. This leaves 900,416 woman and 720,995 men. Of these, we restrict the sample
to consist of individuals’ who had at least one overnight stay and who were not admitted in
the last 365 days. This leaves a sample of 774,012 women and 600,428 men. Of these, we
include only those diagnoses corresponding to either a stroke or ischemic or cardiovascular
heart disease. This leaves 66,112 men and 41,558 woman. Of these, we identify individuals
aged 30–70 at the time of hospitalisation. We also restrict the unaffected spouse to be aged
30–70 the year their spouse experienced a non-fatal health shock. This leaves an analysis
sample of 10,621 men whose female spouses experienced a non-fatal health shock and 31,271
women whose male spouse experienced the non-fatal health shock.
Two apparent issues from Table 2 warrant some discussion. In Panel A, the share of
individuals who died as a result of the conditions of interest accounts for approximately
one third of total deaths. Yet, it is clear that most of these deaths occurred at later ages.
Second, in Panel B, the health events we focus on accounts for around one twelfth of all
hospitalisations with at least one overnight stay, with no hospitalisation having occurred in
the preceding 365 days. However, it is not clear from the literature whether we should include
all sets of conditions in the estimation. Restricting the sample to a limited set of conditions
that may potentially be major life events allows for an easier interpretation compared to
including all different types of conditions. Therefore, we follow the literature discussed in
Section 2.2 and impose these restrictions, which also allows us to put our finding in the
context of previous results.
16Very few people are married below the age of 30, and most people have retired by the age of 70.
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2.3.3 Outcomes
The goal of this paper is to study the effect of individuals whose spouses experienced a health
shock on various outcome variables related to labour market participation and the uptake
of social insurance. To that end, we use two measures of labour market participation. First,
we defined employment from a proxy based on earnings equal to or above the threshold to
accumulate pension points, also known as one price amount (2016 NOK 92,000 ≈ 2016-USD
10,600). Second, we use log earnings to capture the relative changes in labour supply through
earnings.
Note that we do not observe any direct transfers from insurance or wills, but we use
a measure of liquid assets that contains all these types of transfers. Apart from a will or
insurance, these can also be private cash transfers or money earned through the sale of a
house. Although not perfect, we believe that our measure of liquid assets sheds additional
light on our findings based on the earnings and social insurance data.
2.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides mean values for the two samples in our empirical analysis. More than two-
thirds of the subsample, displayed in Panel A, had a spouse pass away due to a heart-related
disease, with the prevalence markedly higher for males than females. It is not surprising,
then, that heart-related diseases are the most common non-fatal health shock. Stroke is more
common among females than males, while the other causes of death and non-fatal health
shocks occur at similar rates for both genders. The the average earnings, liquid assets and
earnings displayed in Table 1 include zeroes.
Table 1 shows that individuals whose spouses experienced a health shock are 57.6 years
old when the shock occurs. Around 60% are employed in both samples, yet the non-employed
are kept in the sample to investigate whether non-employment changes their employment
decision in the event of their spouse experiencing a health shock.17 Furthermore, women are
more than three times as likely as men to have a spouse experience any of the shocks under
consideration, as men. The average age at which a spouse experienced a shock is slightly
higher for men than women. Earnings and liquid assets are deflated to 2006 prices and are
displayed in NOK 1000, with NOK 10 ≈ EUR 1 in 2018.
17Restricting the sample to include only employed individuals’ at the time of the shock would also be a
case of bad controls, as one of the outcomes is employment.
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3 Specification and Results
3.1 Empirical Specification
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect on individuals’ labour supply following a
spouse’s fatal or non-fatal health shock. More specifically, we focus on sudden and unex-
pected deaths and acute and unscheduled hospitalisations. As discussed in the previous
section, we think of these health shocks as unanticipated in the sense that the exact timing
of the shock is difficult to predict. Fadlon and Nielsen (2015) use an empirical strategy
that exploits the randomness in timing of spouses experiencing an acute health shock. By
exploiting that the exact timing of an event (the health shock) is difficult to predict and
is stochastic, they use a differences-in-differences (DiD) approach where they define specific
treatment and control groups.
The empirical method used by Fadlon and Nielsen (2015) is summarized in Figure 1,
where the first group consists of women whose male spouses died because of a fatal health
shock in 1998. The second group consists of women whose male spouses died because of a
fatal health shock in 2003, but this group now acts as a natural control group to individuals
whose spouses died in 1998. In this way, we can identify the effect of a fatal health shock in
1998 on labour earnings in 1999 through 2002, after which the effect is contaminated by the
control group that experienced the same shock.
One potential drawback with the method proposed and applied by Fadlon and Nielsen
(2015) is that it does not extend beyond the point at which the control group experiences
the same shock. This is particularly unfortunate in the setting of a non-fatal health shock,
because our data are limited to shocks that occurred between 2009 and 2014. There seems
to be no obvious reason why one should not use an unbalanced panel instead. Druedahl and
Martinello (2016) show that combining all events is nearly identical to the balanced DiD
setup suggested by Fadlon and Nielsen (2015). Therefore, in our empirical analysis we follow
Druedahl and Martinello (2016) and use an empirical strategy where we include individuals’
who differ only in the timing of a spouse’s health shock.
Our empirical analysis thus consists of using an event study design where we take advan-
tage of the within-person variation over time and the panel structure of our data. Formally,
we estimate the following reduced-form regression equation:
Yi,t = α +
∑
i=k
βkxi(t+k) + ηc,t + µi + εi,t, (1)
where Yi,t is the outcome of interest for individual i in year t. Our interest lies in the event
time indicator xi(t+k), which is a dummy for each year before and after the year that a spouse
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experienced a health shock. In the specification, we use period t − 1 as the base period by
dropping xi(t−1) from the regression. This implies that all estimated effects in what follows
are relative to the year before a spouse experienced a health shock.
Equation 1 implies that the control group consists of individuals whose spouses experi-
enced a health shock but in a subsequent year. We plot all coefficients to investigate the
identifying assumption, namely, that there can be no systematic relationship between the
year in which the shock occurred and the outcome of interest. We include individual fixed
effects, µi, and year-by-cohort fixed effects, ηc,t. The former controls for time-invariant fac-
tors at the individual level, such as labour preferences, and/or underlying ability. As age
correlates with health, adding year-by-cohort fixed effects rules out that we estimate the
effect of getting older. We estimate the model using all pre- and post-shock years, but we
show results only from periods k ∈ {−5, 5}. Given the structure of our data, moving further
away from these periods reduces the number of comparisons, thus resulting in estimates that
are too imprecise for any meaningful interpretation.18
Two apparent issues may potentially invalidate the empirical approach of the present
paper. First, if the shock occurred preceding a long-lasting deterioration in health, the
timing of the event analysis would be invalid. Second, job loss has previously been found to
correlate with bad health. Both of these would be problematic for the design, but the key
idea behind the design is that the timing of the event is difficult to predict, regardless of
the presence of any risk factors. In presenting the results, we therefore visually assess the
outcomes, which also guides the discussion of the validity of the design.
3.2 Results: Fatal Health Shock
We now turn to the main regression results and the effect on individuals’ whose spouses
experienced a fatal health shock. In Table 3, we report the main regression results, and we
plot the outcomes in Figure 2. We find that the death of a spouse significantly reduces the
earnings for widows, but not for widowers. There is no change in earnings up to the year in
which the shock happened. One year after the death of a spouse, widows’ labour earnings
are reduced by approximately 8.0% on average. The impact on labour earnings is stable
through the fifth year after the death of a spouse. However, we find no effect for widowers,
and this is stable for the years under consideration as well. These results suggest a large and
negative effect for women whose spouses died because of a fatal health shock. For example,
by the fifth year after the death of a spouse, widows earn, on average, 8.5% less relative to
18 The empirical strategy relies on identifying assumptions similar to those used to identify the effect of
job displacement (Hilger (2016); Huttunen and Kellokumpu (2016)), arrests in employment and earnings
(Grogger (1995)) and inheritances in labour market decisions (Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993)).
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the year before the shock occurred. For widowers, however, there does not seem to be any
obvious change in earnings.
Next, we consider labour market participation as defined by earnings equal to or above
one basis amount. The estimates presented in Figure 2(c) are consistent with the pattern
documented above. One year after the death of a spouse, widows’ labour market participation
drops by 1.8%. While we find no impact on average earnings for widowers, employment drops
by around 3.3% by the second year after the death of a spouse. For both genders, our results
indicate that the death of a spouse leads to a persistent drop in labour supply on the extensive
margin. Taken together, we find no evidence of the added-worker effect, which is different to
the evidence in Fadlon and Nielsen (2015). There are some indications in the literature that
the death of a spouse leads to bereavement that in turn affects both physical and mental
health, all of which is coupled with labour market supply (see e.g. Stroebe et al. (2007)).
As briefly discussed in the Section 2, widows and widowers may be entitled to a minimum
amount of an inheritance through a will, as well as possible survivor pensions and cash
transfers through private life insurance. Although not explicitly stated in our data, some
of these transfers are picked up by the measure covering all liquid assets as reported by all
third-party financial institutions in Norway.19 Figures 2(e) and 2(f) along with columns 5
and 6 in Table 3 report the estimated effects on liquid assets (in NOK 1000).
In the first two years after the death of a spouse, there is a significant increase in liquid
assets for both widows and widowers, and this effect persists for several years. Remember
that the average earnings measured before the death of a spouse was NOK 208.668 and NOK
142.349 for men and women, respectively. The estimated effects, therefore, are quite sub-
stantial in relative terms. For widows, the estimated change in liquid assets is approximately
NOK 332.000 by the second year after the death of a spouse, which is more than twice the
amount of the average earnings as measured the year before the death of a spouse. For wid-
owers, the effect is not as pronounced, but still statistically significant and approximately
NOK 112.00 by the third year after the death of their spouse.
Some aspects of the observed effect are attributed to observable liquid assets in the years
before the death of a spouse, yet most of the changes are difficult to pick up in our data.
Therefore, it is unfortunately not clear if the observed effect on changes in liquid assets is
a result of changes in homeowner consumption (i.e. selling a house and moving into an
apartment), transfers because of survivor pensions or an inheritance.
Some supportive evidence of these findings exists: Sevak et al. (2003), Venti and Wise
(2004)) and Poterba et al. (2011) find that widows tap into their savings and home equity
when a spouse dies. If it is so that the increase in liquid assets is a result of an inheritance
19Recall that liquid assets include bank deposits, stocks, mutual funds and other securities.
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from their late spouse, evidence exists that an inheritance can lead to a decrease in labour
market participation (e.g. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993)). However, Druedahl and Martinello
(2016) find no effect of an inheritance on employment following a parent’s death. Even if
we had data on housing consumption, the literature on how to measure changes in housing
consumption and furthermore track these changes to a possible increase in liquid assets
is not very clear.20 Nevertheless, the changes in liquid assets give a clear indication that
individuals’ tap into these holdings to counter some of the economic loss following the death
of a spouse.
Finally, Figures 2(g) and 2(h) and columns 7 and 8 in Table 3 presents the estimated
effect on social insurance, following a spouse’s death. For widowers, we find no relationship
between the death of a spouse and the uptake of social insurance. The pattern of the
coefficients shows that there might even be a small decrease in the uptake of social insurance,
but this is merely suggestive. For widows, however, the results indicate an increase in the
uptake of social insurance in the years after the death of a spouse. Column 8 shows that we
find no effect in the years before the death of a spouse. By the first year after the death of a
spouse, the uptake of social insurance increases by approximately NOK 8000. Although the
magnitude of the impact on uptake of social insurance is somewhat marginal, it still supports
our previous findings in that labour market participation is worse for widows following the
death of a spouse than for widowers.
3.2.1 Heterogeneity by socioeconomic status and liquid assets
We explore whether and to what extent the results presented above mask any important
heterogeneity. Specifically, we focus on differences in socioeconomic status as proxied by ed-
ucation to investigate whether education coupled with age21 have any effect on the outcomes
of interest. We report the results in Appendix A on outcomes of interest based on running
a regression on Equation 1.
Tables A5 through A8 present the results from the estimation on earnings and employ-
ment. The results suggests that the effect of the fatal health shock is larger at ages 30-44
than for people aged 45–60 and 61–70. In particular, there is no evidence of an impact on
earnings nor employment for females with higher education who lost their spouses at age
45–70. There is a decline in employment and earnings for female whose spouse passed away
(Tables A1 and A3), which also explains some of the main estimates discussed above.
20For instance, Sinai and Souleles (2005) model changes in housing consumption as a housing service flow
gained from living in the house which equals the rent saved. Based on our measures of liquid assets, this is
unfortunately not possible to disentangle.
21We follow Fadlon and Nielsen (2015) and split the sample by age when the individuals’ spouses experi-
enced the shock.
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The estimates displayed in Tables A5 through A8 also show that there are large flows of
liquid assets in the years after the death of a spouse. This holds regardless of gender, age
and education, except for more highly educated individuals aged between 61 and 70 when
their spouses passed away. The same results emerge when considering social insurance for
widows, whereas we merely find suggestive evidence of an increase in social insurance for
younger widowers with low education. However, the standard errors are too high to draw
any firm conclusion for this group.22
Either way, Appendix A shows that the death of a spouse leads to a drop in earnings and
employment. Even if not directly testable, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the
increase in any form of social insurance and liquid assets explains some of the observed effect
on labour market participation. We find some increase in social security dependency, but the
magnitude of these estimates is quite different compared to the effect of liquid assets. It is
still reasonable to expect that many survivors are subject to a difficult time in the subsequent
years after the death of a spouse, something documented by Stroebe et al. (2007). We also
find that there is important heterogeneity in the effect of a spouse’s death on labour market
outcomes. The effect of a spouse’s death on labour outcomes seems to be more salient for
widows than for widowers, and we find that differences in age and socioeconomic status are
important.
3.3 Results: Non-fatal Health Shock
Next, we investigate whether the relevant outcomes are affected when an individual’s spouse
experienced a non-fatal health shock. As argued in Section 2, there may be different mecha-
nisms in place when considering non-fatal health shocks compared with fatal health shocks.
Institutional features in Norway may rule out big drops in earnings the first year after the
health shock, as the replacement rate for sick leave is 100%. Even so, the healthy spouse
might reduce his or her labour supply because of family caregiving.23 This might be true
even in the absence of complementarities in leisure between the spouses.
Figure 3 presents the results of the estimates for periods k ∈ {−5, 5}, with the corre-
sponding results presented in Table 4. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show that the effect on earnings
and labour market participation is negligible when a spouse experienced a non-fatal health
shock. This is true for men and women. There are no statistically significant differences in
22Admittedly, some of the outcomes displays significant effects before the shock occurred. However, the
magnitude of these are relatively small and, as is the case in Column 8 in Table 3 and Column 5 in Table
A1, we do observe significant effects before the shock but no significant effect after the shock. Because of
that we do not regard these effects as a threat to the validity of the design.
23Some evidence exists in the psychology literature that informal caregiving is correlated with depressive
symptoms. Pinquart and Sörensen (2007) provide a meta-analysis on this subject.
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any of the periods under consideration, except for the fifth year after a male experienced a
health shock.24
Even though some movement occurs in Figure 3(a) and 3(b), the coefficients are too
imprecise to make any firm conclusion. These results stand in contrast to evidence provided
by García-Gómez et al. (2013) and Jeon and Pohl (2017), whose general finding is that
individuals’ reduce their labour market supply when a spouse experienced a non-fatal health
shock or receives a cancer diagnosis. Jeon and Pohl (2017) find that even if households
are sufficiently self-insured, caregiving within households might affect the labour supply.
However, we find no evidence of individuals reducing their labour supply.
As discussed in the previous section, two important mechanisms through which a health
shock may affect individuals’ labour supply are changes in liquid assets and social security.
In Figures 3(e) and 3(f) and columns 5 through 8 in Table 4, we examine how these out-
comes might be affected by a spouse who experienced a non-fatal health shock. We find no
statistically significant effect on changes in liquid assets or in the uptake of social insurance.
These latter results are not surprising given that there seems to be no change in earnings or
employment. One possible explanation may be that individuals’ who suffered from the acute
health condition do not adjust their labour supply in the years after the event. Therefore, we
examine how individuals’ labour supply is affected, given that they experienced a non-fatal
health shock. The estimated coefficients are reported in Appendix B and displayed in Figure
4.
While no relationship is found in the years before the non-fatal health shock, in the years
after the shock, labour market participation declines by approximately 3% for women. For
men, the picture is similar with a decline of approximately 3% as well. For men and women,
the drop in labour market participation is persistent for the remainder of the period. This
is consistent with the findings of García-Gómez et al. (2013), but does not seem to have
a spillover effect on the unaffected spouse. Our findings are in line with those of Dobkin
et al. (2018), who find no effect on spousal labour supply as a response to a spouse’s hospital
admission.
Taken together, there seems to be no effect on any of the outcomes under consideration
regardless of age or socioeconomic status. There is no immediate response regardless of
outcome, and while we uncover some short-term effects in the subsequent years, these are
too imprecisely estimated for any meaningful interpretation. As discussed above, the findings
are not surprising given that the experience of a non-fatal health shock does not inflict the
same shock on household earnings as a fatal health shock. In addition, the social security
programs in Norway provide a generous safety net. One drawback with the way we analyse
24Splitting the analysis by the type of health shock does not alter the conclusion (results not shown).
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the data is that we look at outcomes measured as an average in a year. These outcomes
may not be well suited to pick up any transitory movements occurring in the immediate
aftermath of the non-fatal health shock. However, a slight increase in number of sick days
around the date of the shock should be expected, as the unaffected spouse are entitled to a
maximum of 10 days leave to care for their spouse.25
Overall, these results suggest that individuals’ earnings and labour market participation
do not change when a spouse suffers an acute but non-fatal health shock. The same is true
when considering differences in education and age when the spouse experienced a non-fatal
health shock. Moreover, apart from less educated women women aged 40 through 61 at the
time of the spousal health shock, we find no evidence that these shocks affect individuals’
uptake of social insurance.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
With age comes the inevitable increase in the risk of acute and sometimes fatal health
conditions. These conditions inherently pose some fiscal challenges to within-household
finances. Therefore, in this paper we have investigated how individuals’ are affected when
their spouses experience a fatal or non-fatal health shock. Individuals are followed up to five
years before their respective spouses experienced a shock and up to five years after the shock.
Unlike previous studies, we condition our study on individuals whose spouses experienced
any of the shocks in question and compare the outcome with the outcome for individuals
whose spouses experienced the same shock but at different points in time. This allows for
a more homogeneous comparison of the outcomes, compared to methods applied by García-
Gómez et al. (2013)) and Jeon and Pohl (2017), who combine a matching technique with
the DiD method.
The results show that individuals’ whose spouses experienced a fatal health shock experi-
enced a drop in both earnings and employment. Widowers’ earnings decrease by around 8%,
and this effect is persistent. For widows, however, the effect on earnings is not statistically
distinguishable from zero. On average, widows and widowers reduce their labour market
participation by 2% and 3%, respectively, and the effect is persistent. To get a fuller picture
of the financial impact for the unaffected spouse, we included measures of liquid assets and
the uptake of social insurance. In the year after the death of a spouse, there is a substan-
tial increase in liquid assets, after which they decrease. This may indicate that individuals’
whose spouses died because of a fatal health shock taps into their savings. We also find
some indications of an increase in the uptake of social insurance, yet the effect for widowers
25We do not have information on this type of leave in our data.
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is modest.
When analysing the effect by education and age, we find no clear pattern. For example,
we find no statistically or economically significant effect of a spouse’s death on the remaining
spouse’s own earnings when considering widowers aged between 45 and 60 when their spouse
passed away. However, the same group experienced a statistically significant and persistent
drop in labour market participation following the death of a spouse. This suggests that dif-
ferences in socioeconomic status and age when the shock occurred are difficult to disentangle.
We find no effect on any of the outcomes when considering the effect of a non-fatal spousal
health shock. The individuals who experienced the shock seem to be affected negatively on
the extensive margin, but this does not seem to affect the labour market outcomes for the
unaffected spouse. We find the same results when we split the sample by education and age.
As underlined by Jeon and Pohl (2017), differences in the types of health shock considered
can explain some of the different findings observed. The measure of a non-fatal health shock,
captures events that subsequently results in a hospital admission, and it may be that our
findings are not directly comparable to those in Jeon and Pohl (2017). However, García-
Gómez et al. (2013) consider acute hospitalisations and find a large and negative effect on
the labour supply for the healthy spouse. It is possible to attribute some of the differences
to the generosity of the sickness benefits in Norway with a replacement rate of 100% for up
to 365 days and to the fact that the authors do not consider other monetary transfers.
Our study underlines the theoretical ambiguity associated with the effect on labour mar-
ket participation for individuals’ whose spouses suffered an acute health shock. The added-
worker hypothesis predicts that individuals’ self-insure the drop in household earnings by
increasing their own labour market participation. While Fadlon and Nielsen (2015) find
evidence of the added-worker effect for widows, and only for individuals’ with lower earnings
then those of the spouse who died, our study results clearly do not support this hypothesis,
and we fail to find any evidence for the caregiver hypothesis either.
Although a fatal health shock affects individuals’ labour supply in a negative way, some
of the underlying mechanisms are still not clear. We find large flows of liquid assets following
the death of a spouse, but these assets may stem from several sources, such as a change in
home ownership, which is not measurable in our data. What the estimated changes in liquid
assets show, however, is that devastating health shocks affect channels other than earnings
and labour supply and that this is generally not well understood in the literature.
Overall, this study provides evidence for within-spouses labour market effects when one of
the spouses experiences a severe and unexpected health shock. The magnitude is especially
substantial for widows, whereas we fail to find any changes in labour supply for individuals’
whose spouses experienced a non-fatal health shock. In addition, our study results suggest
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that the mechanism through which a spouse who experiences a health shock affects labour
supply may be much more complex than just through an earnings channel.
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Figure 1: Identification strategy, as in Fadlon and Nielsen (2015)
Notes: This Figure shows annual earnings (in NOK 1000). Individuals whose spouses died in
2003 are given a placebo shock in 1998, so that this group acts as a natural comparison group
to the group of individuals whose spouses died in 1998.
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(a) Widows’ (log) earnings (b) Widowers’ (log) earnings
(c) Widows’ labour market participation (d) Widowers’ labour market participation
(e) Widows’ liquid assets (f) Widowers’ liquid assets
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(g) Widows’ social insurance benefits (h) Widowers’ social insurance benefits
Figure 2: Main outcomes for individuals’ whose spouses experienced a fatal health shock
Notes: All estimations are shown with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The specifica-
tion includes individual and year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered
at the individual level. The complete set of estimates is reported in Table 2.
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(a) Female (log) earnings (b) Male (log) earnings
(c) Female labour market participation (d) Male labour market participation
(e) Female liquid assets (f) Male liquid assets
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(g) Female social insurance benefits (h) Male social insurance benefits
Figure 3: Main outcomes for individuals whose spouses experienced a non-fatal health shock
Notes: All estimations are shown with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The specifica-
tion includes individual and year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered
at the individual level. The complete set of estimates is reported in Table 3.
(a) Female labour market participation (b) Male labour market participation
Figure 4: Effect of an acute and severe health shock on own labour market participation
Notes: All estimations are shown with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The specifica-
tion includes individual and year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered
at the individual level. The complete set of estimates is reported in Appendix B.
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Table 1: Sample means, fatal and non-fatal health shocks
A. Fatal Spousal Health Shocks
Whole Sample Male Female
Characteristics Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Age (at time of shock) 57.77 [8.48] 60.19 [8.27] 57.16 [8.43]
Less than high school degree 0.40 [0.49] 0.36 [0.48] 0.41 [0.49]
High school degree 0.44 [0.50] 0.46 [0.50] 0.44 [0.50]
Any college 0.16 [0.36] 0.17 [0.38] 0.15 [0.36]
Employed 0.57 [0.50] 0.56 [0.50] 0.57 [0.50]
Average earnings in (NOK 1000) 155.716 [182.582] 208.668 [259.244] 142.349 [154.604]
Liquid assets in (NOK 1000) 174.517 [666.782] 319.443 [1.282.235] 137.507 [367.701]
Any social insurance 0.31 [0.46] 0.29 [0.45] 0.32 [0.48]
Spouse passed away due to
Ischemic heart diseases 0.63 [0.48] 0.49 [0.50] 0.67 [0.47]
Other heart diseases 0.11 [0.31] 0.12 [0.32] 0.11 [0.31]
Cerebrovascular diseases (Stroke) 0.19 [0.39] 0.31 [0.46] 0.15 [0.36]
Transportation Accidents 0.07 [0.25] 0.08 [0.27] 0.07 [0.25]
N 25,783 5198 20,585
B. Non-fatal Spousal Health Shock
Whole Sample Male Female
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Age (at time of shock) 57.25 [8.49] 60.32 [7.90] 56.42 [8.51]
Less than high school degree 0.28 [0.45] 0.27 [0.45] 0.29 [0.45]
High school degree 0.46 [0.50] 0.47 [0.50] 0.45 [0.50]
Any college 0.26 [0.44] 0.25 [0.43] 0.26 [0.44]
Employed 0.60 [0.49] 0.56 [0.50] 0.62 [0.49]
Average earnings in (NOK 1000) 226.748 [251.132] 276.134 [333.001] 207.545 [207.745]
Liquid assets in (NOK 1000) 328.843 [2.909.989] 527.995 [3.513.335] 251.401 [2.634.390]
Any social insurance 0.24 [0.43] 0.20 [0.40] 0.25 [0.43]
Spouse hospitalized due to
Stroke 0.26 [0.46] 0.33 [0.48] 0.23 [0.45]
Myocardial infarction 0.69 [0.46] 0.62 [0.49] 0.72 [0.45]
Congestive heart failure 0.05 [0.22] 0.05 [0.22] 0.05 [0.22]
Average length of inpatient stay 4.06 [4.71] 4.23 [5.10] 4.00 [4.56]
N 41,892 10,621 31,271
Standard deviations in [square brackets]
Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics for individuals whose spouses suffered from a fatal (Panel A) or non-fatal
(Panel B) health shock. Employment, earnings and liquid assets are measured the year before the shock and include zeroes.
Employment is defined as earnings equal to or above one basis amount, which is the minimum earnings required for pension
accrual. Cause of death is based on the European shortlist for causes of death, while hospitalisations are based on ICD-10
diagnostic codes and coding for whether the admission was unscheduled or planned. Nominal values are deflated to 2006 prices.
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Table 2: Sample selection
Panel A: Fatal Health Shock Men Women
Number of deaths in 1992–2014 461,040 478,469
as a result of ischemic, cerebrovascular or other heart diseases, or
transport accidents
154,578 164,385
who were married and aged between 30 and 70 when they died 7,709 29,501
with an unaffected spouse aged between 30 and 70 at
time of death
5,198 20,585
Panel B: Non-fatal Health Shock Men Women
Number of people who experienced acute hospitalisations in 2009–2014 720,995 900,416
for at least one overnight stay 613,587 792,784
not admitted the last 365 days 600,428 774,012
as a result of stroke, ischemic or cardiovascular heart disease 66,112 41,558
who were married and aged between 30 and 70 at the time of the
hospitalisation
14,752 35,674
with an unaffected spouse aged between 30 and 70 at
the time of the acute hospitalisation
10,621 31,271
Notes: This table reports the sample selection in this analysis, split by fatal and non-fatal health
shocks.
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Table 3: Effect of a spousal death on labour supply, liquid assets and social insurance
Log Labour
Earnings Employment Liquid Assets Any Social Insurance
(NOK 1000)
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
shock Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
-5 -0.005 -0.058 -0.004 -0.011 18.176*** 28.949 327.5 -5,199***
(0.022) (0.067) (0.004) (0.008) (6.959) (43.136) (446.4) (1,220.8)
-4 -0.005 -0.040 -0.004 -0.006 15.190*** 42.943 231.5 -4,161***
(0.018) (0.052) (0.003) (0.007) (5.550) (38.098) (372.2) (1,054.0)
-3 -0.003 -0.059 0.000 -0.006 10.874*** 31.825 60.5 -1,288.2
(0.013) (0.037) (0.003) (0.006) (4.043) (28.927) (297.5) (863.5)
-2 -0.005 -0.030 -0.002 -0.003 4.088 13.666 -120.9 -140.523
(0.009) (0.023) (0.002) (0.004) (2.626) (13.532) (196.6) (574.3)
0 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003* -0.014*** 304.983*** 158.246*** 3,053.9*** -1,080.9*
(0.009) (0.023) (0.002) (0.004) (10.057) (15.064) (208.2) (566.1)
1 -0.080*** -0.018 -0.018*** -0.024*** 332.303*** 151.886*** 7,746.0*** -1,077.8
(0.014) (0.037) (0.003) (0.005) (11.067) (20.416) (325.1) (778.7)
2 -0.106*** -0.067 -0.025*** -0.033*** 309.359*** 134.724*** 7,539.3*** -1,428.3
(0.018) (0.052) (0.003) (0.006) (28.365) (25.173) (397.9) (961.3)
3 -0.088*** -0.042 -0.024*** -0.037*** 282.989*** 112.841*** 6,992.8*** -1,284.5
(0.022) (0.067) (0.003) (0.007) (36.320) (31.208) (466.9) (1,100.9)
4 -0.084*** 0.004 -0.024*** -0.036*** 245.098*** 97.205*** 6,462.7*** -1,614.0
(0.027) (0.082) (0.004) (0.008) (22.346) (31.328) (528.6) (1,213.0)
5 -0.085*** 0.023 -0.025*** -0.033*** 227.444*** 89.740** 5,822.1*** -1,318.6
(0.031) (0.098) (0.004) (0.009) (22.890) (36.503) (586.0) (1,311.9)
Observations 272,260 68,891 486,112 121,110 486,112 121,110 486,112 121,110
R-squared 0.185 0.257 0.263 0.366 0.010 0.043 0.253 0.218
Number of
ID 18,963 4,900 22,096 5,505 22,096 5,505 22,096 5,505
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and year-by-cohort fixed
effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table 4: Effect of spouse’s non-fatal health shock on labour supply, liquid assets and social
insurance
Log Labour
Earnings Employment Liquid Assets Any Social Insurance
(NOK 1000)
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
shock Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
-5 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -5.23 -22.08 176.09 320.47
(0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (5.01) (14.57) (204.42) (484.90)
-4 0.004 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 -8.29 -10.82 111.49 585.41
(0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (6.80) (14.61) (260.69) (537.07)
-3 0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -10.90 -11.14 248.08 385.85
(0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (8.27) (15.84) (263.53) (529.01)
-2 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -12.47 12.08 229.80 330.13
(0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (8.49) (9.42) (208.93) (412.85)
0 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 0.004 -8.38 7.63 30.85 -581.23
(0.007) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (15.84) (14.45) (295.59) (555.08)
1 -0.018* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 1.07 19.53 215.64 -340.47
(0.010) (0.019) (0.003) (0.005) (16.56) (19.71) (523.96) (978.40)
2 -0.013 -0.023 -0.005 -0.004 5.81 15.57 687.11 -348.14
(0.013) (0.025) (0.004) (0.007) (20.13) (25.27) (720.29) (1,334.25)
3 -0.003 0.014 -0.003 -0.004 -2.09 33.01 614.31 -1,001.46
(0.016) (0.030) (0.005) (0.008) (23.21) (30.28) (924.18) (1,722.01)
4 -0.009 0.025 0.001 0.002 -14.29 25.72 51.27 -148.31
(0.020) (0.039) (0.006) (0.011) (26.34) (47.02) (1,167.16) (2,196.39)
5 -0.024 0.005 -0.002 -0.008 -12.60 8.24 1,624.02 1,235.71
(0.027) (0.054) (0.008) (0.014) (27.52) (40.98) (1,513.63) (2,915.72)
Observations 236,508 88,672 323,256 125,700 323,256 125,700 323,256 125,700
R-squared 0.110 0.157 0.148 0.198 0.005 0.005 0.152 0.139
Number of ID 23,761 9,175 26,938 10,475 26,938 10,475 26,938 10,475
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.. The specification includes individual and year-by-cohort fixed
effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Appendix A. Effect of a spousal death by outcome, age and education
Table A1: Effect on earnings for females whose spouses passed away
Females whose spouses passed away
30–44 45–60 61–70
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu.
-5 -0.029 -0.008 -0.033 -0.098 -0.323*** -5.869
(0.071) (0.079) (0.064) (0.106) (0.116) (4.921)
-4 -0.005 0.007 -0.029 -0.075 -0.251*** -4.423
(0.057) (0.063) (0.049) (0.080) (0.089) (3.691)
-3 0.014 0.015 -0.017 -0.044 -0.200*** -2.916
(0.047) (0.058) (0.034) (0.055) (0.063) (2.461)
-2 0.009 0.029 -0.012 -0.033 -0.098** -1.497
(0.035) (0.043) (0.020) (0.030) (0.038) (1.231)
0 -0.036 -0.036 0.018 0.052* 0.004 1.435
(0.034) (0.038) (0.020) (0.030) (0.040) (1.229)
1 -0.158*** -0.171*** -0.048 0.040 -0.053 2.866
(0.045) (0.052) (0.034) (0.055) (0.067) (2.459)
2 -0.240*** -0.242*** -0.073 0.038 0.032 4.241
(0.054) (0.062) (0.049) (0.080) (0.092) (3.689)
3 -0.221*** -0.270*** -0.043 0.075 0.115 5.677
(0.062) (0.070) (0.064) (0.106) (0.113) (4.919)
4 -0.238*** -0.259*** -0.040 0.112 0.164 7.029
(0.069) (0.072) (0.079) (0.131) (0.135) (6.150)
5 -0.198*** -0.257*** -0.050 0.123 0.282* 8.706
(0.076) (0.078) (0.094) (0.157) (0.157) (7.380)
Observations 20,175 9,040 85,801 33,718 34,306 10,619
R-squared 0.133 0.214 0.155 0.254 0.284 0.424
Number of ID 1,377 564 6,001 1,921 3,329 794
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and
year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table A2: Effect on earnings for males whose spouses passed away
Males whose spouses passed away
30–44 45–60 61–70
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu.
-5 -0.214 -0.041 -0.135 -0.190 -0.199 -0.087
(0.179) (0.284) (0.226) (0.213) (0.251) (0.368)
-4 -0.109 0.131 -0.126 -0.143 -0.198 -0.142
(0.155) (0.212) (0.171) (0.160) (0.195) (0.290)
-3 -0.038 0.047 -0.099 -0.086 -0.231* -0.239
(0.103) (0.141) (0.116) (0.109) (0.138) (0.202)
-2 -0.099 0.009 -0.037 -0.046 -0.088 -0.115
(0.084) (0.093) (0.061) (0.060) (0.083) (0.127)
0 -0.266*** -0.055 0.041 0.050 -0.004 -0.017***
(0.087) (0.110) (0.062) (0.060) (0.023) (0.000)
1 -0.549*** -0.290** 0.078 0.089 0.030 -0.112
(0.126) (0.140) (0.116) (0.108) (0.098) (0.129)
2 -0.575*** -0.391** 0.069 0.069 0.040 -0.039
(0.126) (0.166) (0.167) (0.154) (0.154) (0.217)
3 -0.394*** -0.143 0.099 0.158 -0.007 -0.104
(0.148) (0.182) (0.226) (0.211) (0.209) (0.302)
4 -0.325* -0.077 0.190 0.220 -0.087 -0.294
(0.170) (0.229) (0.280) (0.261) (0.268) (0.392)
5 -0.228 0.042 0.235 0.224 -0.144 -0.493
(0.188) (0.292) (0.337) (0.317) (0.334) (0.487)
Observations 3,066 1,244 17,755 8,000 14,193 5,353
R-squared 0.327 0.624 0.212 0.313 0.334 0.423
Number of ID 192 72 1,145 440 1,309 393
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and
year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table A3: Effect on employment for females whose spouses passed away
Females whose spouses passed away
30–44 45–60 61–70
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu.
-5 -0.051** -0.039 -0.016** -0.035*** -0.005 0.012
(0.023) (0.034) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.032)
-4 -0.039** -0.027 -0.013* -0.023** -0.004 0.010
(0.019) (0.027) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.026)
-3 -0.024 -0.051** -0.007 -0.013* -0.002 -0.003
(0.015) (0.022) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020)
-2 -0.019* -0.037** -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.011) (0.016) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012)
0 -0.021** -0.024* -0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.021*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
1 -0.048*** -0.042** -0.014*** -0.000 -0.019*** -0.033*
(0.013) (0.019) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019)
2 -0.081*** -0.087*** -0.022*** 0.003 -0.020*** -0.049**
(0.017) (0.023) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.023)
3 -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.024*** 0.005 -0.015* -0.042
(0.019) (0.026) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.027)
4 -0.078*** -0.067** -0.025*** 0.013 -0.015* -0.052*
(0.022) (0.030) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.029)
5 -0.074*** -0.068** -0.027*** 0.010 -0.011 -0.044
(0.024) (0.032) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.031)
Observations 28,597 10,384 143,581 41,427 103,155 18,455
R-squared 0.099 0.114 0.229 0.345 0.320 0.515
Number of ID 1,471 573 6,814 1,967 4,732 845
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and
year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table A4: Effect on employment for males whose spouses passed away
Males whose spouses passed away
30–44 45–60 61–70
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu.
-5 -0.062 -0.177* -0.045** -0.040 -0.019 -0.036
(0.062) (0.093) (0.019) (0.029) (0.023) (0.045)
-4 0.002 -0.034 -0.040** -0.029 -0.021 -0.034
(0.049) (0.063) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) (0.037)
-3 0.008 -0.039 -0.025** 0.011 -0.015 -0.040
(0.040) (0.040) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.029)
-2 -0.005 -0.018 -0.010 0.008 -0.011 -0.008
(0.026) (0.027) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.019)
0 -0.080*** -0.042 -0.010 -0.022* -0.015* -0.058***
(0.029) (0.037) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.020)
1 -0.165*** -0.072 -0.009 -0.016 -0.023** -0.079***
(0.039) (0.053) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.027)
2 -0.204*** -0.094 -0.006 -0.027 -0.022 -0.074**
(0.046) (0.068) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014) (0.033)
3 -0.171*** -0.025 -0.015 -0.049 -0.019 -0.061
(0.056) (0.074) (0.018) (0.030) (0.015) (0.038)
4 -0.190*** -0.039 -0.002 -0.031 -0.023 -0.079*
(0.062) (0.095) (0.021) (0.035) (0.016) (0.041)
5 -0.166** 0.035 0.002 -0.035 -0.024 -0.085**
(0.073) (0.109) (0.024) (0.041) (0.016) (0.043)
Observations 3,970 1,440 25,661 9,578 35,920 9,276
R-squared 0.232 0.542 0.319 0.376 0.392 0.484
Number of ID 203 74 1,209 444 1,645 423
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and
year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table A5: Effect on liquid assets for females whose spouses passed away
Females whose spouses passed away
30–44 45–60 61–70
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu.
-5 28.954 113.619* 76.696 -66.227 73.609* 246.017
(23.662) (62.560) (89.373) (92.445) (43.394) (199.396)
-4 25.864 73.158 54.085 -59.193 53.988 185.652
(18.917) (47.940) (64.274) (69.412) (33.186) (161.714)
-3 16.617 40.885 31.037 -38.154 41.629* 149.575
(13.020) (33.723) (40.440) (46.623) (25.075) (122.470)
-2 0.133 11.897 21.163 13.210 4.509 36.903
(6.350) (15.808) (19.886) (26.137) (7.127) (35.662)
0 353.908*** 620.029*** 284.219*** 472.119*** 253.770*** 466.698***
(21.270) (49.193) (13.748) (37.632) (26.236) (104.653)
1 393.086*** 712.016*** 331.258*** 591.597*** 244.194*** 397.149***
(24.798) (59.917) (21.464) (65.044) (19.145) (96.307)
2 335.821*** 613.734*** 360.276*** 546.211*** 198.218*** 245.269**
(25.083) (62.074) (72.090) (75.623) (23.585) (121.736)
3 309.594*** 574.529*** 358.963*** 514.730*** 165.939*** 147.047
(29.026) (72.864) (97.482) (96.151) (26.938) (161.883)
4 274.711*** 533.942*** 286.331*** 497.845*** 142.492*** 91.844
(33.379) (86.232) (51.347) (113.515) (28.934) (184.251)
5 253.046*** 481.215*** 274.249*** 502.177*** 118.221*** 0.707
(34.282) (84.582) (56.327) (138.827) (32.473) (220.770)
Observations 28,597 10,384 143,581 41,427 103,155 18,455
R-squared 0.121 0.220 0.011 0.058 0.032 0.058
Number of
ID
1,471 573 6,814 1,967 4,732 845
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and
year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table A6: Effect on liquid assets for males whose spouses passed away
Males whose spouses passed away
30–44 45–60 61–70
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu.
-5 -155.065 -1,667.520 -32.283 -162.182** -10.120 3.859
(331.930) (1,932.830) (34.427) (76.079) (34.473) (137.750)
-4 -86.068 -992.363 -29.516 -127.606** -4.509 3.257
(222.905) (1,237.493) (26.940) (57.808) (25.355) (105.745)
-3 -72.385 -619.572 -38.184* -126.771*** 7.296 -31.676
(157.036) (782.012) (20.424) (42.805) (22.139) (71.341)
-2 -63.118 -292.906 -20.115 -58.608** -2.561 0.099
(91.171) (392.328) (14.224) (28.403) (13.328) (39.516)
0 360.755* 1,061.600 189.279*** 304.755*** 117.572*** 247.202***
(185.575) (770.643) (18.538) (41.405) (16.094) (64.257)
1 474.148** 1,590.499 226.727*** 414.726*** 123.219*** 263.033***
(231.358) (1,031.802) (24.504) (55.238) (23.525) (97.455)
2 420.821 1,671.977 233.189*** 486.442*** 92.023*** 222.620*
(255.722) (1,215.704) (34.298) (81.630) (28.932) (125.500)
3 424.958 1,897.403 213.456*** 453.014*** 81.794** 246.688
(307.789) (1,539.983) (34.138) (74.797) (34.774) (153.386)
4 324.504 1,687.120 203.349*** 477.394*** 87.507** 283.425
(313.116) (1,575.649) (36.942) (85.456) (42.546) (191.707)
5 253.912 1,547.037 221.960*** 560.886*** 100.234* 330.951
(334.267) (1,700.369) (45.898) (117.759) (53.068) (240.956)
Observations 3,970 1,440 25,661 9,578 35,920 9,276
R-squared 0.104 0.276 0.073 0.142 0.052 0.110
Number of
ID
203 74 1,209 444 1,645 423
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and
year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table A7: Effect on social insurance for females whose spouses passed away
Females whose spouses passed away
30–44 45–60 61–70
Years
since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu.
-5 5,834.85 6,062.72*** 4,893.45*** 6,062.72*** 2,380.15 6,062.72***
(3,827.37) (1,852.15) (1,383.50) (1,852.15) (2,516.45) (1,852.15)
-4 4,767.71 4,430.00*** 3,743.93*** 4,430.00*** 2,219.92 4,430.00***
(3,024.11) (1,446.93) (1,060.40) (1,446.93) (1,905.60) (1,446.93)
-3 2,968.47 3,172.32*** 2,339.36*** 3,172.32*** 786.17 3,172.32***
(2,137.48) (1,056.38) (745.22) (1,056.38) (1,324.74) (1,056.38)
-2 1,258.98 825.46 1,244.86*** 825.46 -281.00 825.46
(1,203.40) (627.13) (434.76) (627.13) (721.00) (627.13)
0 30,549.67*** 17,033.97*** 18,654.03*** 17,033.97*** 19,899.79*** 17,033.97***
(1,572.90) (891.70) (592.92) (891.70) (809.71) (891.70)
1 78,791.16*** 43,792.65*** 41,295.78*** 43,792.65*** 42,910.80*** 43,792.65***
(2,963.18) (1,601.79) (990.23) (1,601.79) (1,360.95) (1,601.79)
2 73,619.75*** 39,150.77*** 39,103.27*** 39,150.77*** 39,729.78*** 39,150.77***
(3,558.55) (1,861.59) (1,228.33) (1,861.59) (1,802.76) (1,861.59)
3 67,877.33*** 36,165.99*** 37,458.90*** 36,165.99*** 36,552.14*** 36,165.99***
(4,129.35) (2,154.75) (1,476.05) (2,154.75) (2,178.45) (2,154.75)
4 62,531.52*** 33,751.28*** 35,790.21*** 33,751.28*** 34,313.33*** 33,751.28***
(4,742.83) (2,513.09) (1,741.10) (2,513.09) (2,506.02) (2,513.09)
5 58,935.88*** 31,214.80*** 34,035.22*** 31,214.80*** 30,090.81*** 31,214.80***
(5,380.12) (2,885.58) (2,016.58) (2,885.58) (2,798.02) (2,885.58)
Observations 28,597 70,266 143,581 70,266 103,155 70,266
R-squared 0.314 0.496 0.414 0.496 0.486 0.496
Number of
ID
1,471 3,385 6,814 3,385 4,732 3,385
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and
year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table A8: Effect on social insurance for males whose spouses passed away
Males whose spouses passed away
30–44 45–60 61–70
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu.
-5 -13,847.23 22,242.37* -1,589.30 -3,648.10 -1,794.29 -5,219.73
(10,104.86) (11,908.46) (2,752.46) (3,243.94) (3,588.51) (6,398.41)
-4 -15,777.09** 15,952.49* -1,951.04 -2,780.57 428.38 -3,843.72
(7,732.89) (9,007.61) (2,319.46) (2,818.90) (2,904.85) (5,183.32)
-3 -12,841.39** 10,380.79 -4.83 -2,693.95 2,541.39 -2,665.70
(5,828.58) (6,268.02) (1,890.56) (2,480.32) (2,138.74) (3,970.13)
-2 -6,323.18* 6,968.21* 356.50 -832.22 480.66 -2,193.57
(3,465.97) (3,767.33) (1,152.56) (1,647.27) (1,238.14) (2,422.42)
0 4,493.05 -4,933.80 234.11 -785.67 -2,416.13** -473.09
(3,109.74) (3,750.47) (1,287.45) (1,011.09) (1,133.15) (2,372.85)
1 15,943.56** -1,075.21 -598.91 -2,569.27 -4,184.39** -1,607.20
(6,235.08) (6,256.69) (1,616.26) (1,955.27) (1,706.85) (3,343.11)
2 22,874.61*** 1,139.95 -1,137.03 -517.72 -5,873.31*** -5,097.30
(8,755.83) (10,790.11) (2,088.77) (2,661.62) (2,049.14) (4,090.23)
3 25,162.64** -4,963.06 -1,344.28 -967.20 -6,242.51*** -5,341.18
(10,492.29) (12,256.32) (2,466.97) (3,015.20) (2,243.67) (4,467.65)
4 23,178.67* -17,239.11 -3,740.56 -1,938.59 -6,707.49*** -4,277.86
(12,261.03) (14,209.41) (2,858.46) (3,499.79) (2,261.65) (4,511.21)
5 25,106.56* -23,396.58 -4,778.27 -2,571.99 -5,862.67*** -4,293.47
(13,783.27) (17,295.37) (3,166.41) (3,872.10) (2,052.13) (4,126.60)
Observations 3,970 1,440 25,661 9,578 35,920 9,276
R-squared 0.281 0.375 0.193 0.162 0.326 0.202
Number of
ID
203 74 1,209 444 1,645 423
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and
year-by-cohort fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Appendix B. Effect of a health shock on own labour market partici-
pation
Table B1: Effect of a health shock on own labour market participation
Employment
























Number of ID 10,621 31,271
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the specification in equation 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The specification includes individual and year-by-cohort fixed
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